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Essays on Information, Expectations, and the Aggregate Economy
Mariana Garćıa-Schmidt
This dissertation contains three essays on Macroeconomics about the importance of
information and expectations in the aggregate economy. The first chapter studies
empirically and theoretically how the interest rate set by the central bank affect the
economy through the effects that the announcement of the decisions has on people’s
forecasts of economic conditions. Using Brazilian Survey data that reports daily
statistics, this chapter studies how forecasts of inflation and output growth respond to
unexpected policy rate decisions. The results show that inflation forecasts increase in
the short run after an unexpected increase in the policy rate and show a mild decrease
1 year after the meeting. Output forecasts, when measured by industrial production
growth also increase in the short run, but less strongly than inflation. When measured
by the growth in gross domestic product, show no response. The theoretical section
develops a New Keynesian model with a signaling role of the interest rate. The
empirical results can be explained when firms possess less information than the central
bank at the time they see the interest rate and they interpret “enough” of the surprise
in the rate as information about the current natural rate of interest.
The second chapter studies if standard theory supports the “Neo-Fisherian”
proposition, in which low nominal interest rates may themselves cause inflation to be
lower. The fact that standard models of the effects of monetary policy have the prop-
erty that perfect foresight equilibria in which the nominal interest rate remains low
forever necessarily involve low inflation (at least eventually) might seem to support
such a view. Here, however, we argue that such a conclusion depends on a misunder-
standing of the circumstances under which it makes sense to predict the effects of a
monetary policy commitment by calculating the perfect foresight equilibrium consis-
tent with the policy. We propose an explicit cognitive process by which agents may
form their expectations of future endogenous variables. Under some circumstances,
such as a commitment to follow a Taylor rule, a perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE)
can arise as a limiting case of our more general concept of reflective equilibrium, when
the process of reflection is pursued sufficiently far. But we show that an announced
intention to fix the nominal interest rate for a long enough period of time creates
a situation in which reflective equilibrium need not resemble any PFE. In our view,
this makes PFE predictions not plausible outcomes in the case of policies of the latter
sort. According to the alternative approach that we recommend, a commitment to
maintain a low nominal interest rate for longer should always be expansionary and
inflationary, rather than causing deflation; but the effects of such “forward guidance”
are likely, in the case of a long-horizon commitment, to be much less expansionary or
inflationary than the usual PFE analysis would imply.
The final chapter introduces asymmetric information in a simple stochastic general
equilibrium model with endogenous default. It shows that when foreign lenders price
sovereign assets with less information than the government, the volatility of spreads
increases substantially. This increase in volatility is mainly due to an increase in debt
and a strong increase in spreads when output of the country is relatively low and
foreign lenders believe that it is higher. In other scenarios, the behavior of spreads is
similar to the symmetric information case. For an empirically plausible level of noise,
the model implies a better fit to data in spread-related statistics without harming the
fit on other areas. It is also shown that when the noise of the signal increases, there
is a non-monotonic relation between the noise and business cycle statistics.
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Chapter 1
Monetary Policy Surprises and
Expectations
1.1 Introduction
Central Bank policy decisions affect the economy not only through the direct
effects of the bank’s market interventions on market conditions, but also through
the effects that the announcement of the decisions may have on people’s forecasts of
economic conditions. Effects of the latter sort are arguably more important in many
cases than the direct effects. The direct effects of policy actions are often limited to
changes in the current level of a very short-term interest rate (typically an overnight
rate), and it may be wondered why a change in this rate should in itself greatly affect
spending, pricing or production decisions. But one often observes immediate effects
on longer-term asset prices as well, that indicate that expectations are significantly
1
affected by the policy announcements and these are often large enough to matter for
other important decisions.
The effects on expectations of central bank policy announcements may further
be of two types. First, the announcement of a decision may change expectations
about future policy decisions as well, as when an unexpected tightening of policy is
interpreted as the beginning of a “tightening cycle”. In such cases, one would expect
the economic effects of the change in expectations to be similar to direct effects of the
policy decision, but to further amplify those effects. For example, spending should
be reduced even more by an interest-rate increase if interest rates are expected to
remain high or increase further. But there is also another possible type of effect on
expectations with quite different consequences than the announced policy action.
This second type is the effect on people’s expectations that may result from what
the announcement is taken to reveal not about the central banks intentions, but about
what it knows about the state of the economy. Such effects may have the opposite
sign of the intended effects of the policy. For example, a policy intended to stimulate
aggregate demand may reveal that the central bank expects demand to be low, and
that information may tend to reduce people’s forecast of aggregate demand and also
their willingness to spend, rather than increasing it. This channel provides a possible
explanation of seemingly paradoxical effects of central bank policy announcements.
This paper contributes to understanding of this second type of effects of policy
announcements empirically and theoretically. The empirical section, using a survey of
professional forecasters in Brazil, studies the reaction of inflation and output growth
forecasts to unexpected changes in the monetary policy rate (Selic rate), decided by
the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom).
There are two major empirical complications when studying the reaction of fore-
casts to unexpected monetary policy announcements. The first is to measure the
unexpected component of the announcement and the second is to identify what part
2
(if any) of the change in forecasts are caused by the announcement and are not reac-
tions to any other shock that hit the economy. This last issue is particularly difficult
to identify because forecasts or expectations in general, and from surveys in particu-
larly, are normally available only at monthly or quarterly frequency. For this reason,
when computing the change of one measurement to the next, many more shocks are
likely to have occurred.
The database used in this paper overcomes the empirical difficulties because it
provides daily statistics of the forecasts asked by the survey. On the one hand, this
allows to measure the Selic rate respondents expect at the same day the Copom
announces its decision1. On the other hand this allows to identify the effect of this
unexpected decisions on forecasts assuming that only during one day there were no
other shocks2.
The empirical results show that in response to an unexpected increase in the Selic
rate, inflation and output growth forecasts, measured by industrial production (IP)
growth, increase in the short run. Inflation forecasts increase for the month of the
meeting and 2 months afterward, then show no significant change until 14 months
after the meeting when they decrease3. Output growth forecasts when measured by
IP growth show also an initial increase which vanishes 7 months after the meeting.
In contrast when measured by gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecasts there
is no significant movement until allowing for 3 days to update the forecasts.
The results are puzzling given that the effects of an increase in interest rates are
generally expected to reduce aggregate demand, leading to lower output and inflation.
1It is measured before the Selic rate decision is made public. This is necessary since only the
unexpected change should affect forecasts, because the expected component of the change should
already be included.
2The empirical analysis shows results allowing also for 2 and 3 days for forecasts to react. It also
excludes dates when other relevant shocks happened to make sure the identification assumption is
not violated.
3This last results is based on the analysis of 2 and 3 days.
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For example, in the baseline perfect information New Keynesian model, there is no
role for the interest rate to give information about the shocks, because all the agents
have the same information. Even if we allow firms to learn about the monetary shock
via the interest rate, the responses of output and inflation (and hence their forecasts)
would be negative4.
The theoretical section studies qualitatively the changes in forecasts made by
rational firms in response to unexpected monetary policy rate decisions, depending
on the type of information provided by the surprise in the interest rate set by the
central bank. It develops a New-Keynesian Model with a signaling role of the interest
rate because firms have less information than the central bank. Since firms know
that the central bank has more information, they also know that the interest rate will
depend on that larger set of information and they will react updating their forecasts5.
After seeing the interest rate, firms will get perfect information if there is only one
shock that they don’t have (perfect) information from other sources and that affects
the interest rate. In contrast, if they don’t know 2 or more shocks perfectly, they
only end up with imperfect information.
The model can explain the positive reaction of inflation and output growth ex-
pectations if the interest rate provides information about a shock that affects the
natural rate of interest. As in the baseline model with perfect information a pos-
itive natural rate of interest shock increases inflation and output and the interest
rate when the central bank follows a Taylor rule. So, when the interest rate gives
“enough” information about such a shock, inflation and output growth forecasts will
4Some have proposed recently that increases in interest rate should increase inflation even when
these are not changes that convey information that the central bank knows about the economy.
This view has been called “Neo-Fisherian” and can be found on the internet, for example in Smith
(2014), Williamson (2014) and Cochrane (2015a). Garćıa-Schmidt and Woodford (2015) show that
this view is not supported by the theory.
5Forecasts are going to be formed by the expectation of the variable under study given the
information set of the firm at different points in time.
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be revised upwards when the surprise in the interest rate is positive (and downwards
when it is negative). The model first shows the solution when the interest rate gives
information about one shock at each time that firms don’t know perfectly (hence we
arrive to the perfect information solution of the model) to get intuition. Then shows
the results for the case that the interest rate gives information about 2 shocks each
time, the monetary policy shock and another.
This paper relates directly to the empirical literature that has analyzed the re-
action of forecasts to monetary policy decisions and also to the theoretical literature
that has given a signaling role to monetary policy decisions. The first one has only
showed results for the U.S. and has relied, in the majority of cases, on a much wider
period to measure the change in forecasts because of data availability. The second
one has been in general to analyze how optimal monetary policy changes when there
is a signaling role because of incomplete information.
Romer and Romer (2000) found that the Federal Reserve had superior informa-
tion than professional forecasters, that monetary-policy actions provide signals of the
Federal Reserves information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts
in response to those signals. After an increase in interest rate, they found that pro-
fessional forecasters increase their inflation forecasts from the current quarter until 6
quarters ahead. D’Agostino and Whelan (2008) by extending the analysis of Romer
and Romer (2000) found that the informational advantage of the Fed deteriorated
after 1991, but kept having superior forecast accuracy than professional forecasters
for the very short term. Faust et al. (2004) on the other hand analyzed the reaction
of expectations of inflation and output to the surprise in monetary policy for periods
already realized by the time of the monetary policy decision, but before the data is
released. They found no evidence of changes in their measures of inflation and GDP
and a positive, but non-significant coefficient for the case of IP.
Campbell et al. (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) present results for
5
changes in inflation and unemployment or output expectations to a monetary surprise,
that not only takes into account the surprise in the current policy rate, but also the
surprise in future rates. Campbell et al. (2012) estimate 2 factors, target and path,
that explains their measure of the monetary policy surprise. The factor that directly
relates to the measure used in this paper is the target, since it accounts for most of the
surprise change in the current federal funds rate. They analyze the change in inflation
and unemployment forecasts by professional forecasters from the current quarter to 3
quarters ahead in response to these two factors. They found evidence that a positive
realization of both factors are associated with increases in inflation forecasts that
decay with the forecast horizon and decreases in unemployment forecasts with no
clear pattern depending on the horizon.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) find that a positive realization of their mone-
tary surprise measure that includes both, unexpected changes in the current rate as
well as future rates, is associated with non-significant decreases in inflation forecasts
from professional forecasters from one quarter until 4 quarters ahead and then non-
significant increases from 5 until 7 quarters ahead. They also find that output growth
forecasts respond positively to a positive surprise for all the horizons under study,
which is from the current quarter until 7 quarters ahead.
The theoretical literature that relates to this paper are papers that include a sig-
naling role to the monetary policy instrument. Melosi (2015) includes such a role in a
dispersed information model to study the empirical relevance of the signaling effects
of monetary policy for the U.S. and their implications for the propagation of policy
and non-policy disturbances. In contrast to that model, the one presented in this
paper assumes that all firms have the same information to focus on the conditions
under which the model can explain the empirical results while keeping tractability.
For this study it is not necessary to go to dispersed information and introduce higher
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order beliefs and a role of the interest rate as a coordination mechanism6. If the
mechanism studied in this paper is put in such an environment, the general conclu-
sions are not going to be altered, but additional complications will be encountered.
The model presented here is kept as close to the perfect information New-Keynesian
model as possible while allowing for a signaling role of the interest rate7.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents the empirical analysis. It
first describes the dataset highlighting its benefits and problems. It then explains
the empirical strategy and shows the main results with a robustness section. It
also presents evidence suggesting that the Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) has an
informational advantage over the survey for a short period and finalizes by providing
additional results for inflation, showing that the reaction of inflation forecasts to the
surprise in the interest rate, depends on which governor was in place and whether
the statement of policy that announces the interest rate gave also some indication
of future policy movements. Section 3.2 develops the New-Keynesian model with a
signaling role of the interest rate. It first describes the environment, then presents the
shocks, the timeline and the information set of firms. It then shows the results when
there is only one shock that firms don’t have adequate information from their own
sources and they get that information from the interest rate. Because it is assumed
that firms make their pricing decisions at the end of the period, the solution of this
model is the same as a perfect information New-Keynesian model. Following that,
the section presents the results when firms don’t have all the information about 2
shocks and get some information about both of them from the interest rate. In this
6For theoretical literature about role of public information and higher order beliefs see Morris
and Shin (2002, 2003).
7There are other papers that include a signaling role in the monetary policy actions, but that
the instrument is not the interest rate. For example, Adam (2007), Tamura (2013), and Baeriswyl
and Cornand (2010) study optimal monetary policy, Tang (2014) and Mertens (2011) study the
effects that this signaling role has on discretionary policy and Berkelmans (2011) studies the effect
of a signaling role on the propagation of shocks.
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case the solution is different than the perfect information New-Keynesian model. At
the end, there is a discussion about the interpretation of the last results showed in the
empirical section about interpreting the different coefficients depending on governor
and forward guidance through the lenses of the model. Finally, section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Analysis
The objective of this section is to estimate the reaction of inflation and output
growth forecasts in response to unexpected changes in the monetary policy rate. It
starts by describing the dataset, then presents the empirical strategy and the main
results. The shows results suggesting that the Central Bank of Brazil has a short-term
advantage of information and it finalizes by showing additional results for inflation
forecasts allowing for a different response to an unexpected change in the interest rate
for different governors and when the statement provides information about forward
guidance.
1.2.1 Description of the Data
The analysis is based on forecasts reported by the Market Expectations System
(MES) of CBB. The MES reports daily statistics of forecasts made by professional
forecasters for several variables, including inflation, output growth and the Selic rate,
at different horizons8. It is managed by the Investors Relations and Special Studies
Department, which was created in 1999 as part of the monetary policy framework
of the inflation targeting (IT) regime. It generates daily reports of the forecasts for
members of the Copom and weekly publications posted in the website of CBB.
8The variables include 8 inflation indexes, the Selic rate, GDP growth, IP growth, the exchange
rate, fiscal variables and external sector variables. The Selic rate is the instrument of the Central
Bank and is the average interest rate charged on daily loans with a maturity of one day (overnight)
backed by government securities registered in the Special System of Clearance and Custody (Selic
by its initials in Portuguese).
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The forecasts are based on expectations reported by around 120 institutions9.
Most of them are part of the financial market such as banks, asset managers and
consultants and there are also companies of the real sector that have specialized
teams who produce forecasts. They have to be pre-approved to provide forecasts
and they must have an economist responsible for the projections. Initially they were
contacted by phone or fax, but since 2001, they can provide their forecasts whenever
they want through MES’s webpage. At the end of each day, the information until
5 p.m. is consolidated and statistics are generated10. Only information updated in
the last 30 days is included in the calculation of the daily statistics in order to avoid
outdated projections. Daily statistics are public information, but the forecasts of
each individual firm is not.
Inflation forecasts are collected for 8 indexes and there are 23 projections for each
index asked; 18 monthly and 5 yearly. The monthly forecasts are informed as the
monthly percentage variation of the index. The main analysis is made for monthly
forecasts of the variation in IPCA, which stands for Extended National Consumer
Price Index and is the official inflation measure of the country11. For robustness, the
analysis is done for other important price indexes, which are the National Consumer
Price Index (INPC) and the General Price Index-Internal Availability (IGP-DI)12.
The measures for output growth forecasts included in the MES are IP and GDP.
9When MES started there were around 50.
10The statistics are: mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and the coefficient
of variation across all forecasters.
11It covers 11 biggest metropolitan regions of Brazil, it is the main price index and is used for
adjusting financial transactions. It measures inflation for households with incomes between 1 and
40 minimum wages. It is a headline index.
12INPC is another consumer price index with national coverage that is widely used in wage
negotiations. Its scope is smaller than that of IPCA, since it measures inflation for households with
incomes between 1 and 5 minimum wages. IGP-DI is a traditional index, which was the official
inflation measure and its a mixed index that combines wholesale and retail prices. It exists since
1944. The consumer price index that is part of this index covers households between 1 and 33
minimum wages.
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There are 23 forecasts provided for IP (18 monthly and 5 yearly) and 11 for GDP
growth (6 quarterly and 5 yearly). The analysis includes the reaction for the monthly
forecasts in the case of IP and quarterly forecasts in the case of GDP13. In both cases
what is reported is the percentage growth over the same period of the previous year.
There is no incentive for institutions to update their information on a daily basis,
but there is an incentive to do it regularly for some variables, since the best forecasters
are publicly recognized. Top 5 rankings are published and the mean and median of
these top 5 institutions is closely followed by the agents of the economy. There are
monthly and yearly rankings for forecasts in the short run, medium run and long run
for 5 different variables; 3 inflation measures, the Selic rate and the exchange rate.
The rankings are based on forecasts available at predefined dates, which are called
reference dates14. There are some additional conditions in order to participate in the
top 5 rankings that have to do with the update of their projections and the number
of projections previously given15.
The objective of the analysis is to get the response in forecasts attributed to
unexpected monetary policy changes. For that reason the analysis needs a good
measure of the unexpected component of a monetary policy decision and also an
identifying assumption that relates an observed change in forecasts only to the shock
of interest. The unexpected change in the Selic rate is measured as the difference
between the rate decided at the Copom Meeting and the forecast of that same rate
13Only monthly and quarterly forecasts are analyzed, because there are not enough observations
for the yearly measures. This is because it is not sensitive to assume that the errors from revising
forecasts in January and December come from the same process. This would imply that the analysis
would need to be done only for revisions in January, then February and so on, decreasing the number
of observation.
14These reference dates are different for each variable and depend on dates when the variable
itself or related variables are released. For example the reference date for the Selic target is the last
business day equal to or before the Wednesday of the week previous to the Copom meeting. For
IPCA it is the last business day before an associated index, the IPCA-15, is released.
15For more information about this, see the FAQ made by CBB about the MES.
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held at the day of the meeting, but before the release of the decision. For this to be
a good measure of the unexpected component, it is necessary that the expectation
of the day is up-to-date and that the only shock that occurred in the day was the
realization of the monetary policy rate. These assumptions are not strong when taken
into account that the reference date for the monetary target is the week before the
Copom meeting and the forecast is measured the same day of the meeting, just a
couple of hours before the release of the decision16. As compared with identification
using bond-prices, which is the common procedure in the current literature, this
measure is not market-formed, but it is a measure of the surprise for agents that are
the same ones who are asked and will possibly change their forecasts of inflation and
output. It measures the surprise in the current Selic rate as opposed to a mixture
between that value and updates in the forecast of future rates in order to avoid the
endogenous update in future rates that could arise because of revisions in expectations
and not because an exogenous change17.
The initial analysis measures the changes in forecasts of inflation and output as
the difference in forecasts of the variables only 1 day after the meeting and at the day
of the meeting. This is very unique since there are no other survey-based forecasts, as
far as I know, that have this frequency. So the identifying assumption is that during
that one day (the day after the meeting) there was no other shock. This contrast
greatly with the current literature that have to assumed a much longer period with
the exception of the long term measures for inflation expectations in Nakamura and
Steinsson (2015)18. Another advantage is that it is based on a survey instead of only
16Except in some cases where the previous day was taken.
17It is important to know that Brazil has not even been close to the zero lower bound and
so, forward guidance have not been the main focus. Despite this, the Copom gives signals about
future changes sometimes, which is included in the analysis of the additional results for inflation in
section 1.2.4.
18Faust et al. (2004) had to assume one week, and the rest one month with the exception of one
of the regressions in Romer and Romer (2000) that was one quarter, but they controlled for changes
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one institution as the case of Faust et al. (2004).
The assumption of no other shock, except for the monetary policy surprise hap-
pening during one day is not a problem for this dataset as opposed to market-based
measures. In market-based measures, as discussed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2015),
bond prices are affected by varied shocks every day and so the results can be mis-
leading even assuming that during one day there is no other shock. That problem
is not present in survey data and actually a problem is that surveys of professional
forecasters have been found to adjust incompletely in response to shocks19. To be
conservative, the main results exclude dates in which releases of information of the
variable under study happened the day after the meeting20. In addition, the robust-
ness section shows the results excluding the cases when releases of any national price
index included in MES and both measures of output coincide with the day after
meetings.
The great problem of this dataset is that firms do not have to update their fore-
casts on a daily basis and so, even though they have changed their forecasts it will
not necessarily be reflected. There is no direct public measure of how often firms
update their information. The FAQ of to the webpage comments that “most of the
institutions update their expectations weekly” and Marques (2013) referring to fore-
casts of IPCA inflation discusses that the top 5 institutions update their forecasts
every 7 days previous to the release of the ranking, on average, while the remaining
institutions every 12 days. The average number of updates is 13 institutions per day,
reaching 50 in dates of reference. Using these numbers as benchmarks, and making
in the environment.
19Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, forthcoming) show that in the U.S. the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters and in 12 advanced economies Consensus Forecasts do not fully adjust to shocks
and the errors go in the same direction of a model with information rigidities.
20For the case of IPCA inflation, it also excludes dates that coincide with releases of information
of an associate price index, IPCA-15.
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many simplifying assumptions, if each institution updates its information every 7-12
days, the probability to make an update each day is 8 − 14%, which implies that
10-17 institutions update their information daily. This can cause an important bias
toward zero, and so the hypothesis of no change in the forecasts will be favored. The
bias is probably higher for output measures since there is no ranking for them and so
it is expected to be less updated.
To control for this problem the main analysis also presents the results when al-
lowing the forecasts to be updated 2 and 3 days after the meetings. On the one hand,
this alternative measure of change in forecasts has the problem that other shocks are
more likely to occur than when allowing for one day. To control for this problem,
the samples additionally exclude days in which releases of information of the variable
under study happened 2 and 3 days after the meeting respectively. On the other
hand these alternative measures lower the bias since they allow more firms to update
their forecasts. This improvement seems to be sizable, since the response of the next
meeting’s Selic is only 0.09 basis point every 1 basis point of the current surprise when
1 day is allowed to measure the change, while it is 0.61 and 0.79 when allowing 2 and
3 days respectively21. This measure is an indicator of the extent to which allowing
more days lowers the bias assuming that the surprise today is not expected to be
reverted the next meeting and that the update in forecasts of inflation and output
growth are comparable to the ones in future Selic rates.
21This numbers are the coefficients βs of the regressions
iet+1,d+s − iet+1,d = α1 + βs1(it − iet,d) + eit
where iet+1,d+s is the forecast of the Selic that will be set in meeting t + 1 at day d + s, where the
(d, t) is the day and month of the current meeting and s is 1 when allowing for one day, until 3 when
allowing 3 days to update the forecasts. The responses of future Selic rates from 1 until 13 meetings




The regression of interest for inflation is the following:
πet+h,d+s − πet+h,d = αh + βh(it − iet,d) + eπt
where the meetings are held at day d of month t, (d, t). πed,t+h is the forecast of
inflation for month t + h held at day d, it is the Selic rate decided by the Copom at
the meeting of day d and ied,t is the forecast of the Selic rate at the day of the meeting
d22. The coefficient of interest is βh which measures the effect that a surprise in the
monetary policy rate decided at month t has on the change in inflation forecasts of
month t+h. It is important to note that πed,t+h measures the m-o-m inflation of month
t + h in annualized terms and so, for the effect in the price level, the coefficients of
the different months need to be summed up. The analysis is made from the month
of the meeting until 17 months after the meeting, so h ∈ (0, 17).
The regression of interest for IP is the same as the one for inflation but replacing
inflation by the growth in IP. The available months are from the month previous to
the meeting until 16 months after the meeting, so in that case h ∈ (−1, 16). The
regression of interest for GDP growth is:
yeq+h,d+s − geq+h,d = αh + βh(it − iet,d) + e
y
t
where yeq+h,d is the forecast of GDP growth for quarter q + h at day d. Note that
with this notation the quarter in which the meeting (d, t) was held is q. The available
quarters are from the quarter before the meeting until 4 quarters after the meeting, so
h ∈ (−1, 4). GDP and IP growth are measured y-o-y, so it is the 12 month variation.
22For the meetings between October 2009 and March 2015 the exact time of the press release is
known and is always after 5 p.m., so the forecast of that same day were taken. For the meetings
before October 2009, only the time at which the meetings ended are known, and so if it ended after
5 p.m., the same day was taken, but if it ended before, which happened 17 times, the previous day
was taken.
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The baseline analysis measures the forecasts as the median across forecasters,
since that is the most used statistics in survey data. Available data is from the
meeting held in November 2001 until March 2015, which implies 124 meetings23. As
mentioned in the previous section, the main analysis presents the results for s = 1−3
and excludes dates when the day (or days) after meetings coincided with releases
of the statistic of interest24. Dates in which releases of information coincided with
meeting dates were not excluded from the sample since in general releases occur in
the morning and so the measure taken at the day of the meeting, because it is taken
at 5 p.m., should already include that information. The robustness section presents 2
sets of results with more exclusions; in the first, all dates that coincided with releases
of any national price indexes forecasted by MES, and with releases of GDP and IP
where excluded from the results of all variables and the second excludes cases when
the release of the variable under study coincided with meeting dates.
The regressions were estimated with OLS and robust standard errors since there
can be heteroskedasticity. The reason behind this is that the meetings are not held
the same period in a month and so, the update in expectations can depend on the
forecast horizon25.
23MES has data with varied starting dates since the beginning of 2000, but forecasts of the Selic
rate starts in November 2001. There were 125 meetings in total, but an extraordinary meeting of
October 2002 was excluded since there is no measure of the unexpected component of the change
in the Selic rate, because that rate was defined until the following meeting which happened also in
October 2002 and forecast of the Selic rate are made for the end of the month.
24For s = 1 excluded dates where the ones when releases of information of the variable of interest
coincided with the first day after meetings. The case of s = 2 adds to the exclusions when releases
coincided with the second day after the meetings and s = 3 adds when they coincided with the third
day. In the case of inflation, 11 dates were excluded for s = 1, 33 for s = 2 and 34 for s = 3. For IP
the exclusions were 2, 3 and 5 and for GDP 6, 15 and 15.
25In addition to heteroskedasticity, the errors of different equations for the same variable can
be correlated if the update in expectations of consecutive months is correlated beyond the effect of
the surprise. This possibility was analyzed and causes only a small decrease in the standard errors.
Those results are presented in Section A2.2 of the online Expanded Appendix.
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1.2.3 Main Empirical Results
The main results for inflation are reported in the graphs a. and b. of Figure 1.126.
Graph a. shows the estimated coefficients with its 95 percent confidence interval.
After an unexpected increase in the Selic rate, inflation forecasts initially increase and
starting 3 months after the month of the Copom meeting do not change significantly.
A 1% surprise increase in the Selic rate, increases inflation forecasts by an annualized
0.34% for the month of the meeting, by 0.25% the month after the meeting and
by 0.06% the 2nd month after the meeting. After that the coefficients turn non-
significant and mostly negative.
Graph b. shows the sum of the coefficients, which represents the effect in the
price level of an unexpected increase in the Selic rate. The initial increase makes the
cumulative effect remain positive even 17 months after the meeting.
The constant in each regression should be zero if there is no information provided
by just having the meeting. This is the case in the majority of the regressions, but
there are 2 cases significant at the 5% and 3 cases at the 10%. It is worth noting
however that even in those cases the coefficients are very small.
The results for economic activity are less conclusive as seen in graphs c. and d.
of Figure 1.1. On the one hand, IP forecasts show a positive but not very significant
increase from the month previous until 6 months after the meeting with values ranging
from 0.03 to 0.17. For example, a 1% unexpected increase in the Selic rate, increases
IP growth forecast by 0.08% in the month previous to the meeting and in the 1st until
3rd month after the meeting, and by 0.17% in the month of the meeting. Then the
coefficient lowers for the 4th and 5th month after the meetings and then increases.
The coefficient is significant at 10% and 5% in the month of the meeting and in
the 6th month after the meeting. After that the coefficients are non-significant and
26For the Tables for Inflation, IP and GDP refer to the online Expanded Appendix, Section A2.3.
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Figure 1.1: Change in Forecasts in response to an unexpected increase in the Selic
Rate
Notes: Graph a. shows the annualized percentage change in the m-o-m inflation forecast of month
h given a 1% unexpected increase in the Selic rate in month 0 with its 95% confidence intervals.
Graph b. shows the annualized cumulative response between month 0 and month h. Graph c. shows
the percentage change in the y-o-y forecast of IP growth of month j given a 1% unexpected increase
in the Selic rate in month 0 with its 95% confidence intervals. And graph d. shows the percentage
change in the y-o-y forecast of GDP growth of quarter h given a 1% unexpected increase in the Selic




Note that the confidence interval becomes much wider starting on the 12th month
after the meeting even though the number of observations does not drop until the
13th month. This widening does not happen in the case of inflation even though the
decrease in observations is similar starting 13 month after the meeting.
On the other hand, GDP shows in general no reaction to unexpected changes in
the Selic rate. The only case that shows a coefficients not so numerically insignificant
is 4th quarters after the meeting and as can be seen by its large confidence interval,
it is highly imprecise. Note that the widening of the confidence interval happens at
the same time as in IP.
In contrast to the results obtained for inflation forecasts, the constants in the
equations for output show a pattern. It is significant for 5 out of 7 initial months in
IP and 2 out of 4 initial quarters for GDP27. In this case the magnitudes are larger
than for inflation and are closer to the magnitudes found for the slope. Also note
that the constants are negative for all the regressions for GDP and until 10 months
after the Copom meeting for IP. This means that forecasts were adjusted downwards
after each meeting irrespectively of the decision made.
As the bias toward zero can be really important and seem to decrease when
allowing a couple of more days to adjust the forecasts, Figure 1.2 show the results
when allowing 2 and 3 days to update the forecasts while dropping observations that
conflict with their own release dates28. Each graph includes a blue dash-dotted line
that shows the results when allowing 1 day for comparison.
As shown in graphs a. and b. of Figure 1.2, inflation forecasts of the initial 2
months react much strongly to unexpected changes in the Selic rate when 2 and 3
days are allowed to updated them. A 1% unexpected increase in the Selic rate in
273 out of 4 if the significant at 10% of the quarter previous to the meeting is counted.
28For the Tables, see the online Expanded Appendix Section A2.4.
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Figure 1.2: Change in Expectations, Allowing More Days to React
Notes: Graphs a. and b. show the annualized percentage change in m-o-m inflation forecast of month
h given a 1% unexpected increase in the Selic rate in month 0 with its 95% confidence intervals when
allowing for 2 and 3 days to update the forecasts. Graphs c. and d. show the percentage change
in the forecast of y-o-y IP growth of month h given a 1% unexpected increase in the Selic rate in
month 0 with its 95% confidence intervals when allowing for 2 and 3 days to update the forecasts.
And graphs e. and f. show the percentage change in the forecast of y-o-y GDP growth of quarter
h given a 1% unexpected increase in the Selic rate in quarter 0 with its 95% confidence intervals
when allowing for 2 and 3 days to adjust the forecasts. The blue dashed line shows the results when
allowing for 1 day of adjustment for comparison. The sample is November 2001 until March 2015.
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month t increases inflation forecasts of month t by 0.83% when measured after 2 days
and 2% when measured after 3 days, which contrast greatly with the 0.34% when
measured after 1 day. For month t+ 1, the coefficients are 0.25% after 1 day, 0.55%
after 2 days and 0.71 % after 3 days. For the following months, the changes are less
important and varied and are still non-significant until 13 months after the meeting.
For months t + {14− 16} the results show a decrease when compared to 1 day such
that the coefficients become negatively significant. A 1% unexpected increase in the
Selic rate, decreases the annualized inflation forecasts around 0.13% in the 14th and
15th month after the Copom meeting and around 0.2% in the 16th month after the
meeting.
In the case of IP, as shown in graphs c. and d. of Figure 1.2, there is in general
also an increase in the coefficients of the initial months, but not as big as the case of
inflation. The significance also increases, being 3 out of 4 coefficients significant of
the initial months when allowing 3 days. The final months show generally decreases
in the coefficients, but many mixed results.
The results for GDP growth, graphs e. and f. of Figure 1.2, show that even though
there are increases in the coefficients when allowing 2 and 3 days, they are still not
as large as the ones for IP growth. Its significance also increases becoming 3 quarters
significant at the 10 percent when allowing 3 days.
To sum up, the results show that unexpected increases in the Selic rate increase
inflation and IP growth forecasts in the short term, but the change in IP is smaller.
The changes for the longer term tend to be negative for inflation and IP, but they are
still not significant unless 3 days are allowed to update the forecasts. GDP growth
forecasts are not greatly altered by unexpected changes in the Selic rate.
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1.2.3.1 Robustness
The purpose of this section is to discuss that the conclusions are not changed
when controlling for potential problems and when using alternative measures29.
Subsamples
Brazil introduced the IT framework in 1999 and according to Carvalho and Minella
(2009), Cerisola and Gelos (2009) among others, there can be 3 periods defined:
implementation and initial years (1999 until mid-2001), problematic period (mid-
2001 until end of 2003) and consolidation (2004 onwards). During the second period
Brazil experienced many problems including a confidence crisis from the end of 2002
until the beginning of 2003 in which agents considered a regime change to a more
controlled exchange rate likely. During this period inflation forecasts from the MES
changed their behavior becoming more backward looking and as shown in Carvalho
and Minella (2009) regressions that include inflation forecasts are greatly affected by
this period, making estimates decrease their significance when this period is excluded
or dummies are put in place30.
If one presents the same graphs of the main analysis but only for the period after
2004, the main conclusions are not altered, but the significance of the initial months
for inflation is31. For IP growth there is no change in the significance while a general
increase in the coefficients and for GDP there is no important change.
29The results are shown in the online Expanded Appendix, Section A2.5 for inflation, IP and GDP.
All results are shown when allowing one day to update the forecasts. In non-reported results, it was
also controlled for the change in the exchange rate and in a different set of equations for the change
in expected exchange rates during the days in which the change in expectations were measured.
The findings were not altered since there is practically no correlation between the monetary policy
surprise and change in expectations of the exchange rate or change in realized exchange rate.
30Discussion about this can be found in Bevilaqua et al. (2008), Minella et al. (2003), Cerisola
and Gelos (2009).
31When allowing for 2 and 3 days to update the forecasts, the initial coefficients increase and
become significant.
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Excluding other release dates
There were two exclusions made without this affecting any of the results. The
first excluded observations when meetings coincide with releases of statistics of the
variable under study to control for the possibility that forecasters take more than
one day to include that information as well as for the possibility that the release of
the statistic was not always early in the morning. And the second excluded dates
when releases of statistics of any national price index in MES and output measures,
IP and GDP, coincide with the day after meetings. This is to control for the fact that
forecasts can be affected not only by releases of the same variable under study, but
also by releases of other macro variables. The results are remarkably similar despite
the decrease in observations.
Alternative Measures
And finally instead of the medians, the means across forecasters were used to
measure the consensus of the forecasts. This is an alternative measure of the consensus
of forecasters which is less used in survey data since it is more affected by outliers.
First the variable measured using the mean were the forecasts of inflation and output
growth and then the forecast of the Selic rate. This last measure was made to control
for the fact that CBB does not always surprise the market and so there are many
zeros in the baseline measure32.
For inflation, two alternative indexes were also used, INPC and IGP-DI. The
results are expected to be less strong than in the case of IPCA, since these alternative
indexes are less followed by the market and so probably are less updated.
In all the alternative measures, the main conclusions are not changed. When
measuring the left-hand-side forecasts by the mean, the coefficients are altered, but
32The percentage of zeros using the median across forecasters is around 70% of the total sample.
When using the mean is only 15%. The correlation between the two measures of surprise in the
monetary policy decision is 0.85.
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the qualitative results are the same. It is only for the case of GDP, 2 quarters after
the meeting that the change is a little stronger, making that coefficient significantly
negative. Results are almost identical when using the mean of the forecast of the Selic
rate in all cases. And when using the alternative inflation measures, as expected, the
results are less significant, but go in the same direction.
1.2.3.2 Comparing MES and CBB Forecasts
If forecasts are responding to surprises in monetary policy decisions, that means
that the surprise is giving information that agents think is relevant to forecast inflation
and output growth. For this to be rational, there have to be at least some days in
which CBB has an informational advantage over MES (particularly before announcing
the monetary policy decision).
Inflation forecasts made by the CBB staff is not available for every day as the ones
in MES, but they are available on a quarterly basis in the Inflation Report published
by CBB around the end of each quarter. They are for annual inflation from the
current quarter until several quarters in the future. To make a sensible comparison,
MES forecasts were used to construct a comparable projection.
Ideal tests would do three comparisons/tests: (i) would compare forecasts of MES
and CBB at the same day d before the policy decision is made public, (ii) would test
if the differences of forecasts of step (i) is transmitted via the interest rate policy
decision, and (iii) would compare the forecasts at a day d + 1 after the decision is
made public to see if MES incorporated the information. Unfortunately, one cannot
make those comparisons because of the availability of the forecasts of CBB.
What can be done instead is to compare the forecast of CBB with forecasts made
by MES at 3 important dates: the cutoff day, the last available day before the release
of the report and the first available day after the release. The cutoff day is the last day
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in which information can be included in the inflation report to make the projections33.
If CBB has better information than MES it has to be true that the error made by
MES at the cutoff date is larger than the error made by CBB.
To see if MES includes information made public by CBB, it is not enough to
compare the errors of the day after the release of the report. This is because there
are several days between the cutoff day and the day that the report is released and
since MES forecasts can be updated daily, and at least partially they are as shown by
Bragoli et al. (2014), the reason behind the improvement in the errors could be the
acquisition of other information (that is also not in CBB’s forecast). For this reason,
it is also informative to see the performance of MES forecasts just before and after
the release of the report.











where πq+h is inflation in quarter q + h and π
e,x
q+h,d is the forecast of quarter q + h
made at day d by x with x = {MES,CBB}. For CBB d is only the cutoff day, but
for MES, the results are shown for the cutoff day, the day previous the release of the
report and at least one day after its release. For the regression results refer to the
Appendix Table A.1.
From the Table we see that the forecasts by CBB have a better fit than MES
at the cutoff date. The only exception is the forecast of 4 quarters ahead for which
33The exact day is written explicitly since 2008. Before that it was calculated by subtracting
from the report’s publication day the minimum number of days between cutoff and publication since
2008. It was make sure that the corresponding day was after the last meeting.




q=1(πq+h − π̂q+h)2, where N is the number of observations and
π̂q+h is the predicted value.
24
Table 1.1: Comparing Forecasts of MES and CBB
MES CBB





q 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.16
q + 1 1.02 0.97 0.94 0.96
q + 2 1.84 1.8 1.78 1.8
q + 3 2.47 2.44 2.42 2.44
q + 4 2.86 2.85 2.85 2.88
Notes: The table reports the RMSFE of regressing the quarterly inflation rate on MES
forecast or CBB forecast for different horizons and at different dates. Cutoff day is the
day until which data is added to the forecast made by CBB. 1 day pre-release is the day
previous to the release of the Inflation Report and 1 day post-release is at least one day
after the release of the Inflation Report. The sample is from November 2001 to March
2015.
MES is better even at that date. This shows that having access to the same data to
construct the forecasts, the ones of the CBB are better than MES.
As MES incorporates data on a daily basis, the table shows that the RMSFE of
MES decreases even before knowing the forecasts made by CBB. This causes that
the MES forecast of the current quarter becomes better than the CBB the day before
the release. For the case of 1 until 3 quarters ahead, both forecast are comparable in
goodness of fit. And finally when the forecasts by CBB become public information,
MES are better at all horizons35.
This is suggestive results because eventhough it is true that CBB forecasts are
slightly better than MES at the cutoff date, the the RMSFE of each regression, for
each horizon h in every day and for CBB and MES, are really close. As seen in the
Appendix A.1, the goodness of fit is really similar for each horizons h between CBB
35Similar conclusions emerge when running the specification in Romer and Romer (2000) that
regress realized inflation in both forecasts at the same time. This results are shown in Table A2.6
of the online Expanded Appendix. The idea behind the regressions is to ask whether a forecaster
that has available both sources would use only one (and which one) or both. As shown there, it
is generally true that at the cutoff date, the forecaster would choose the ones made by CBB, then
before the release would choose a combination (except for the same quarter that already chooses
the one by MES) and after the release would choose the one by MES.
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and MES, and so the differences are not statistically significant.
1.2.4 Additional Results for Inflation
This section allows for the effect of the surprise in the monetary policy decision to
affect forecasts of inflation differently depending on additional characteristics36. The
regression of interest is:
πet+h,d+1 − πet+h,d = αh + βhSt,d +
K∑
k=1
βCkh DCkSt,d + e
πC
t
where St,d = it− iet,d is the surprise change in the Selic rate and DCk is a dummy that
is equal to 1 when condition Ck is met. The default condition by this specification is
defined as C0 and the total effect of the surprise when condition Ck for k 6= 0 is true,
is βh + β
Ck
h .
The results are presented in Figure 1.3. All graphs include a blue dash-dotted
line that shows the main results for inflation when allowing one day to update the
forecasts.
By Governor
These results consider the possibility that the professional forecasters react differ-
ently to surprises when the different governors were in place. The sample studied in
the analysis includes periods for 3 governors: (i) Arminio Fraga from the beginning
of the sample until end of 2002; (ii) Henrique Meirelles from the beginning of 2003
until the end of 2010 and (iii) Alexandre Tombini from the beginning of 2011 until
the end of the sample. This goes in line with the belief that different governors can
36For space restrictions, this section only shows in graphs the effects in inflation forecasts. To see
the tables associated with the graphs, refer to the online Supplemental Appendix Section A2.7. For
the graphs showing the results for IP and GDP growth forecasts, refer to the online Supplemental
Appendix Section A2.8.
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have different attitudes toward inflation and so conduct a different policy. C1 is the
meetings in which H. Meirelles was governor and C2 when A. Tombini was.
As shown by panel a. of Figure 1.3, the greatest difference are coefficients asso-
ciated with the last governor A. Tombini. While it is the case that there are some
differences between the main results and the coefficients during the periods of A.
Fraga and H. Meirelles, the main picture does not change; a positive surprise causes
an increase in inflation expectations of the short run and not much change afterward
when allowing one day to update the forecasts. In the case of A. Tombini, almost all
coefficients are lower than the main results and particularly for the first months37.
This results imply that professional forecasters in Brazil see a difference between
the governors in what the surprise is referring to. As will be explain in the last section
of the theoretical results, this could arise because of a change in policy attitudes
toward inflation and output (the coefficients in the Taylor rule) or because of a change
in the shocks of the economy (and forecasters know that).
By Forward Guidance
To consider the possibility that the effect of the surprise varies if it is associated
with forward guidance, these last set of results interact the surprise with dummies
associated with information about future increases or decreases in the Selic rate. C1
in this setup takes the value of one when the statement gives information about a
future increase in the policy rate, positive bias, while C2 is associated with information
about a future decrease, negative bias.
In order to construct the dummies, all the statements were analyzed and if there
was an explicit bias or an indication that there were important risks associated with
inflation, the one in the corresponding dummy was written. In general, CBB follows
37Similar results are found when instead of allowing for different coefficients for every Governor,
the equation allows for different coefficients before and after March 2009, date in which there was a
structural change in the behavior of CBB according to Berriel et al. (2013). These authors find a











































































































































































































































































a smooth path of changes in the Selic rate. For example after a period of increases,
it normally maintains the rate and then starts the period of decreases signaling the
first time it moves the rate that future changes are likely to occur. So, in general the
dummy that signals future increases has the value of 1 in the first period that the
Selic rate was actually increased (and the same for the other case)38. There were 5
observations associated with a positive bias and 5 with a negative bias.
The results, shown in panel b. of Figure 1.3, show that the coefficients change
significantly when there is a positive or negative bias. Note first that the coefficients
without bias are almost the same as the main results, which is not surprising since
it covers the vast majority of cases. Also note that in both bias cases, the positive
response of the first two months vanishes and actually the coefficients turn negative.
After these initial two months, the bias causes in general the opposite movement,
a positive bias is associated with coefficients higher than the main results and the
negative bias is associated with lower (and many significant) coefficients.
As will be discussed in the last section of the theoretical part, this could arise
because there is now an additional source of information that is making forecasts
react. If this extra information is interpreted the same way, a positive bias associated
with the same shock as a negative bias, just with the opposite sign, these results
will not be able to be explained by the model. They can be explained if forecasters
interpret the positive and negative biases as information from different shocks.
38It was checked that a bias for a positive (negative) change was not associated with a current
negative (positive) surprise. The reason behind this was that if a bias of an increase happens at the
same time that a negative surprise today, people were actually expecting a higher increase today
and so that expected increase of the future is likely to be already included in the expectations. The
results do not change when introducing this additional condition or not.
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1.3 New-Keynesian Model with a Signaling Role
for the Interest Rate
Section 1.2 showed that inflation and output forecasts respond positively in the
short run to unexpected increases in the interest rate set by the central bank. In the
baseline New-Keynesian model, where all agents are assumed to have full information
about exogenous shocks to the economy, if the interest rates reveal any information
it is about a “monetary policy shock”, i.e. a change in the expected path of policy,
relative to what would have been expected the exogenous shocks to fundamentals.
It is hard to see why learning about such a shock could have effects of the kind
observed, however. The model presented in this section instead allows for a richer set
of possible effects, by allowing asymmetry of information. In this case, unexpected
monetary policy decisions can have additional effects owing to what they reveal about
the information of the central bank about exogenous shocks to the economy that are
not directly observed by firms.
The household side of the economy will be conventional, homogeneous and with
perfect information. The central bank will have perfect information and will follow
a Taylor rule. There is a government, but its only role is to introduce an exogenous
expenditure.
The main difference from the conventional model comes from the firm side. They
will still be homogeneous, but because they will start each period with incomplete
information, they will get part of their information from seeing the interest rate
before they make their decision. If after seeing the interest rate, firms end up with
the same information as the rest of the economy, the equilibrium is the same as in
a model with perfect information, as analyzed in Gertler et al. (1999), Woodford
(2003, Chapter 4), Gaĺı (2008, Chapter 3) and Walsh (2010, Chapter 8). However,
the predicted effects of a monetary policy announcements will be different than in
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standard analyses, since the monetary policy surprise will not correspond to a pure
change in monetary policy, unrelated to any shocks to fundamentals, but will instead
be correlated with a particular type of shock to fundamentals. Moreover, if firms
are not able to infer all of the central bank’s information, even after observing the
interest rate decision, then the resulting equilibrium differs from the full-information




Assume there is a representative household that seeks to maximize the discounted
















Where, Ct is consumption and Ht is the quantity of labor supplied in time t. In
this formulation σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ξ is the Frish








with θt > 1 the elasticity of substitution between varieties, which is a stochastic
shock with mean E(θt) = θ̄. The shock to the elasticity is introduced to allow for a
cost-push shock. The price index that defines the minimum cost of a unit of Ct is:
39The model is kept as simple as possible, which allows to get analytical results in the least
complicated cases. The model could allow for less information from the part of households or allow
for dispersed information from firms and households, but is not necessary to get the results. For









For simplicity, assume only one traded asset each period, which is a one period
riskless nominal bond. This is introduced to allow the central bank to set that interest
rate. The households own the firms (same share each household) and face also a tax
set by the government. So, its budget constraint in t is:




where Bt is the one period nominal bond that pays ĩt in period t+1, Wt is the nominal
wage determined in the labor market, Πt(i) are the nominal profits of firm j and Tt
is a tax set by the government.
Each household is the same and so make the same decisions. Households choose
the amount consumed, worked and saved taken prices as given and so their three op-
timality conditions are: (i) optimality across differentiated goods, (ii) intertemporal
optimality, which is the Euler equation and (iii) optimal supply of labor.
Firms
Each firm j is the monopolistic supplier of good (j) and so, given the demand faced
from the households chooses its price. Its production function uses only labor as
input:
Yt(j) = AtHt(j)
Where At is a productivity factor common to all firms. The profits of each firm j are:
Πt(Pt(j), .) = Pt(j)Yt(j)−WtHt(j)
Additionally assume as Calvo (1983), that they can only choose their price in any
given period with probability (1 − α). Firms that choose their price maximize the
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where Qt,t+s = β
s[U ′(Ct+s)/U
′(Ct)][Pt/Pt+s] is the stochastic discount factor of the
household. Note that the expectation with which firm j optimizes is put explicitly
as Êt which is defined by information Ît. Depending on the information known by
the firms at the time they make their decision it will be perfect information, Ît = It,
with It being perfect information in period t or imperfect information, Ît ⊂ It. In
both versions of the model firms are assumed to rational and make choices that are
optimal, conditional on their information set.
Government








where Gt(i) is the quantity consumed of good i and Gt is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate.
It is also assumed to hold a balanced budget:
Tt = PtGt
Central Bank
The Central Bank sets the interest rate following a Taylor rule of the form:








Where Y ∗t is the efficient level of output in period t, εt is the monetary shock in period
t and φπ, φx are such that the Taylor principle is satisfied.
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Market Clearing
In Equilibrium the goods market, the bonds market and the labor market clear, which
means:






Log-linear approximation of the Equilibrium conditions
As is common in the literature, the first order conditions are log-linearized around a
non-stochastic steady state in which all exogenous state variables are forever constant,
inflation is zero, the interest rate is set to be consistent with that. Making the
convenient simplification, the above model imply the following 3 conditions40:
πt = Êt [κxt + βπt+1 + ut] (1.1)
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1 − r∗t ) (1.2)
it = φππt + φxxt + εt (1.3)
where inflation is πt = log(Pt/Pt−1), the output gap is xt = yt − y∗t = log(Yt/Ȳ ) −
log(Y ∗t /Ȳ ) and Ȳ is the level of output at the non-stochastic steady state. The
nominal interest rate is given by it = log(1 + ĩt)− logβ−1. There are 3 shocks which
are the cost push shock, ut arising because of the variation in the elasticity between
varieties, the natural rate of interest, r∗t arising because of variations in government
expenditure and productivity and the monetary shock εt
41. The first equation is the
Phillips curve, which since it comes from the optimality condition of the firms is
potentially in a more restricted information set than the other equations. The second
40For the derivation, refer to the online Supplemental Appendix, Section A2.9.
41The shocks are: ut = −((1−αβ)(1−α)/α)(θ̂t− θ̂)/θ and r∗t = σ−1(Gt/Y − y∗t −Et(Gt+1/Y −
y∗t+1)), with θ̂t = log(θt − 1).
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equation is the IS relation which comes from the Euler equation of the household and
the final equation is the monetary policy rule.
The rational expectations equilibrium is defined by processes {πt, xt, it} consistent
with (1.1)-(1.3) given the exogenous shocks {ut, r∗t , εt}, their distributions and the
available information of firms that defines Ît. To close the formulation, we need to
specify the distribution of shocks and the information held by firms when they make
their decisions.
1.3.2 Shocks, Timeline and the Information Set of Firms
The unique rational expectations equilibrium of the model solves current endoge-
nous variables as a function of current and expectation of future exogenous shocks.
To analyze what information needs to be revealed by the interest rate to get positive
revisions of inflation and output expectations when there is a positive surprise in the
interest rate, the next two sections analyze different scenarios. The cases will differ
in the information set held by firms before they see the interest rate, defined by Ĩt
and will be specified in the next section in each case.
Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the exogenous shocks are AR(1) and
normally distributed. The evolution for each shock ωt = {εt, ut, r∗t } is given by:
ωt = ρωωt−1 + ν
ω
t
with iid νωt ∼ N(0, σ2ν,ω) for ρω = [0, 1). The cases will be separated when ρω = 0
and when ρω > 0.
The information setup is also going to allow for current information about future






with iid ζωt ∼ N(0, σ2ζ,ω) and for ω = {ε u, r∗}. If ρω = 0 this is a signal of the future
shock itself. If ρω > 0 this is a signal of the unknown component of the future shock.
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CB and HH see shocks
Firms get info Ĩt
and set net,d
CB sets it
Firms update info Ît
Firms set net,d+1 and pt(j)
Quantities realized
HH and Gov consume
Notes: CB = Central Bank, HH= Households, Gov = Government.
The timeline, as shown in Figure 3.1, is as follows. At the beginning of period t
the shocks are realized, current and news, and the central bank and household see
them perfectly. At the same time, all firms get (if any) some imperfect information
about the shocks which will define the information set Ĩt (the same for all firms).
At this point they can form expectations about any variable nt which will be called
net,d
42.
Then, the Central Bank sets and announces the interest rate and firms, after
seeing the interest rate, update their information set to Ît = {Ĩt ∪ it}. At this point
they can also form expectations about any variable nt, which will be called n
e
t,d+1 and
they make their pricing decisions. Finally quantities are realized so households and
the government consume.
Note that the information set with which firms make their decisions, Ît, will be
defined as the one they had before they see the interest rate, Ĩt, and the information
provided by the interest rate. The model assumes that firms get no new information
between the interest rate and when they make their decisions. If there were other
sources of information or additional communication by the central bank, the solution
of the model could always be the perfect information solution43.
42Following the notation of the empirical results. For example, nt can be the shocks themselves




t} and endogenous variables yt = {πt, xt, it}.
43This would imply different final equations, but the same intuition as the results reported in
this paper.
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Firms will forecast variables and shocks rationally and so their forecasts will be
the expectations of the variables conditional on their information set at each moment
in time, net,d = E[nt|Ĩt] and net,d+1 = E[nt|Ît]. Given the assumptions of the model, this
implies that firms will solve a signal extraction problem when seeing the interest rate
and so the information transmitted by the interest rate will determine the coefficient
that relates the surprise in the rate and the revision of their forecasts.
If the information set Ĩt is defined by perfect information of all but one of the
relevant shocks in t (current and news), then after seeing the interest rate, firms will
get perfect information about that shock and the solution of the model will be the
symmetric information solution. This does not depend on the type of information
contained in Ĩt, as long as it is true that there is imperfect information about only
that one shock. For example, the results are the same when firms know all previous
observations about the shocks xt−1, which are relevant when the autoregressive coef-
ficients are non-zero, if the firms receive a noisy observation about that shock or if
they don’t know anything about it. These cases are analyzed in section 1.3.3 below.
If the information set Ĩt is defined by imperfect information of 2 or more of the
relevant shocks in t, then after seeing the interest rate, firms don’t get perfect in-
formation and the solution will be the asymmetric information solution44. In this
case, the results not only depend on what shocks is the interest rate giving informa-
tion about, but also on the exact definition of Ĩt. Cases of this kind are analyzed in
section 1.3.4.
1.3.3 Symmetric Information Cases
This section presents the results based on the symmetric information solution of
the model. In this case, equations (1.1)-(1.3) can be written in terms of a 2x2 system:
44This happens because the interest rate gives information about a linear combination of the 2
or more unknowns, but not about each one separately.
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From this equation we see directly that inflation and output are functions of
current and expectation of future shocks46. Hence, in order for the interest rate to
affect expectations of inflation and output, it needs to give information about any of
the shocks that firms did not have from the beginning of the period.
Solving this system and using equation (1.3) to solve for the interest rate, gives
solutions of the form:
yt = Λ
y




















for yt = {πt, xt, it} and for Λyω∗ with ω∗ = {ε, u, r∗, sε, su, sr
∗} defined in Appendix A.2.
This way, firms will form expectations about the endogenous variables using what



























45Which is the conventional solution selection of this model.
46From this point, output and output gap are going to be used interchangeably. Alternatively I
could have modeled the structural shocks to get results for output directly.
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The coefficients of interests, χπ and χx, measure the change in the expectation
of current inflation and output to the surprise in the interest rate set by the Central
Bank. In this case, these can be written as:
πet,d+1 − πet,d = χπ(it − iet,d) (1.6)
xet,d+1 − xet,d = χx(it − iet,d) (1.7)
Note that all terms concerning shocks that firms know perfectly before the central
bank sets the interest rate are going to be canceled out in both sides of equations (1.6)
and (1.7) and the only terms that are going to be left is about the shock that firms
had imperfect information about. Note also that these set of results are not going
to depend on the information held by firms before seeing the interest rate. To see
this, consider for example the case that the interest rate gives information about the
monetary shock. In this case, we have that:
yet,d+1 − yet,d = Λyε (εet,d+1 − εet,d)





ω irrespective of the information with which expectations with information
Ĩt (with subscript “d”) were taken.
Note also that in this version of the model, because firms get perfect information
after seeing the interest rate, actual output and inflation are going to be the same as
their expectations at d+ 1, πet,d+1 = πt and x
e
t,d+1 = xt.
Table 1.2 shows the signs of the coefficients χπ and χx when the interest rate
gives information about one shock each time, for each current and news shocks47.
This means that if, for example, the case of the news about monetary policy is under
study (which is presented in the first column of the News shocks panel), all agents,
47There can be two interpretations about this, either all the shocks except the one under study
is perfect information for all agents since the beginning of the period, or all the other shocks do not
exist (except the shock about which news exists in the case of news shocks).
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including firms, can see perfectly all shocks except the news about monetary policy,
sεt, since the beginning of the period. In contrast, the news of the monetary policy can
be seen by all agents except firms from the beginning of the period and firms will get
that information by seeing the interest rate. In other words, in this case we have that
Ĩt = {εt, ut, r∗t , sut , sr
∗
t } and so, the only relevant information missing is the news about
future monetary policy shock. Note that Ĩt can also include imperfect information,
like a noisy observation of sεt without this affecting the results. In addition, it can
be defined as the history of shocks until period t for shocks that firm have perfect
information since the beginning and until period t − 1, for the monetary news, Ĩ ′t =
{εt, ut, r∗t, st−1ε, stu, str
∗
} also without altering the results48.
The cases are separated when ρω = 0 and when 1 > ρω > 0 for ω = {ε, u, r∗}49.
The analytical expressions can be found in Appendix A.3.
The results for current shocks show that the responses of inflation and output
expectations are both positive only in the case of the natural rate of interest shock.50.
The intuition behind the results for each shock is straightforward. First, the reaction
of both expectations to information about the monetary shock is negative, since this
shock increases the short term real rate, decreases current demand, which causes a
drop in inflation and output.
48It can also include the history of interest rates, inflation and output until t−1 without affecting,
since these can already be calculated by the history of shocks. In the example of news shocks, the
definition of Ĩt or Ĩ
′
t is completely irrelevant because of the Markovian assumption. In the example
of current shocks, this is not irrelevant, because the shock in t − 1 contains information about the
shock in t, but it does not change the results, because it is imperfect information about the unknown
shock.
49The value of autoregressive parameter ρω for ω = {ε, y, r∗} only affects the results when the
interest rate provides information about that specific ω or about the news of that shock in the future.
It does not affect the results when the interest rate provides information about shocks different than
ω (and its news).
50When shocks are AR(1), condition (I) is necessary for the coefficients regarding the monetary
policy shock to be negative. That condition implies that if the autoregressive coefficient is too high
(the condition is violated), the decrease in inflation and output are so strong that current interest
rate actually decrease given a positive monetary policy shock. Because of that is of less interest.
How high ρε has to be depends on parameters, but for regular calibrations is above 0.9.
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Table 1.2: Results of the Symmetric Information Solution










A. ρω = 0
χπ − + + + + +
χx − − + + − +
B. 1 > ρω > 0
χπ −(I) + + + +(III)(IV ) +
χx −(I) − + +(II) −(IV )(V ) +(V I)
(I) if (1− ρε)(1− ρεβ)− ρεσκ > 0 (II) if 1 +σκ(1−βφπ)−βρε > 0 (III) if (β+σ(βφx +
κ)−βρu)(1+σφx)−σκφπ > 0 (IV ) if (σφx+σκφπ)(1+σφx−φπ)+βφπ(1−ρu+σφx) > 0
(V ) if (βφπ − 1)(1 + σφx) + φπ(1− βρu) > 0 (V I) if 1 + σκ(1− βφπ)− βρr∗ > 0
Notes: All results are for parameter values that satisfy φx ≥ 0 and φπ ≥ 1. The results for
the news shock need further restrictions in the parameter values in some cases. In those
cases, the results are shown for values that satisfy the ranges defined in Appendix A.4.
In contrast, when the information is about cost-push shock, there is a revision
upward of inflation expectations and downward of output expectations since this
shock causes an increase in the desired markup, which increases inflation and contracts
output. It is only the case of the natural rate of interest, that causes a positive update
in both expectations because that shock causes an increase in both variables51.
When the interest rate gives information about news, which is shown in the right
panel of Table 1.2, the signs of news about monetary policy are reversed as compared
to current monetary policy shock. The reason behind this is that while a positive
monetary policy shock tomorrow (and hence news about it) decreases inflation and
output today, as is the case of current monetary policy shocks, it decreases the interest
rate today. As shown in the Appendix, the coefficients for news about future natural
rate of interest are the same as for news of a future monetary shocks52. This is
because the effect of a positive future monetary shocks in this model are exactly the
51This could be thought as an increase in current government expenditure, which increases de-
mand and so increases prices and output.
52Replacing ρε by ρr∗ in the case with positive ρ’s.
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same as a negative future natural rate of interest53. Finally when the interest rate
gives information about future cost-push shocks, the results have the same signs as
the case of current cost-push shocks54.
The limitation of the results shown in this version is that the interest rate can
only give information about one shock each time. When the shocks other than the
monetary shock were analyzed, it was assumed that firms got information about the
monetary shock from another source or that this shock simply did not exist. While it
is likely that firms have information about the cost-push shock and the natural rate
of interest from other sources, it is unlikely that they have a source other than the
monetary policy rate about the monetary shock. A more realistic assumption would
allow for the interest rate to give information about the cost-push shock and/or the
natural rate of interest in addition to information about the monetary shock.
The next section will allow the interest rate to give information about a linear
combination of 2 shocks, the current monetary shock and another one. As this section
showed, for the model to get positive coefficients the other shock will have to be either
the current natural rate of interest or news about future monetary shock or future
natural rate of interest.
1.3.4 Asymmetric Information Cases
Once imperfect information is allowed, the possibilities to analyze increase expo-
nentially55. In addition, it is no longer true that the results do not change for different
53This can be seen directly from the vector ξt since both shocks affect inflation and output by
the same amount only with opposite signs. This does not happen with current shocks, since the
monetary shock has additionally a direct effect on the interest rate.
54When shocks are AR(1), the Table shows a lot of necessary conditions for the results to be
true. Those conditions are met in the great majority of parameter values. It is only in the very
extreme cases that there could be reversions in the results.
55Mixture of different shocks, or just 2 shocks with different combinations of ρ’s, different sets of
initial information of firms Ĩt, etc.
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sets of initial information, Ĩt, held by firms. The objective of this section is not to
show all possibilities, but to show results for cases that could get positive coefficients
and some alternatives for Ĩt.
This section studies the cases in which the interest rate gives information about
two shocks each time, but one of each is always current monetary shock. For simplicity
it is going to be studied cases with ρy = 0 for y = {ε, u, r∗}56. Current and news about
cost-push shocks is excluded from the analysis since, as seen in the previous section,
the effect on output is always negative and so when combined with a monetary shock
there is no chance of getting a positive coefficient57. This version then abstracts from
cost push shocks and news about them for simplicity, but the results are the same
when firms see both shocks from the start of the period perfectly58.
As in the previous model we will have that πet,d+1 = πt, because firms are the ones
setting prices (hence inflation) and their information set is the one that determines
their decisions. In contrast xet,d+1 6= xt, since after seeing the interest rate firms will
know a fix combination of both shocks, but will not know each one separately.
The solution of the model is made with the indeterminate coefficients method,
since there is dependence of the interest rate on inflation (by equation (1.3)) and
of inflation on the interest rate, because firms get information from that source (at
least partially) to set their prices59. To solve the model, we need to assume that
the interest rate will be a linear function of the exogenous variables, with unknown
56Results can also be obtained for 1 > ρy > 0, but the conditions complicate further and there is
no gain in intuition.
57In addition, the current version of the model does not allow for the interest rate to alter firm’s
information about current cost-push shock. This is because the Central Bank follows a Taylor rule
instead of a policy equation that directly depends on all the shocks of the economy. If one needs
to allow for that possibility, one option is to make each firm receive a different noisy signal about
the cost-push shock with errors that vanish in the aggregate (white noise with enough firms). This
model would imply similar results of the one presented here with the extra complication of having
to deal with higher order beliefs because firms would not have the same information sets.
58Or if they get noisy observations about any of them.
59A paper that uses the same method in a related environment is Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010).
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coefficients, and given the relations that need to be satisfied in the model, we can
solve for the coefficients60.
1.3.4.1 Example: Interest rate gives information about εt and r
∗
t
Assume initially that there is no news shocks and that firms get no independent
information about the current shocks, yt = {εt, r∗t }. Because we are in the case
with ρy = 0, previous observations of the interest rate or the shocks don’t contain
any information about current or future shocks. Since firms don’t get independent
information about the shocks under study, this means Ĩt = ∅. Since equations (1.1)-
(1.3) are linear and shocks are normal, a natural assumption is that the interest rate












r∗ , but do not see each shock indepen-
dently. Firms are rational and need to decide prices, so they will use that information
to form expectations about demand conditions knowing that equations (1.1)-(1.3)
hold in equilibrium. Inflation will then be the solution of (1.4), but given the infor-
mation set of firms:
Êtzt+1 = AÊtzt + Êtξt
The solution of inflation will be given by the first row of: πt
Êtxt
 = − ∞∑
j=0
A−(j+1)Êtξt+j
In the case of the example, this leads to:
πt = Êt
[
−κσ(εt − r∗t )
∆
]
60Which exogenous variables will be defined by each case.
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with ∆ ≡ 1 + σφx + σκφπ. Because firms do not see the shocks directly, they form
expectations solving a signaling extraction problem using the interest rate, which







 it = Ωit


























Because of this inflation will be a function of the interest rate, which in turn is a
function of the shocks:
πt = Λ
π
i it = Λ
π





with Λπi = −κσ(Ω11 − Ω21)/∆, Λπε = Λπi Λiε and Λπr∗ = Λπi Λir∗ . Then, output can be








Et(φππt+j + εt+j − πt+j+1 − r∗t+j)




(φππt + εt − r∗t )





with Λxε = −σ(φπΛπε +1)/(1+σφx) and Λxr∗ = −σ(φπΛπr∗−1)/(1+σφx). The equations
for inflation and output can themselves be replaced in equation (1.3), which gives us














61For the equations in terms of exogenous shocks, the unknown coefficients and the analytical
expressions of χπ and χx, refer to Appendix A.5.
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1.3.4.2 Results of the Asymmetric Information Solution
All the cases analyzed are solved by the same method described above, but their
exogenous processes and coefficient differ depending on the assumptions made in each
case. There is only 2 cases in which analytical solutions can be obtained, which are the
ones that analyze combination of current shocks. For combination of the monetary
shock with news shock we need to rely on numerical results62.
There are 5 cases presented in Table 1.3 varying the information that the interest
rate gives and the initial information held by firms, Ĩt. The exogenous processes that
are part of each version are also varied for simplicity and to make it reasonable63. For
the cases where no analytical solution can be obtained, the χπ and χx were calculated
by regressing the change in the expectation of inflation and output respectively after
and before seeing the interest rate on the difference between the interest and its
expected value given information Ĩt.
Each column presents the results for each case, showing the signs of coefficients
χπ and χx (and the conditions under which the result hold when necessary), the
exogenous processes that were assumed in the model and the information held since
the beginning of the period by firms. Only the exogenous processes that are related
to the asymmetry of information were listed, but the results do not change when
the other shocks are added as long as they are known perfectly by firms from the
beginning of the period64. The same way, what is listed in Ĩt is the information
relevant to the shocks that are part of the asymmetry problem given the assumptions
62For the numerical results the analysis is based on parameters value given in Appendix A.4 and






ζ,r∗ were varied between [0.5, 2].
63For example, when the case of current natural rate and monetary policy are analyzed, news
shocks are excluded. It would be hard to think of a scenario that firms can see news about future
shocks, but cannot see them at the same period.
64The preferred interpretation is that the cost-push shock is perfectly seen by firms in all cases (at
least its current realization), since it relates to their markup. Also when analyzing the combination
of current and news about monetary shock, the preferred interpretation is that there is a natural
rate of interest shock, but also seen perfectly from the beginning by firms.
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and shocks assumed65.
Columns a. and b. show two cases when the asymmetry is about the current
monetary and natural rate of interest shocks. Case a. is the one analyzed in the
example, where firms did not have any relevant information about the shocks in Ĩt,
and column b. shows the results when firms have an additional source of information






with iid τt ∼ N(0, σ2τ ). Because inflation will now depend on this process, so will the
rest of the endogenous variables of the model.
Columns c.-e. show results when the model includes news shocks. In columns
c. and d. the interest rate provides information about the current monetary shock
and its news about its future realization. In this case what firms knew in period
t − 1 about the news received then, sεt−1, comes into play, because it affects today’s
expectation about the current realization of the monetary shock. Column c. assumes
that there is no additional information besides the one provided by the history of
interest rates until period t, Ĩt = {it−1} (Ît = {it}) and column d. assumes that the
monetary shock of period t− 1 became public knowledge at the beginning of period
t and so firms also know the information about the news received in t− 1 about the
monetary shock in t, Ĩt = {sεt−1}66. In case c., because firms never see the realization
of the shocks, they develop a Kalman Filter in which they form the expectation with
all the history of interest rates.
And finally, column e. shows the case when the interest rate is giving information
about the current monetary shock and news about the natural rate of interest. This
65Since ρy = 0 for y = {ε, r∗}, when only current shocks are assumed, exogenous processes
before t do not provide information about relevant shocks. When news shock come into play, past
realizations become relevant, and so need to be listed when they are known.
66This is because firms knew it−1 which is a linear combination of εt−1 and s
ε
t−1 in this case, and




Table 1.3: Results of the Asymmetric Information Solution






a. b. c. d. e.
χπ + if (I) + if (II) +/− +/− +/−
χx + if (I) + if (II) − − −
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The numerical results were obtained for parameter values described in Appendix A.4 and






ζ,r∗ that were varied between [0.5, 2].
case assumes that firms have perfect information about the current natural rate of
interest in order to differentiate it from cases a. and b. and only combine two shocks.
The general picture of Table 1.3 is that positive coefficients for inflation and output
result only when the interest rate provides “enough” information about the current
natural rate of interest. What exactly is “enough” varies depending on each case. In
case a., the condition to get a positive coefficient is σ2ν,ε < σφxσ
2
ν,r∗ . The interpretation
is that when the natural rate of interest is relatively more variable than the monetary
shock, the signal extraction problem will attribute more of the surprise to the natural
rate and so the coefficients become positive. A related condition emerges when firms
have previous information in the form of the signal f r
∗
t . The condition now also
includes the variability of the signal received by firms, since the more precise is the
signal, the less surprise in interest rate is attributed to the natural rate and so the
coefficients are more likely negative.
When the interest rate provides information about current and news about future
shocks the coefficient of inflation turns positive depending on parameters, but the co-
efficient of output remains negative as long as the standard deviations of the relevant
shocks are not so different. This is true for news about the monetary shock as well as
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for news about the natural rate of interest. If standard deviations are too different,
the coefficient on output expectations can turn positive in cases where the coefficient
on inflation expectations is also positive. For example such a case arises in case d.
when the monetary shock has a high standard deviation and its news a very low one.
The reason behind this is that in this case the interest rate is much more informative
about the future monetary shock than the current one and so the coefficients become
positive.
To sum up, in order for positive surprises in the interest rate to cause positive
revisions in inflation and output expectations, the interest rate needs to give “enough”
information about current natural rate of interest as long as the shocks present in the
model do not have too different volatilities.
1.3.5 Interpreting the Additional Results
This section provides interpretation to the results discussed in section 1.2.4 that
found that the coefficients varied by governors and forward guidance. The discussion
is based on the results of the imperfect information model with the interest rate
giving information about current iid shocks and where firms get no relevant previous
information67.
The model has 2 possible interpretations for the finding that the coefficient for
inflation was near zero in the case of A. Tombini as compared with positive coefficients
during the other two governors. The first one is a change in the importance of the
shocks in the information provided by the surprise. As shown in the above, the




ν,ε, so if firms believe that the monetary
shock is now more variable relative to the natural rate of interest, then the difference
67A similar analysis could have been done for the case in which they get the signal of the natural
rate of interest.
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decreases and may even become negative68.
The second interpretation that would go more in line with the view that different
governors have different attitudes toward inflation, would attribute the change in the
coefficient to changes in the responses of the interest rate to inflation and output,
(φπ, φx). Based on evidence for Brazil provided by Berriel et al. (2013), a little before
the change in office there was an increase in the response to output and a decrease
in the response to inflation. While the sign of the coefficient would not turn negative
by that change it could decrease as long as the natural rate shock is relatively more
variable than the monetary shock69.
The interpretation of the result about the variation in the coefficient when the
statement gave information about future changes in the interest rate relate to the
results given about the news shocks. In both cases of a positive and negative bias,
the coefficient of the response of current inflation forecasts decreases to the point
of becoming near zero. Because the model is symmetric, it cannot explain both
of these effects unless people interpret different biases providing information about
different shocks. Information about a future change in the interest rate is like a news
shock, because it is about something that will happen in the future70. But note that
it is different from the results discussed in the previous section, because those were
about the reaction given that the unexpected change in current interest rate provided
information about news shocks. In this case, we have that there is an additional source
of information, so even if firm could be learning about current shocks from the interest
68There are other changes in the coefficients because the denominator depends on both standard




69The derivative of the coefficient with respect to φπ is negative and with respect to φx is positive
as long as ∆ < σφx(σφxσ
2
ν,r∗ − σ2ν,ε).
70This has to be the case in the iid model. While in the autoregressive model is possible that
forward guidance gives information about current shocks that will also impact the future rate, it is
natural to assume that such information would be in the current rate and not in the announcement
of a future policy change.
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rate, they learn from future shocks from the forward guidance.
A negative impact on current inflation expectations will occur if a positive bias
provides information about a positive future monetary shock or negative future cost-
push shock or natural rate of interest, because this shocks also increase the future
rate71. In contrast, for a negative bias to decrease inflation expectations, it has to
provide information about a future negative monetary shock, a future positive cost-
push shock or a future positive natural rate of interest.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper presented evidence on the responses of inflation and output growth
forecasts to unexpected increases in the monetary policy rate. The analysis was based
in a very unique dataset for the case of Brazil that provides a daily measure of the
forecasts among professional forecasters. The results show that in response to an
unexpected increase in the Selic rate, professional forecasters revise their inflation
forecasts upward in the short run and their output growth forecasts mildly upward
also in the short run. For the medium term the effects are near zero. When allowing
three days to update the forecasts, inflation shows also a mild decrease after 1 year.
This is a surprising result for current macroeconomic theory since surprises in the
interest rate set by the central bank are associated with monetary shocks and these
have negative effects on inflation and output and so, the responses of current inflation
and output growth forecasts, if rational, should be negative.
The results can be explain by a baseline New-Keynesian model if one allows the
interest rate to provide information about shocks other than the monetary shock.
This paper developed a baseline New-Keynesian model that allows asymmetry of
71Note the contrast with the result of the perfect information model that had a positive coefficient
when the interest rate gave information about the future monetary shock. The reason behind this
is that the future monetary shock has a negative effect on current inflation and current interest rate
and so the coefficient that relates both is positive.
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information between the central bank and firms. It was shown that in order to
obtain positive responses of inflation and output forecasts, the interest rate must
provide “enough” information about current natural rate of interest.
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Chapter 2
Are Low Interest Rates
Deflationary?
A Paradox of Perfect-Foresight
Analysis
2.1 Introduction
One of the more notable features of recent monetary experience has been the
fact that first Japan, and now more recently the U.S. as well, have gone through
prolonged periods of extremely low nominal interest rates (overnight interest rates
reduced practically to zero and kept there for years) without this leading to the sort
of inflationary spiral that one might have expected to follow from such a reckless
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experiment. Instead, inflation has remained low, below both countries’ desired levels
of inflation (and even below zero, much of the time, in Japan), while real activity has
remained disappointing as well. A common reaction to these surprising developments
has been to conclude that financial crises of the kind that both countries experienced
can lower the equilibrium real rate of interest for a very prolonged period of time, so
that real interest rates that seem very low by historical standards may nonetheless
continue to be contractionary.
But some have proposed an alternative interpretation of these experiences, ac-
cording to which low nominal interest rates themselves may cause inflation to be
lower. In this view, the monetary policy reactions to these crises may have actually
prolonged the disinflationary slumps by creating disinflationary expectations. Under
such a view, actually promising to keep interest rates low for a longer period than
would otherwise have been expected — as both the Fed and a number of other central
banks have done in the recent period1 — would be the worst possible policy for a
central bank worried that inflation will continue to run below its target, and some
(beginning with Bullard, 2010, and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2010) have proposed
that such a central bank should actually raise interest rates in order to head off the
possibility of a deflationary trap. As the period over which the U.S. has kept its
federal funds rate target near zero has continued, views of this kind, that some have
taken to calling “neo-Fisherian,” have gained increasing currency, at least on the
internet.2
Moreover, it might seem that even a standard textbook model of the effects of
alternative monetary policy commitments would support the “neo-Fisherian” posi-
tion. The most straightforward theoretical argument proceeds in two steps.3 One
1See, for example, Woodford (2012) for a discussion of these experiences.
2See, for example, Cochrane (2015a) for discussion and additional references.
3The argument is explained more formally in section 2.2 below.
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first considers what should happen if a central bank were to commit to maintain the
short-term nominal interest rate at an arbitrarily chosen level f orever. According to
a traditional view, famously articulated by Friedman (1968), this is not a possible
experiment, because any such attempt would lead to explosive inflation dynamics
that would require the central bank to abandon the policy in finite time. But in fact,
many modern equilibrium models of inflation determination, including standard New
Keynesian models, imply that there exist rational-expectations equilibria associated
with such a policy in which inflation and other variables remain forever bounded —
so that there is no reason to deny the logical possibility of the proposed thought ex-
periment.4 In a deterministic setting, there is typically a one-dimensional continuum
of perfect foresight equilibria consistent with this policy commitment, all of which
converge asymptotically to a steady state in which the constant inflation rate is the
one determined by the nominal interest-rate target and the Fisher equation. Thus
one might conclude that such an experiment should lead to an inflation rate that
converges to the one determined by the Fisher equation (and hence that is higher by
one percentage point for each percentage point increase in the nominal interest-rate
target), at least eventually.
The second step in the argument notes that it doesn’t make sense to suppose
that the outcome resulting from a given forward path for policy should be extremely
sensitive to small changes in anticipated policy that relate only to the very distant
future. More specifically, one might assert that an expected shift in the monetary
policy rule should have an effect on outcomes now that shrinks to zero as the date of
the anticipated policy shift is pushed far enough into the future.5 But this means that
a commitment to keep the nominal interest rate at some level up until some finite
4This is emphasized in expositions of the neo-Fisherian view such as that of Cochrane (2015a).
5This is the basis for the proposal in 2015b that a plausible analysis should select the “backward
stable” perfect foresight solution consistent with a given forward path policy.
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date T should not have consequences that are very different than those that would
follow from keeping the interest rate at that level forever. If keeping the interest rate
low forever must eventually lower the inflation rate, then there must be some finite
length of time such that keeping the interest rate low for that length of time also
must eventually lower the inflation rate almost as much. It is only a question of how
long a period of low interest rates should be required to observe this effect.
This is a paradoxical result: it seems that the very assumptions that underly com-
mon arguments for the efficacy of forward guidance — the use of a New Keynesian
model of the monetary transmission mechanism, and the assumption of perfect fore-
sight (or rational expectations) to determine the effects of a given policy commitment
— imply that a commitment to keep interest rates low for a long time should be even
more disinflationary than a plan of returning sooner to a more normal policy. Yet
this is not at all what standard model-based analyses of the implications of forward
guidance have concluded, and it is certainly not what policymakers have assumed
when recently announcing or contemplating commitments of that kind.
It might seem that an argument of the kind just sketched about the consequences
of policies expected to last for unboundedly long periods of time has no consequences
for anything we will ever actually observe, and therefore no bearing upon either prac-
tical policy analysis or the interpretation of historical experience. But the standard
approach to analyzing the consequences of an expectation that the short-term interest
rate will remain at the zero lower bound (ZLB) for several more quarters — which
looks at the perfect foresight equilibrium (or the rational-expectations equilibrium,
in the case of a stochastic model) consistent with the forward path of policy that
converges asymptotically to the steady state in which the central bank’s long-run
inflation target is achieved — has the consequence, in a standard (very forward-
looking) New Keynesian model, that as the length of time that the interest rate is
expected to remain at zero is made longer, the predicted positive effects on inflation
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and output at the time that the policy attention is announced grow explosively, as
shown by Del Negro et al. (2013), Chung (2015), and McKay et al. (2015). This
prediction violates the principle that anticipated policy paths that differ only in the
specification of policy far in the future should have similar near-term effects; but if
one thinks that the conclusion must be wrong about the effects of commitments to
long spells of zero-interest-rate policy, one may suspect that it is wrong about the
effects of shorter-range policy commitments as well.
And similarly, if one thinks that selecting instead the “backward stable” perfect
foresight equilibrium as the relevant model prediction (as proposed by Cochrane,
2015b) makes sense in the case of commitments to a long spell of zero-interest-rate
policy, one may find this a reason to regard it as the more sensible prediction in the
case of shorter-range policy commitments as well. But the conventional equilibrium
selection and the “backward stable” selection lead to very different predictions about
the effects of even periods of modest length at the zero lower bound.6
Thus the conclusion that one reaches about the paradoxes resulting from attempts
to analyze very long spells at the zero lower bound matters for the analysis that
one should give of types of policy experiments that have recently been attempted
or contemplated. Indeed, if one accepts the analysis proposed by , the neo-Fisherian
logic applies also to spells at the zero lower bound of only a few years. In the numerical
solutions that he displays, a temporary reduction of the natural rate of interest to a
level that makes the zero lower bound inconsistent with the central bank’s inflation
target — so that the ZLB requires an interest rate higher than the one consistent
with the target inflation rate, for a time — is inflationary, rather than deflationary
as in analyses like that of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). And maintaining a
higher interest rate during the period of the shock would be even more inflationary,
according to the “backward stable” equilibrium selection.
6See the demonstration of this in Cochrane (2015b), sec. 3.1
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In this paper we consider whether a standard New Keynesian model of the effects
of monetary policy requires one to accept paradoxical conclusions of this kind.7 We
shall argue that it does not. Our quarrel, however, is not with the postulate that
anticipated changes in policy sufficiently far in the future should have negligible effects
on current economic outcomes. Rather, we deny the practical relevance of the perfect
foresight solutions (or more generally, rational-expectations solutions) of the model
under the thought experiment of a permanent interest-rate peg.
Moreover, our criticism of the perfect-foresight analysis of this case is not based on
a wholesale denial of the plausibility of forward-looking expectations. It is well-known
that Friedman’s view of the consequences of an interest-rate peg can be defended if
one supposes that people’s expectations are purely backward-looking, as Friedman’s
informal discussion presumed.8 However, this particular defense of conventional views
about the effects of interest-rate policy would also imply that “forward guidance”
as to a central bank’s intentions regarding future policy should have no effects on
equilibrium outcomes, as expectations regarding the future are assumed to follow
solely from the data that have already been observed. Such a view would imply that
if the zero lower bound prevents a central bank from lowering the current short-term
rate enough to achieve its stabilization objectives through that channel alone, there
7Of course, we do not pretend to consider all of the logically possible models, and all of the
logically possible assumptions about policy, that might be consistent with neo-Fisherian claims.
For example, we do not discuss the derivation of neo-Fisherian conclusions under the assumption
of a non-Ricardian fiscal policy discussed in Cochrane (2014); here we are solely concerned with
situations in which fiscal policy is expected to be Ricardian, in a sense made precise in Woodford
(2013). We would dispute the argument in Cochrane (2014) that a non-Ricardian fiscal policy
should be assumed because the path of the price level is otherwise indeterminate in New Keynesian
models. We offer here a way of obtaining a determinate prediction despite Ricardian expectations
regarding fiscal policy, and show that it leads to quite different conclusions from those that would
result from the kinds of expectations about fiscal policy analyzed in , in addition to differing from
the predictions obtained in Cochrane (2015b) by selecting the “backward stable” equilibrium.
8One can show formally, in a model derived from intertemporal optimization of the kind used
below, that an interest-rate peg will imply explosive dynamics if expectations are based on extrapo-
lation from past data, as under Friedman’s hypothesis of “adaptive expectations” or the hypothesis
of “least-squares learning” that has been popular more recently. See Woodford (2003, sec. 2.3) for
discussion and references.
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is nothing further to be done; keeping the interest rate low even beyond the end of
the period in which the bank’s current targets cannot be achieved can achieve higher
output and inflation in that later period, but because this will not be anticipated
until it occurs, this will do nothing to improve outcomes during the constrained
period (while meaning less successful stabilization later). So while it would not imply
that a commitment to keep the nominal interest rate low for a long time would
actually lower inflation, it would nonetheless imply that such a policy would impede
macroeconomic stabilization rather than improving it.
We offer a different reason for rejecting the neo-Fisherian conclusion. We believe
that people are at least somewhat forward-looking; this is why central bank commit-
ments about the way in which monetary policy will be conducted in the future (such
as explicit inflation targets) matter. Nonetheless, it may not be reasonable to expect
that the outcome associated with a given policy commitment should be a perfect
foresight equilibrium, even when the commitment is fully credible and people have
the knowledge about how the economy works that would be required for calculation
of such an equilibrium.
We argue that predicting what should happen as a result of a particular policy
commitment requires that one model the cognitive process by which one imagines peo-
ple to arrive at particular expectations taking that information into account. In this
paper, we offer a simple example of such an explicit model of reasoning. Under our
approach, a perfect foresight equilibrium (or more generally, a rational-expectations
equilibrium9) can be understood as a limiting case of a more general concept of re-
9We consider only deterministic environments in which, after some (possibly unexpected) change
in economic fundamentals and/or the announced path of monetary policy, neither fundamentals nor
policy should depend on any further random events, and so we consider only the reasonableness
of assuming a perfect foresight equilibrium. But the kind of reflective equilibrium that we define
below could also be considered in stochastic environments, in which case we could instead consider
under what conditions the process of reflection will eventually converge to a rational-expectations
equilibrium; and some of the convergence results obtained below have direct extensions to stochastic
environments. To economize on notation and technicality, however, we here expound the idea only
in the simpler deterministic setting.
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flective equilibrium, which limit may be reached under some circumstances if the
process of reflection about what forward paths for the economy to expect is carried
far enough. Our concept of reflective equilibrium is similar to the “calculation equilib-
rium” proposed by Evans and Ramey (1992, 1995, 1998): we consider what economic
outcomes should be if people optimize on the basis of expectations that they derive
from a process of reflection about what they should expect, given both their under-
standing of how the economy works and (as part of that structural knowledge) their
understanding of the central bank’s policy intentions.
Furthermore, like Evans and Ramey, we model this process of reflection as an
iterative process that adjusts the provisional forecasts that are entertained at a given
stage of the process in response to the predictable discrepancy between those forecasts
and what one should expect to happen if people were to behave optimally on the basis
of those forecasts. Thus the process is one under which beliefs should continue to be
adjusted, if the process is carried farther, unless perfect-foresight equilibrium beliefs
have been reached. And like Evans and Ramey, we are interested in the theoretical
question of where such a process of belief revision would end up asymptotically,
if carried forward indefinitely, but we regard it as more realistic to suppose that
in practice, the process of reflection will be suspended after some finite degree of
reflection, and people will act upon the beliefs obtained in this way.
The most important difference between our approach and that of Evans and
Ramey is that the primary goal of their analysis is to determine how far the belief
revision process should be carried forward, by specifying costs of additional calcu-
lation and a criterion for judging the benefits that should be weighed against those
costs; we do not propose any explicit model of such costs or the decision to terminate
the process of belief revision. Our concerns are instead to determine whether the
process will necessarily reach a perfect foresight equilibrium even if carried forward
indefinitely; to ask which perfect foresight equilibrium is reached in the case that
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the process converges; and to understand what determines the speed of convergence
when it occurs.
In our view, the predictions obtained by considering the perfect foresight equilib-
rium (PFE) consistent with a given forward path for policy are of practical relevance
only in that the belief revision process converges to those PFE beliefs, sufficiently
rapidly and from a large enough range of possible beliefs that may be initially en-
tertained. If one has fast convergence to certain PFE beliefs from many possible
starting points, then the PFE predictions should be a good approximation to what
one should expect to occur in a reflective equilibrium, under any of a considerable
range of assumptions about where the process starts and how far it is carried forward.
We show below that standard conclusions about equilibrium determination under a
Taylor rule (when the zero lower bound does not constrain policy) can be justified in
this way; our analysis not only provides a reason for interest in the perfect-foresight
(or rational-expectations) predictions about such a policy commitment, but explains
why one particular PFE solution should be regarded as the relevant prediction of the
model, addressing the critique of the standard New Keynesian literature by Cochrane
(2011).
If, instead, a particular perfect foresight equilibrium cannot be reached under the
belief revision process, except by starting from extremely special initial beliefs, then
we do not think it is plausible to expect actual outcomes to resemble those PFE out-
comes.10 And if the belief revision process does not converge, or if it converges only
very slowly, then we do not believe there is ground to make any very specific predic-
tion about the beliefs that people should be expected to hold in practice and hence
about the economic outcomes that should be observed; and the range of outcomes
that should be considered to represent reasonable possibilities need have little to do
10This is our view of the “backward stable” PFE solutions analyzed by Cochrane (2015b) in the
case of a temporary interest-rate peg.
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with the set of perfect foresight equilibria. We show below that in a standard New
Keynesian model, the thought experiment of an interest-rate peg that is maintained
forever produces a situation of this kind: while perfect foresight equilibria do indeed
exist, the belief revision process that we consider does not converge to any of them,
and the set of reflective equilibria resulting from different finite degrees of reflection
do not resemble perfect foresight equilibria. Thus in our view, the forward guidance
paradox sketched above results from reliance upon the concept of perfect foresight
equilibrium in a context in which it is especially inappropriate.
Some may protest that an equilibrium concept that allows no definite conclusion
about what should occur (in the case of non-convergence or slow convergence) is of
no use in informing policy design. Yet as our results below illustrate, even in such
a case, it may well be possible to derive qualitative conclusions about the effects on
a reflective equilibrium that should be expected from changing policy in a particular
direction; and these may differ, even as to sign, from those that would be suggested
by considering the set of perfect foresight equilibria.
In particular, we show that in our model, a commitment to maintain a low nominal
interest rate for a longer period of time — or to maintain a lower rate, for any fixed
length of time — will typically result (under any given finite degree of reflection) in
increased aggregate demand, increasing both output and inflation in the near term,
though the exact degree of stimulus that should result depends (considerably) on the
assumed degree of reflection. This is true regardless of the length of time for which
the interest-rate peg is expected to be maintained, and even in the limit of a perpetual
interest-rate peg. Thus consideration of the reflective equilibrium resulting from a
finite degree of reflection yields conventional conclusions about the sign of the effects
of commitments to lower interest rates in the future, and does so without implying
any non-negligible effects of changing the specification of policy only very far in the
future.
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Hence the reflective equilibrium analysis avoids both of the paradoxical conclu-
sions that a PFE analysis requires one to choose between: affirming either that main-
taining low nominal interest rates must eventually be deflationary, or that the out-
come implied by a given policy commitment can depend critically on the specification
of policy extremely far in the future. It implies that PFE (or rational-expectations
equilibrium) analyses of the effects of committing to keep the nominal interest rate
low for a longer (but still fairly short) period of time, under the conventional approach
to equilibrium selection, are likely to be correct as to the s igns of the predicted effects,
but that the numerical magnitudes of the effects obtained from such analyses may
be quite inaccurate. In particular, our numerical illustrations below suggest that the
predicted effects on output and inflation from the PFE analysis are likely to be upper
bounds on the effects that should occur in a reflective equilibrium with only a finite
degree of reflection — and indeed, wild exaggerations in cases where the interest rate
is expected to remain at the zero lower bound for many years.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces our New Keynesian model of infla-
tion and output determination under alternative monetary policies and alternative
assumptions about private-sector expectations, and the belief revision process that
underlies our proposed concept of reflective equilibrium. Section 3 then considers
reflective equilibrium when the forward path of monetary policy is specified by a
Taylor rule, and both the path of policy and the economy’s exogenous fundamentals
are such that the ZLB never binds in equilibrium. We allow the Taylor rule to involve
a possibly time-varying intercept (or inflation target), so that we can analyze a type
of forward guidance (but not one that involves commitment to a constant interest
rate). By contrast, section 4 considers reflective equilibrium in the less well-behaved
case of an expectation that the short-term interest rate will remain fixed until some
horizon T , and then revert to a Taylor rule thereafter; and also the limiting case
of a commitment to keep the interest rate fixed forever. Section 5 offers concluding
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reflections.
2.2 Reflective Equilibrium in a New Keynesian
Model
We expound our concept of reflective equilibrium in the context of a log-linearized
New Keynesian (NK) model. The model is one that has frequently been used, under
the assumption of perfect foresight or rational expectations, in analyses of the poten-
tial effects of forward guidance when policy is temporarily constrained by the zero
lower bound (e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Werning, 2012; McKay et al.,
2015; Cochrane, 2015b).11 As in the analyses of Evans and Ramey (1992), 1995;
1998, we must begin by specifying the temporary equilibrium relations that map
arbitrary subjective expectations about future economic conditions into market out-
comes; these relations play a crucial role in the process of reflection that we wish to
model, in addition to being required in order to predict what should happen if peo-
ple’s beliefs do not converge to PFE beliefs. Because these relations are not generally
discussed in a form that would be valid under arbitrary subjective expectations in
expositions of the NK model that consider only its rational-expectations equilibria,
it is necessary to briefly sketch the foundations of the model. The presentation here
largely follows Woodford (2013), where the derivations are discussed in more detail.
2.2.1 Temporary Equilibrium Relations
In our model, both households and firms solve infinite-horizon decision problems,
and hence their optimal decision rules depend on their expectations about economic
11Werning (2012) and Cochrane (2015b) analyze a continuous-time version of the model, but the
structure of the model that they consider is otherwise the same as the discrete-time model considered
here.
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conditions in a series of future periods extending indefinitely. It is important that we
explicitly represent the way in which actions depend on expectations about different
future dates, because of our interest in analyzing the effects of announcements about
future policy that may refer to points in time at different distances from the present.
The economy is made up of identical, infinite-lived households. Each household i






s=t ρs [u(CiT )− v(H iT )] (2.1)
when planning their path of consumption, looking forward from date t. Here Cit is a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the household’s purchases of differentiated consumer goods,
H it is hours worked, the sub-utility functions satisfy u
′ > 0, u′′ < 0, v′ > 0, v′′ ≥ 0,
and ρt is a possibly time-varying discount rate. We allow for the possibility of a non-
uniform discount rate in order to introduce a reason why the ZLB may temporarily
constrain monetary policy; the fact that intra-temporal preferences are uniform over
time will allow the efficient level of output to be constant over time.12 The operator
Êit indicates that this objective is evaluated using the future paths of the variables
implied by the household’s subjective expectations, which need neither be model-
consistent nor common across all households.
For simplicity, there is assumed to be a single traded asset each period: one-period
riskless nominal debt (a market for which must exist in order for the central bank
to control a short-term nominal interest rate). Each household also owns an equal
share of each of the firms (discussed below), but these shares are assumed not to
be tradeable. In the present exposition, we abstract from fiscal policy, by assuming
that there are no government purchases, government debt, or taxes and transfers.13
12In , a more general version of the model is presented, in which a variety of other types of
exogenous disturbances are allowed for.
13 shows how the temporary equilibrium framework can be extended to include fiscal variables.
The resulting temporary equilibrium relations are essentially of the kind derived here, as long as
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We can then define the set of expenditure sequences {CT} for dates T ≥ t that the
household expects will be feasible as a function of the expected paths of real income,
the one-period nominal interest rate, and the rate of inflation.
We can then solve for the household’s optimal expenditure plan as a function of
those expectations, and log-linearize the optimal decision rule around the constant
plan that is optimal in the event that ρT = ρ̄ > 0 for all T ≥ t, the inflation rate
is expected to equal the central bank’s target rate π∗ in all periods, and real income
and the nominal interest rate are also expected to be constant in all periods at values





βT−t Êit {(1− β)yT − βσ (iT − πT+1 − ρT )} (2.2)
where {yT , iT , πT} are the expected paths of real income (or aggregate output, in
units of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate), the nominal interest rate, and inflation, and
all variables appearing in the equation are measured as log deviations from their
steady-state values (hence the use of cit rather than the C
i
t that appears in (2.1)).
Here β ≡ e−ρ̄ < 1 is the steady-state discount factor and σ > 0 is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of consumer expenditure. Note that (2.2) generalizes the
familiar “permanent-income hypothesis” formula (obtained by keeping only the yT
terms on the right-hand side) to allow for a non-constant desired path of spending
owing either to variation in the anticipated real rate of return or transitory variation
in the rate of time preference.
households have “Ricardian expectations” (defined precisely there) regarding their future net tax
liabilities: that is, they expect that no matter how prices and interest rates evolve, net taxes
collected by the government will have a present value exactly equal to the value of outstanding
government debt. The assumption of Ricardian expectations is important for one’s conclusions
about the macroeconomic effects of interest-rate policy, as shown by Cochrane (2014).
14We assume that π∗ > −ρ̄, so that the required nominal interest rate in this steady state is
positive.
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We assume that households can correctly forecast the variation over time (if any)
in their discount rate in their intertemporal planning, so that ÊitρT = ρT for all
T ≥ t.15 The subjective expectations (that instead may not be model-consistent)
regarding future conditions that matter for a household’s expenditure decision can
then be collected in a single expectational term, allowing us to rewrite (2.2) as






measures the cumulative impact on the urgency of current expenditure of a changed




βT−t Êit {(1− β)yT − σ(βiT − πT )}
is a household-specific subjective variable.
Then defining aggregate demand yt (which will also be aggregate output and each
household’s non-financial income) as the integral of expenditure cit over households i,
the individual decision rules (2.3) aggregate to an aggregate demand (AD) relation







is a measure of average subjective expectations.
The continuum of differentiated goods are produced by Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competitors, who each adjust their prices only intermittently to changing market
conditions; as in the Calvo-Yun model of staggered pricing, only a fraction 1 − α of
15This means that expectations regarding future preference shocks are treated differently in (2.3)
below than in the expression given in Woodford (2013). The definition of the composite expectational
variable vit is correspondingly different.
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prices are reconsidered each period, where 0 < α < 1 measures the degree of price
stickiness. Our version of this model differs from many textbook presentations (but
follows the original presentation of Yun, 1996) in assuming that prices that are not
reconsidered in any given period are automatically increased at the target rate π∗.16
If a firm j reconsiders its price in period t (rather than simply increasing it at the
rate π∗), it chooses a price that it expects to maximize the present discounted value
of profits in all future states prior to the next reconsideration of its price, given its
subjective expectations regarding the evolution of aggregate demand {yT} for the
composite good and of the log Dixit-Stiglitz price index {pT} for all T ≥ t. A log-
linear approximation to its optimal decision rule (again around the steady state with
constant inflation rate π∗) takes the form
p∗jt = (1− αβ)
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−tÊjt [pT + ξyT − π∗(T − t)] (2.5)
− (pt−1 + π∗) (2.6)
where p∗jt is the amount by which j
′s log price exceeds the average of the prices that
are not reconsidered, pt−1 + π
∗, ξ > 0 measures the elasticity of a firm’s optimal
relative price with respect to aggregate demand,17 and the operator Êj[·] indicates
that what matter are the subjective expectations of firm j regarding future market
conditions.
Again, the terms on the right-hand side of (2.6) involving subjective expectations
of conditions at various future horizons can be collected in a single composite term,
αβÊjt p
∗j
t+1. Aggregating across the prices chosen in period t by the continuum of firms,
16This allows us to assume a positive steady-state inflation rate — which is important for the
quantitative realism of the numerical examples below, since the steady-state inflation rate matters
for the tightness of the ZLB constraint — while at the same time retaining the convenience of
a steady state in which the prices of all goods are identical, despite the assumption of staggered
pricing.
17The parameter ξ is thus a measure of the degree of “real rigidities.” See 2003, chap. 3 for a
detailed discussion of its dependence on underlying parameters relating to preferences, technology
and market structure.
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we obtain an implied aggregate supply (AS) relation
πt = κyt + (1− α)β e2t (2.7)
where πt ≡ pt − pt−1 − π∗ is inflation in excess of the target rate,









measures average expectations of the composite variable.
We can close the system by assuming a reaction function for the central bank of
the Taylor (1993) form
it = ı̄t + φππt + φyyt (2.8)
where the response coefficients satisfy φπ, φy ≥ 0. We allow for a possibly time-varying
intercept in order to consider the effects of announcing a transitory departure from
the central bank’s normal reaction function. (More generally, we consider below the
possibility of situations in which the response coefficients are assumed to be different
at different times, though they are assumed time-invariant in (2.8).) Equations (2.4),
(2.7) and (2.8) then comprise a three-equation system, that determines the temporary
equilibrium (TE) values of yt, πt, and it in a given period, as functions of the exogenous
disturbances (gt, ı̄t) and subjective expectations (e1t, e2t). Under our sign assumptions,
it is easily shown that the TE values are uniquely determined, linear functions of the
vector of disturbances and the vector of subjective expectations (see the Appendix
for details).
As preparation for our discussion of the process of expectation revision, it is useful
to note the relationship between subjective expectations and the actual values of the
variables that people seek to forecast. The two sufficient statistics for subjective
expectations eit are each the average forecast of a certain average of the future values
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of a certain composite variable aiT at different horizons T > t, where aiT is a variable
that is determined purely by disturbances and subjective expectations in period T .
For i = 1, 2, we can write





δ1 = β, δ2 = αβ
(so that 0 < δi < 1 for both variables),








and the operator Ēt[·] indicates the average of the population’s forecasts at date t.18
We can then use the TE relations to solve for the equilibrium values of the variables
ait that people seek to forecast as linear functions of the current vector of disturbances
and current average expectations. This solution can be written in the form
at = M et + mωt, (2.10)
where at is the vector consisting of (a1t, a2t), et is the vector consisting of (e1t, e2t),
ωt is the vector consisting of (gt, ı̄t), and the matrices of coefficients are given in
the Appendix. The system (2.10) shows how expectations determine the endogenous
variables that are themselves being forecasted in those expectations, as indicated by
(2.9).
18While we still allow for the possibility of heterogeneous forecasts, from here on we assume that
the distribution of forecasts across the continuum of households is the same as the distribution across
the continuum of firms, and so refer simply to the distribution of forecasts. Ēt[·] refers to the mean
of this distribution of forecasts at some date t.
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2.2.2 Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
The assumption of perfect foresight equilibrium adds to the above model the
further assumption that the expected paths for output, inflation and the interest
rate (and hence the expected paths for the variables {at}) are precisely the paths for
those variables implied by the TE relations under those expectations. Thus a PFE
corresponds to sequences {at, et} that both satisfy (2.10) each period and satisfy (2.9)
when the equilibrium paths {at} are substituted for the average expectations in those
equations.
It can be shown (see Woodford, 2013) that under the PFE assumption, the TE
relations (2.4) and (2.7) imply that the paths of output, inflation and the interest
rate must satisfy difference equations of the form
yt = yt+1 − σ(it − πt+1 − ρt) (2.11)
πt = κyt + βπt+1 (2.12)
which are simply perfect-foresight versions of the usual “New Keynesian IS curve”
and “New Keynesian Phillips curve” respectively. Using the policy specification (2.8)
to eliminate it, one obtains a pair of difference equations that can be written in the
form
xt = B xt+1 + b (ρt − ı̄t) (2.13)
where xt is the vector consisting of (yt, πt), and the matrix B and vector b are defined
in the Appendix.
Under our sign assumptions for the model coefficients, the matrix B is invertible,
and the system (2.13) can be uniquely solved for xt+1 as a function of xt and the period
t disturbances. One then obtains a two-parameter family of possible PFE solutions
consistent with any given forward paths for the disturbances, corresponding to the set
of possible choices for the elements of x0. The asymptotic behavior of these solutions
as t is made large depends as usual on the eigenvalues of the matrix B.
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As shown in the Appendix, the matrix B has both eigenvalues inside the unit




φy > 1 (2.14)
so that the “Taylor Principle” is satisfied. In this case, there is a unique bounded
PFE solution for the sequences {xt} corresponding to any bounded sequences {ρt, ı̄t},




Bjb (ρt+j − ı̄t+j). (2.15)
When this is uniquely defined, we shall call this the “forward stable” PFE (FS-PFE).
It is common to regard this as the relevant prediction of the model in such a case;19
below we shall provide a justification for this in terms of our concept of reflective
equilibrium.
This solution implies that in the case of a sufficiently transitory change in policy,
a reduction of ı̄t (for a given path of the real disturbance) must be both expansionary
and inflationary (must raise both yt and πt), while the nominal interest rate is tem-
porarily reduced (though by less than the reduction in ı̄t). In the case of a sufficiently
persistent shift in ı̄t, output, inflation and the nominal interest rate are all predicted
to increase, because of the endogenous effect of the output and inflation increases on
the central bank’s interest-rate target;20 but even in this case, a downward shift in
the reaction function (reducing the interest-rate target implied by any given current
levels of inflation and output) is inflationary rather than deflationary.
If the inequality in (2.14) is reversed, the matrix B instead has two real eigenvalues
19See however Cochrane (2011) for objections to this interpretation.
20In a more realistic model than the simple NK model used in this paper, there will be delays in
the effect of the policy change on output and inflation. It is then possible to have an initial decline
in the nominal interest rate in the case of an expansionary monetary policy shock, even in the case




0 < µ1 < 1 < µ2,
so that the larger is outside the unit circle. In particular, this is true if the central
bank fixes the forward path for the nominal interest rate (the case φπ = φy = 0),
regardless of whether this path is constant. In this case, there is no longer a unique
bounded solution; instead, assuming again that the sequences {ρt, ı̄t} are bounded,






µj1 (ρt+j − ı̄t+j) − v2(e′2b)
t∑
j=1
µ−j2 (ρt−j − ı̄t−j) + χ v2µ−t2 (2.16)
in the case of any real number χ. (In this expression, vi is the right eigenvector
corresponding to eigenvalue µi, e
′
i is the left eigenvector corresponding to that same
eigenvalue, and we normalize the eigenvectors so that e′ivi = 1 for each i.) Since such
solutions necessarily exist, the PFE analysis gives us no reason to suppose that there
is anything problematic about a commitment to fix a path for the nominal interest
rate, including a commitment to fix it at a constant rate forever.
Now suppose that not only are the exogenous disturbance sequences bounded,
but that after some finite date T , they are expected to be constant: ρt = ρLR and
ı̄t = ı̄LR for all t ≥ T, where the long-run values need not equal zero. We show in the
Appendix that in any of the continuum of bounded PFE solutions, the elements of
xt converge asymptotically to long-run values
πLR = ı̄LR − ρLR, yLR =
1− β
κ
(̄ıLR − ρLR). (2.17)
One observes that the long-run inflation rate increases one-for-one with increases in
the long-run interest-rate target. Hence if we suppose that the economy must follow
one or another of the PFE associated with the central bank’s policy commitment,
we would conclude that a lower path for the nominal interest rate must at least
eventually result in a lower rate of inflation; and similarly, a higher nominal interest
rate must eventually make inflation higher.
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One might obtain even stronger conclusions under further assumptions about how
to select a particular solution from among the set of PFE. Consider the simple case
of a policy commitment under which the interest rate will be fixed at one level ı̄SR
for all 0 ≤ t < T, and another (possibly different) level ı̄LR for all t ≥ T, and let us
suppose for simplicity that ρt = 0 for all t.
21 In this case, the complete set of PFE










































for all t ≥ T.
Now suppose that we believe that there should be a unique prediction regarding
the equilibrium outcomes under such a policy; then equilibrium output and inflation
in period t should be given by a single-valued outcome function x(t, T ; ı̄SR, ı̄LR). And
suppose further that we demand that the equilibrium outcomes from any period k > 0
onward should also be given by the same outcome function, if period k is re-numbered
as period 0, and all periods t > k are re-numbered as t− k, given that the structural
equations that define PFE from period k onward are of exactly the same form as
those that define PFE from period 0 onward, with this re-numbering of the periods.22
21Given the linearity of the model’s structural equations, it is reasonable to suppose that the
prediction in the case of any disturbance sequences {ρt, ı̄t} can be expressed as the sum of a predicted
effect of the real disturbance {ρt} (under the assumption that ı̄t = 0 for all t) and a predicted effect
of the monetary policy disturbance {ı̄t} (under the assumption that ρt = 0 for all t). The discussion
in the text concerns the latter half of this problem; but similar considerations can be offered to
select a particular prediction regarding the effects of alternative sequences {ρt}.
22This assumption about the form of the correct prediction is in the spirit of the “minimal-state-
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This means that the outcome function can depend only on t− T, rather than on the
absolute magnitudes of either t or T . But the only one of the PFE given by (2.18)–
(2.19) with this property is the solution with χ = 0. Under this criterion, there is a
unique PFE prediction, obtained by substituting χ = 0 into equations (2.18)–(2.19).
This is also the unique PFE solution selected by the “backward stability” criterion
proposed by Cochrane (2015b).
Under this equilibrium selection, the perfect foresight analysis yields a “neo-
Fisherian” conclusion about the effects of interest-rate policy in the short run, and
not just in the long run. When we set χ to zero, the solution (2.18)–(2.19) implies
that the inflation rate will equal
πt = λ(t− T ) ı̄SR + (1− λ(t− T )) ı̄LR,
where the sequence of weights {λ(t− T )} depend only on the distance in time from
the date of the policy shift. Increasing both ı̄SR and ı̄LR by the same number of
percentage points is predicted to increase the inflation rate in all periods by exactly
that same number of percentage points. Increasing only one of the interest rates is
also predicted to increase the inflation rate both initially and later, and an increase
in ı̄SR should immediately increase inflation by nearly as much as the increase in the
interest rate, even though the increase is not expected to be permanent, if T is far
enough in the future.
The conclusions that one obtains about the sign of the effects of a shift in the
anticipated path of {ı̄t} on inflation seem then to depend crucially on the magnitude
of the reaction coefficients (φπ, φy), if one believes the results of the perfect foresight
analysis. We shall argue however, that the conclusions of PFE analysis are misleading
in the case just discussed, in which the “Taylor principle” is violated. This requires
variable criterion” by McCallum (1983, 1999). It requires that the predicted outcome in any period
not depend on the number of the period, but only on its distance from the period T in which the
interest rate changes, since the equilibrium conditions do not involve the former state variable.
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that we consider whether the PFE paths just discussed are ones that can be justified
as resulting from beliefs that people would arrive at under a process of reflection,
that involves a comparison between their beliefs and the outcomes that should be
expected to result from such beliefs.
2.2.3 Reflective Equilibrium
Why should people have the particular expectations about the future that are
assumed in a perfect foresight equilibrium? One answer could be that, if they ex-
pected a future path for the economy of any other type, action on the basis of their
expectations would produce outcomes that disconfirm those expectations. One might
suppose, then, that experience should sooner or later disabuse people of any expec-
tations that are not consistent with a PFE. And if one supposes that people have
sufficient structural knowledge (including understanding of the central bank’s inten-
tions regarding future policy), one might even think that they should be able to
recognize the inconsistency between their expectations and what they should expect
to happen if others were also to think that way — allowing them to refine their be-
liefs on the basis of their understanding of how the economy works, even prior to any
experience with the current economic disturbance or policy regime. Here we explore
the conditions under which a PFE might arise (or under which outcomes would at
least approximate a PFE) as a result of reflection of the latter sort.
Presumably the structural knowledge required for such reasoning would have to
reflect previous observation of the economy; but it might reflect only experience
with the effects of shocks and/or policy changes of different magnitudes and different
degrees of persistence than the ones currently faced. If it were possible to acquire such
knowledge of how the economy responds to shocks and to monetary policy from past
experience, and then also to have reason to expect time paths for the current shock
and current policy regime that are different from any prior experience, a process of
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reflection of the kind proposed here would make more sense than simply forecasting
by extrapolating the past evolution of the variables that are forecasted. This kind
of reasoning is particularly relevant when considering how one should expect people
to respond to an announcement about future policy intentions that are historically
unprecedented, as with recent experiments in “forward guidance.”
We model a process of reflection by a decisionmaker (DM) who understands how
the economy works — that is, who knows the correct quantitative specification of the
TE relations (2.4) and (2.7) — and who also understands the policy intentions of the
central bank, in the sense of knowing the policy rule (2.8) that will determine policy
in all future periods. However, while the DM understands (and fully believes) the
announcement of what the central bank will do, she does not know, without further
reflection, what this implies about the future evolution of national income, inflation,
or the resulting level of interest rates (unless the policy rule specifies a fixed interest
rate).
The assumed structural knowledge can however be used to refine her expecta-
tions about the evolution of those variables. Suppose that the DM starts with some
conjecture about the future evolution of the economy, which we can summarize by
paths for the variables {et} for each of the dates t ≥ 0, where t = 0 means the date
at which the economy’s future evolution is being contemplated. She can then ask:
suppose that others were sophisticated enough to have exactly these expectations (on
average), both now and at all of the future dates under consideration. What path for
the economy should she expect, given her structural knowledge, under this conjec-
ture about others’ average expectations? (Note that specification of the conjecture
in terms of the implied sequences {et} for t ≥ 0 gives exactly the information that is
needed to answer this question, using the TE relations and the assumed path for the
central-bank reaction function.)
Under such a conjecture {et}, the TE relations imply unique paths for the variables
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{at}, where in each period the implied at is given by (2.10). From these predictions
the DM can infer implied paths {e∗t} for all t ≥ 0, where for each date t, e∗t are
the forecasts that would be correct at that date if the economy evolves in the way
implied by the TE relations, in the case of the average expectations {et}. This
deduction yields an affine operator23
e∗ = Ψe
mapping sequences {et} of conjectured expectations into sequences {e∗t} of correct
forecasts of the same variables.24 Note that the operator Ψ is purely forward-looking;








for all t ≥ 0, where the sequences of matrices {ψj} and {ϕj} are given by




for all j ≥ 1.
We suppose (following the logic sketched above) that an awareness that the im-
plied correct sequences e∗ differ from the conjectured sequences e should constitute a
reason to doubt the reasonableness of expecting people to hold the conjectured beliefs.
But what should one expect instead? We propose that the conjectured beliefs should
be adjusted in the direction of the discrepancy between the model prediction on the
basis of the conjectured beliefs and the conjectured beliefs themselves. Specifically,
23Note that the definition of the operator Ψ depends on the sequences of fundamental perturba-
tions {ωt}. To simplify notation, we suppress these additional arguments. We shall be interested
in the application of this operator to different possible conjectured beliefs {et}, holding fixed the
fundamentals.
24Note that the definition of the operator Ψ depends on the sequences of fundamental perturba-
tions {ωt}. To simplify notation, we suppress these additional arguments. We shall be interested
in the application of this operator to different possible conjectured beliefs {et}, holding fixed the
fundamentals.
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we consider a process of belief revision described by a differential equation
ėt(n) = e
∗
t (n) − et(n), (2.21)
where the continuous variable n ≥ 0 indexes how far the process of reflection has been
carried forward, et(n) is the conjecture regarding average beliefs in period t at stage n
of the process, e∗t (n) is the implied correct forecast in period t if average expectations
are given by the stage n conjectures, and ėt(n) is the derivative of et(n) with respect
to n.
One possible interpretation of the law of motion (2.21) for the belief-revision
process would be as follows.25 At each stage n of the process, one conjectures a
particular sequence of average forecasts {et(n)}. But one supposes that people ought
to further revise their beliefs, and considers the consequences of their revising their
beliefs each time an event occurs that arrives as an independent Poisson process
for each member of the population, with some fixed rate. If one supposes that each
time someone revises their own expectations, they switch from whatever expectations
they had held until that point, to the expectations that would be correct given the
distribution of beliefs held by others at that state of the process of belief revision,
then the rate of change of average beliefs will be given by (2.21); for the average of the
previous period-t expectations of those revising their beliefs in any small time window
will be et(n), while the expectations that they adopt after reconsidering reconsidering
their beliefs will be e∗t (n).
We suppose that the process of reflection starts from some initial “naive” conjec-
ture about average expectations et(0), and that the differential equations (2.21) are
then integrated forward from those initial conditions. This initial conjecture might
be based on the forecasts that would have been correct, but for the occurrence of
25Note that this is not the only possible interpretation of the equation, as it specifies only a
dynamic process for average beliefs, and not the heterogeneity in beliefs that may exist at each
stage of the process. An alternative interpretation, in which n indexes the Poisson distribution of
discrete “levels of thinking” in the population, is discussed below in section 2.4.
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the unusual shock and/or the change in policy that are the occasion for the process
of reflection about what to expect in light of new circumstances. (One might sup-
pose that but for these changes, the situation would have been a sufficiently routine
one for people to have learned how to accurately forecast the economy’s evolution.)
The process of belief revision might be integrated forward to an arbitrary extent,
but like Evans and Ramey (1992, 1995, 1998), we suppose that it would typically
be terminated at some finite stage n, even if the sequences {e∗t (n)} still differ from
{et(n)}.
By a reflective equilibrium26 we mean a situation in which output, inflation and
the nominal interest rate at some date (here numbered date 0) are determined by
the TE relations, using the average subjective expectations e0(n) at the stage n
at which the belief revision process is terminated.27 We may also refer to the entire
sequence of outcomes in periods t ≥ 0 implied by the TE relations if average subjective
expectations in each period are given by et(n) as representing a reflective equilibrium
of degree n. One should however only expect this entire sequence of outcomes to be
realized on the assumption that the same process of reflection would determine beliefs
and hence actions in each of the subsequent periods; this would make sense only if
one supposes that the assumptions used as inputs to the process of reflection do not
change in later periods in the light of additional observations, or that the process of
26It may be objected that we should not speak of “equilibrium” if there remains a discrepancy
between {e∗t (n)} and {et(n)}; but we use the term in the same way that Hicks and Grandmont refer
to a “temporary equilibrium” (even though the assumed expectations need not be model-consistent).
A reflective equilibrium is a temporary equilibrium in which the subjective expectations from which
decision rules are derived are not arbitrarily specified, but instead result from the process of reflection
just described.
27We could generalize the concept to consider possible TE outcomes resulting from distributions
of subjective expectations in which different members of the population have carried forward the
belief revision process to different degrees, so that there would more generally be a distribution of
values of n, rather than a single value as assumed in the discussion here. Note however that, as
discussed in section 2.4, the reflective equilibrium of degree n defined here can already be viewed
as one in which there is a distribution of different levels of reflection across the population, with n
indicating the mean level of reflection rather than a level common to all individuals.
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reflection is only undertaken once. More generally, one might suppose that at each
date the outcomes result from a process of reflection of the above type undertaken at
that date, starting from an initial conjecture that may have been modified relative
to the one used in previous periods; but here we consider only the beliefs resulting
from a one-time process of reflection, and how similar or not these should be to PFE
beliefs.
A reflective equilibrium of the kind defined here might alternatively be supposed to
arise from prior experience with similar shock/policy scenarios. One might suppose
that the first time such a scenario occurred, people had (on average) the “naive”
expectations specified by the sequence e(0), and that as a result the outcome was the
one implied by the TE relations (2.10) given these beliefs. The next time that people
realize that a similar shock and policy response are occurring, one might suppose
that (in light of the previous experience) average expectations e(1)28 would instead
be some convex combination of the previous expectations e(0) and what turned out
to be correct that time, the sequence e∗ = Ψ(e(0)). Hence the change in expectations
between the first occurrence of the scenario and the second, e(1) − e(0), will be
proportional to the discrepancy Ψ(e(0)) − e(0) Similarly, if on the third occasion
that the same scenario is expected to occur, average expectations e(2) are a convex
combination of average expectations e(1) on the second occasion and what turned
out to be correct that time, then the change e(2) − e(1) will be proportional to
Ψ(e(1))− e(1).
One obtains in this way an adjustment process for expectations that is essentially
a discrete version of the continuous process specified in (2.21). We could on this
ground be interested in whether the process (2.21), or a discretization of it, will
converge eventually to a perfect foresight equilibrium, even if we do not believe that
28Here we use e(n) to mean average expectations when there have been n previous occurrences
of the scenario.
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many people possess the structural knowledge reflected in the Ψ mapping. (In the
adaptive learning dynamics just described, it is the working of the economy that
computes Ψ(e) if average expectations are e; no one in the economy need have been
able to anticipate this through mental calculation.) However, our primary interest
in this paper is in the question of what should happen when an unusual, perhaps
wholly unprecedented, policy commitment is announced; and in such a case, our
concept of a reflective equilibrium is relevant only on the assumption that at least
part of the population can (at least approximately) calculate Ψ(e) on the basis of
their understanding of the economy. But even so, it is important to remember that
(2.21) simply indicates the rate of adjustment of average expectations; a reflective
equilibrium of degree n > 0 is still consistent with part of the population maintaining
the “naive” expectations that they held without any consideration of what the TE
relations should imply.
It should be evident that the proposed concept of reflective equilibrium will not
generally lead to a unique prediction as to how the economy should evolve as a re-
sult of a specific policy commitment; the reflective equilibrium outcome will depend
both on the initial expectations e(0) from which the process of reflection is assumed
to start, and on the stage n at which the process of reflection is assumed to termi-
nate. Nonetheless, if the dynamics (2.21) converge globally (or at least for a large
enough set of possible initial conditions) to a particular PFE, and furthermore con-
verge rapidly enough, then a quite specific prediction will be possible under fairly
robust assumptions. This is the case in which it would be justifiable to use the PFE
(the specific PFE that represents this limit of the process of belief revision) as a
prediction for what should happen under the policy commitment in question; for in
this case, a reflective equilibrium will be quite similar to this PFE under a wide range
of assumptions (both a wide range of assumptions about the initial beliefs e(0) and
a wide range of assumptions about the degree n at which the process of reflection
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terminates).
We show below that there exist circumstances under which PFE analysis can
indeed be given a justification of this kind; in particular, we show in section 3 that
when policy is expected to conform to a Taylor rule, the belief revision dynamics
converge to a PFE, and more specifically to the FS-PFE defined in (2.15). This
provides not only a justification for the concept of a PFE, but a definite answer to
the question of which of the two-dimensional continuum of PFE solutions to (2.13)
should be viewed as the model’s prediction. However, in cases where the belief revision
dynamics do not converge, or converge only very slowly, we argue that there is little
reason to expect the outcome of a policy to be similar to the prediction of a PFE
analysis.
To be sure, in such cases, the concept of reflective equilibrium will not provide
a precise quantitative prediction, but only indicate a range of possibilities. But
this does not mean that the predictions of a PFE analysis should be considered
“as likely as anything else” to be correct. For even when the analysis of reflective
equilibrium suggests only a range of possibilities, they may all be quite different from
the conclusions that would be obtained from considering the PFE consistent with the
policy in question. We show below that this is true in the case of a commitment to
a fixed interest rate for a long period of time.
2.2.4 Related Proposals
The idea that a perfect foresight equilibrium can be obtained as the limit of an iter-
ative process with a logic of the kind proposed above is the basis for an algorithm pro-
posed by Fair and Taylor (1983) for numerical solution for the rational-expectations
equilibrium (REE) of dynamic economic models. Essentially, their method begins
with an initial conjectured sequence e(0) of expectations, and computes an updated
sequence of expectations e(1) = Ψ(e(0)) by solving the model under the conjectured
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expectations. This process can be repeated, resulting in a further updated sequence
e(2) = Ψ(e(1)), and so on; the process is continued until one finds that one has a
sequence of conjectured expectations that is close enough to being a fixed point of
the mapping.29 This is essentially a discrete version of the belief-revision dynamics
(2.21). An important difference, of course, is that for Fair and Taylor these dynamics
are simply a way for an econometrician to deduce the predictions of a model that he
wishes to estimate; a failure of the dynamics to converge,30 or to converge quickly
enough, may pose a problem for the econometrician’s ability to draw conclusions, but
is not viewed as affecting the validity of the assumption that the data are generated
in accordance with the REE of an appropriately parameterized model.
An algorithm of this kind is instead proposed as a representation of how equi-
librium is actually determined in the economy, as a consequence of the calculations
upon which people base their decisions, in the “calculation equilibrium” of Evans
and Ramey (1992, 1995, 1998), already mentioned in section 1. Like us, Evans and
Ramey are interested not simply in whether this process would eventually converge
to a PFE, but in how quickly it converges, as they posit that the process should be
terminated after only a few steps owing to “calculation costs” (that they explicitly
model, unlike us). In addition to seeking to endogenize the finite degree of reflection,
29The Fair-Taylor algorithm is actually more complex than this. Because they are interested in
performing actual computations (with only a finite number of operations), they approximate the
forward path of the economy by a sequence that extends only to some finite horizon T . But this
raises the problem that it is only possible to solve a forward-looking model for endogenous variables
out to date T using conjectured expectations that extend farther into the future than date T , and one
cannot get such expectations by numerical solution of the model (under some previous conjecture
about expectations) if one only solves the model out to date T . Their “extended path” method
proposes a way to get around this problem; this complication is not needed in our exposition here,
as we define our updating operation on infinite sequences, even if actual mental operations would
have at best to approximate this.
30Fair and Taylor recognize that their algorithm need not converge. They offer a conjecture that
it “will converge in the class of [RE] models for which the uniqueness conditions hold” (p. 1179)
— that is, when the model has a unique forward-stable solution. In fact, that is just what we find
in the case of the NK model considered here; but this determinacy condition fails in the case of an
exogenous fixed path for the interest rate, as discussed in section 2.2 above.
84
their approach differs from ours in considering discrete iterations of the Φ mapping,
rather than a continuous belief revision process (2.21).
A related idea has also been proposed as an explanation of observed behavior in
laboratory experiments with games of full information, under the name of “level-k
thinking” (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Crawford et al., 2013). This
model begins by positing a “naive” form of behavior, requiring no strategic reasoning
on the basis of information supplied about others’ payoffs, which is taken to be the
behavior of “level-0” players. “Level-1” players instead use their understanding of
the game to calculate their best action on the assumption that the other players in
the game think like “level-0” players; “level-2” players calculate their best action on
the assumption that the other players think like “level-1” players, and so on.
Under a suitable assumption about the play of “level-0” players, the observed
play of many experimental subjects in multi-player games — when the subjects are
confronting a new situation (they have no experience playing the game) but have had
the rules explained to them (so that they possess the structural knowledge to calculate
the best response to a conjecture about others’ expectations) — is found to correspond
to one or another of these levels of reasoning (most commonly, levels 0, 1, 2 or 3).31
The empirical support for this type of reasoning suggests that one should only expect
an outcome similar to the Nash equilibrium prediction in cases where iteration of
the best-response mapping (the analog of our Ψ mapping above) converges relatively
quickly to the Nash equilibrium. (In fact, the concept has primarily been of interest
31Keynes (1936) famously asserted (with regard to the role of higher-order expectations in invest-
ment decisions) that few investors reason beyond “the third degree, where we devote our intelligences
to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be,” though “there are some,
I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees” [p. 156]. Arad and Rubinstein (2012)
report that even in the case of a fairly sophisticated population of experimental subjects, and a
game which makes iterated best-response reasoning relatively natural, few if any subjects exhibit a
level higher than 3. (In their preferred model of their experimental data, level-3 thinkers make up
43 percent of the sample, while the mean level of thinking is 2.2.) See Camerer et al. (2004) and
Crawford et al. (2013) for reviews of other empirical evidence as to the levels of thinking observed
in experimental games.
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because of cases in which level-k thinking allows outcomes that remain quite different
from Nash equilibrium play, for low values of k.)
Given the empirical support for level-k thinking in the experimental game theory
literature, as well as the way that belief revision is modeled by Evans and Ramey, it
may be wondered why we do not consider a discrete a sequence of belief revisions,
et(k) = Ψ
k(e(0)) (2.22)
for integral levels of reasoning k ≥ 0, instead of the continuous process (2.21). While
this would lead to conclusions somewhat like those that we obtain, we prefer the
continuous model of belief revision for several reasons. One is that we are concerned
with average beliefs about average beliefs about . . . , in an economy made up of very
many individuals reflecting individually about what to do. Even if we suppose that
each individual is a level-k thinker for some integral value of k, there is no reason to
assume that everyone in the economy should carry the process forward for exactly the
same number of stages. And a reflective equilibrium of degree n, as we have defined
it, is observationally equivalent to an economy made up of level-k thinkers, under a
particular population distribution of the levels of thinking.
The linear system (2.21) can be integrated forward from the given initial condition
e(0) to obtain
e(n) = exp[n(Ψ− I)] e(0) (2.23)
where I is the identity operator (mapping an infinite sequence e into itself) and the


















for each integer k ≥ 0, and e(k) refers to the “level-k” expectations defined in (2.22).
Moreover, for any n, the {sk(n)} are a sequence of positive weights that sum to 1,
corresponding to a Poisson distribution with parameter n.
Hence a reflective equilibrium of degree n involves the same average expectations,
and hence the same temporary equilibrium outcomes for output, inflation and interest
rates, as a model in which fraction sk(n) of the population is made up of level-k
thinkers, for each k ≥ 0. In this interpretation, the degree of reflection n indexes
a one-parameter family of possible distributions of “levels of thinking” in the sense
proposed in the “level-k” literature, and the continuous variable n indicates the mean
“level of thinking” in the population.33 However, our model does not require that we
assume that all (or any) members of the population have beliefs corresponding exactly
to one of those in the sequence (2.22); for example, we might suppose that most (or
all) people conjecture that the rest of the economy is made up of a non-degenerate
distribution of different levels of thinking, as proposed by .34
Consideration of the continuous process (2.21) rather than a discrete sequence
of progressively higher levels of thinking defined by (2.22) also avoids a technical
problem with the latter progression as a way of modeling convergence to PFE. It
is possible for the mapping Ψ to be such that the sequence of progressively revised
beliefs {e(k)} defined by (2.22) will fail to converge as k is made large, owing to
33The use of a Poisson distribution to characterize the distribution of “levels of thinking” by a
single parameter has been proposed in the experimental game theory literature by Camerer et al.
(2004), though they also define the discrete “levels of thinking” in a different way than is standard
in the “level-k” literature.
34Note that the interpretation of (2.21) suggested above, in the text immediately following the
equation, is one in which at each stage n of the belief-revision process, not only is there a non-
degenerate distribution of degrees of reflection across the population, but most members of the
population have expectations that reflect an assumption that the beliefs of others involve a non-
degenerate distribution of degrees of reflection. We do not present a formal analysis of this “cognitive
hierarchy,” as we are here concerned solely with the aggregate dynamics predicted by our model.
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the existence of a negative eigenvalue of absolute value greater than one, resulting
in explosive oscillations.35 Expectations of high inflation at one level of thinking
result in expectations of low inflation at the next level, which result in expectations
of still higher inflation at the following level, which result in expectations of still lower
inflation at the level after that . . . .
In our view, the possibility of oscillations of this kind should not constitute a
reason to find it unlikely that people would arrive at PFE beliefs even if able to carry
out a very long chain of reasoning about others’ likely beliefs. For the instability
indicated by the explosive sequence requires a very rigid and implausible kind of
reasoning: one must first entertain the belief that everyone else is exactly a level-9
thinker, and then pass from this to the conclusion that really everyone else should
be exactly a level-10 thinker, and so on, even though the extreme conjecture at
each stage of the reasoning has implications quite different from the one before.
Assuming instead a continuous revision of average beliefs (which may be interpreted as
a continuous shift in the population fractions that stop at different levels of thinking)
avoids this possibility — though as we shall see, it still allows for belief revision
dynamics that may fail to converge (for reasons that are less fragile).
Our continuous process of belief revision (2.21) is also closely related to the con-
cept of expectational stability (or “E-stability”) analyzed by Evans and Honkapohja
(2001). Evans and Honkapohja classify rational-expectations equilibria as E-stable or
not through an analysis of the properties of a mapping that associates with each of
a class of a possible “perceived laws of motion” (on the part of the decisionmakers in
some economic model) the “actual law of motion” for endogenous variables that will
result from the expectations implied by that perceived law of motion. The key to their
analysis is thus a mapping from a parametric specification of subjective beliefs to the
35We discuss in the Appendix how this problem can arise, for certain numerical parameter values,
in the context of the model treated in this paper.
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corresponding specification of beliefs that would be correct if people generally act on
the basis of the subjective beliefs, like our Ψ mapping. They then posit a differential
equation for the adjustment of subjective beliefs (specifically, of the parameters of
the “perceived law of motion”) similar to (2.21), and say that an REE (a fixed point
of the Ψ mapping) is “E-stable” if and only if the posited dynamics converge to it
starting from arbitrary initial beliefs. The analysis of E-stability is proposed as a
criterion to distinguish REE that could arise as the outcome of a learning process
from ones that one should not expect to arise.
Our approach differs somewhat from theirs in that we prefer to map subjective
expectations into the expectations that would be correct if people acted upon the
subjective expectations, rather than mapping a subjective description of the process
generating the data into the description that would be correct if people’s forecasts
were based on the subjective description; but while we think that our approach
has advantages,36 it makes little difference for the conclusions obtained. The more
important difference is that we parameterize beliefs in terms of sequences that describe
people’s beliefs about different horizons, instead of assuming that the dynamics can
be described by a Markov process with only a finite number of parameters. This
in turn means that our process is more easily interpreted as a process of prospective
calculation by decisionmakers before they observe what actually happens, rather than
a process of learning from experience. Except for this, our analysis of the convergence
of reflective equilibrium to a PFE poses essentially the same question as Evans and
Honkapohja consider when they determine whether such an equilibrium is E-stable.
Our convergence analysis is even more closely related to the consideration of the
“eductive stability” of REE by Guesnerie (1992, 2008). Instead of assuming that only
the REE of a given model (including the specification of policy) is a relevant prediction
36We need only describe subjective beliefs in terms of the evolution of two variables per period,
the two summary measures of expectations that matter, rather than having to describe the evolution
of the three variables per period that matter for people’s decision problems.
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of the model, Guesnerie proposes that one should consider the entire set of outcomes
that are rationalizable, in the sense that the outcome could result from optimizing
behavior under some specification of expectations regarding the economy’s evolution,
which expectations are for outcomes that could result from optimizing behavior under
still other specifications of expectations, which other expectations are for outcomes
that could result from optimizing behavior, and so on.37 The question whether a given
outcome can be rationalized by progressively higher-order specifications of beliefs
belonging to some admissible set M is essentially a question whether the outcome
can be generated by beliefs that remain within the image of M under progressively
higher-order iterations of the mapping Ψ; hence the question of “eductive stability”
is essentially a question about whether the sequence defined by (2.22) converges to
a given PFE for all initial beliefs e(0) drawn from an admissible set. This in turn
is closely related to (though not identical to) the question of convergence of the
continuous process (2.21).
Like ours, Guesnerie’s analysis considers whether an REE should be the outcome
of a process of reflection based on knowledge of the model of the economy (including
a rule that specifies policy). The most important difference from our analysis is his
consideration of belief specifications that result from repeated application of the Ψ
mapping, rather than from integration of the continuous process (2.21). As discussed
above, this discrete form of the belief revision process converges for a smaller range
of parameter values, making “eductive stability” more elusive. But we believe that
Guesnerie’s criterion admits too large a set of rationalizable outcomes: it does not
seem likely that people capable of a high level of reflection should expect a higher
rate of inflation than the PFE rate, if this is rationalizable only by a conjecture that
most other people are expecting a lower rate of inflation than PFE rate, which would
37This line of analysis was originated by Phelps (1983). See Woodford (2013) for further discussion
of the proposal, and its application to an NK model of the kind assumed in this paper.
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in turn be consistent with their rationality on the supposition that most of them
expect most other people to expect a higher rate than the PFE rate, and so on, with
the bias changing sign in a precisely choreographed way at each higher stage.38 Our
own proposed criterion implies in such a case that if the average level of reflection is
high enough, the economy’s evolution should not be too different from the FS-PFE
prediction.
2.3 Convergence of Reflective Equilibrium to
Perfect Foresight: The Case of a Taylor Rule
Here we show that under some circumstances, the PFE analysis (with a correct
equilibrium selection) can be justified as an approximation to a reflective equilibrium,
and that (for some parameter values) the degree of reflection required to approach
the PFE outcome need not even be too large. The case that we consider is that in
which monetary policy is expected to be specified by a Taylor-type rule of the form
(2.8), where the response coefficients φπ, φy are assumed to be constant over time,
though we allow a time-varying path for the intercept {ı̄t}. The allowance for time-
variation in the intercept allows us to analyze policy experiments in which there may
be a commitment to conduct a “looser” policy for a specified period of time, before
returning to the central bank’s normal reaction function; but here the temporary
loosening of policy is understood as a temporary reduction of the intercept (or a
temporary increase in the implicit inflation target), while the endogenous responses
to variations in inflation in output remain the same. We further assume that these
endogenous responses satisfy (2.14), so that there is a unique bounded PFE solution
38The conclusion in Guesnerie (2008) that the PFE is not eductively stable in the case of monetary
policy specified by a Taylor rule, except for a narrow range of possible parameter values, depends
on oscillating constructions of this kind.
91
in the case of any bounded sequences {gt, ı̄t}, given by (2.15).39
We assume in this section that under the reflective equilibrium dynamics, the zero
lower bound never binds, so that it is in fact feasible for the central bank’s interest-rate
target to satisfy (2.8) at all times. This is not an “equilibrium selection” assumption,
since for each value of n, reflective equilibrium is uniquely defined. It is, however, an
assumption that both the disturbances to fundamentals {ωt} and subjective beliefs
{et(n)} involve small enough departures from the long-run steady state (the values
of the state variables around which we have log-linearized our model) for the interest
rate implied by the TE relations (including the policy specification (2.8)) to always
be non-negative.
This will be unproblematic in the case of small enough disturbances, and small
enough differences between initial expectations and those consistent with the long-run
steady state, i f the belief-revision dynamics (2.21) remain forever bounded. (Since
the system is linear, the bound on the distance between beliefs and steady-state
beliefs will be proportional to the magnitude of the perturbations of fundamentals
and of initial beliefs, so that one can ensure any desired bound — in particular, one
that implies that the ZLB is never violated — by choosing a small enough bound on
those perturbations.) We show below that for the kind of policy considered in this
section, the belief-revision dynamics are indeed bounded for all n. Hence the analysis
in this section applies as long as the shock to the economy, the policy response to
it, and any associated shift in the initially conjectured expectations are all small
enough departures from the long-run steady state. We defer until the next section
consideration of the case in which a large shock causes the ZLB to constrain policy
for some period of time.




2.3.1 Exponentially Convergent Belief Sequences
Our results on the convergence of reflective equilibrium as the degree of reflection
increases depend on starting from an initial (“naive”) conjecture that is sufficiently
well-behaved as forecasts far into the future are considered. We shall say that a
sequence {xt} defined for all t ≥ 0 “converges exponentially” if there exists a finite
date T̄ (possibly far in the future) such that for all t ≥ T̄ , the sequence is of the form






where x∞ and the {ak} are a finite collection of real coefficients, and the {λk} are
real numbers satisfying |λk| < 1. This places no restrictions on the behavior of the
sequence over any finite time horizon, only that it converges to its long-run value in
a sufficiently regular way. We shall similarly say that a vector sequence such as {et}
converges exponentially if this is true of each of the individual sequences (elements
of the vector).
We shall consider only the case in which the initial belief sequence {et(0)} con-
verges exponentially. This amounts to an assumption that these “naive” beliefs are
of a sufficiently simple form, as respects what is anticipated about the very dis-
tant future. Note that the TE relations (2.9)–(2.10) imply that if the sequence of
fundamentals {ωt} converges exponentially, and a conjecture {et} regarding average
subjective expectations converges exponentially as well, then the correct expectations
{e∗t} implied by this conjecture also converge exponentially. Thus if people start from
an initial conjecture about others’ average expectations that converges exponentially,
they should be led by reflection to beliefs that also have this property. Thus the
operator Ψ maps exponentially convergent belief sequences into exponentially con-
verging belief sequences, and any finite number of iterations will similarly lead to
exponentially convergent beliefs.40 Hence our assumption of an initial conjecture
40The conclusion requires that the sequence of fundamentals also converges exponentially, but this
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that converges exponentially does not preclude an initial conjecture that may reflect
some degree of sophistication; it might, for example, be based on the paths that en-
dogenous variables were observed to take on some previous occasion when there was
a shift in fundamentals described by series that converged exponentially.
2.3.2 Reflection Dynamics
We now consider the adjustment of the sequence {et(n)} describing subjective
beliefs as the process of reflection specified by (2.21) proceeds (that is, as n increases),
assuming that fundamentals {ωt} converge exponentially and that the initial “naive”
conjecture {et(0)} converges exponentially as well. Then there exists a finite date T
after which all four sequences (both elements of {ωt} and both elements of {et(0)})
have the form (2.25). There is furthermore a finite set of growth factors {λk} such
that all four sequences can be written in the form (2.25) using the same values {λk}
for each of the series.
Thus all four sequences must belong to the linear space L, consisting of all se-
quences that take the form (2.25) for all t ≥ T̄ , where the value of T̄ , the value of K,
and the values {λk} are part of the definition of L. Note that L is a finite-dimensional
linear space (specifically, one of dimension T̄ +K + 1), the elements of which can be
parameterized by specifying {xt} for 0 ≤ t ≤ T̄ − 1, {ak} for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and x∞. We
shall similarly let L2 ≡ L × L denote the linear space of vector sequences {et} such
that both elements are sequences in L.
The TE relations (2.9)–(2.10) imply that if both fundamentals {ωt} and a conjec-
ture {et} about average beliefs belong to L2, then the implied correct expectations
{e∗t} belong to L2 as well. The dynamics (2.21) then remain forever within the finite-
is a relatively innocuous assumption. It will be satisfied, for example, if the shock (and associated
policy change) that create the situation that we wish to analyze have implications after some finite
horizon (possibly far in the future) that converge to long-run values with dynamics that can be
described by a stable autoregressive process with real roots.
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dimensional linear space L2 if one starts from an initial conjecture {et(0)} in L2.
Our study of the dynamics implied by (2.21) then reduces to the study of a linear
differential equation system on a finite-dimensional vector space, that we can write
in the form
ė(n) = V e(n) +W ω. (2.26)
Here e(n) and ω are vectors of length 2(T̄ + K + 1), that parameterize elements of
L2 (i.e., that specify the weights on 2(T̄ + K + 1) basis vectors for that space), and
V and W are square matrices of that same dimension.
We show in the Appendix that if the central bank’s reaction function satisfies the
Taylor Principle (2.14), each of the 2(T̄ + K + 1) eigenvalues of the matrix V has a
negative real part. This implies that V must be non-singular, and the system (2.26)
has a unique fixed point, given by
ePF ≡ −V −1W ω. (2.27)
Any such fixed point must correspond to a PFE solution of the model, as defined in
section 2.2 above, though the converse is not true: only PFE solutions that belong to
the finite-dimensional space L2 will be fixed points of the reduced-dimension system
(2.21). The unique PFE of this kind corresponds to the FS-PFE defined by (2.15).
The general solution of the linear system of differential equations (2.26) can then
be written in the form
e(n) = ePF + exp(nV ) [e(0)− ePF ] (2.28)
for all n ≥ 0.41 Furthermore, the fact that each of the eigenvalues of V has a negative
real part implies that
lim
n→∞
exp(nV ) = 0,
a matrix that is zero in all its elements. This yields the following important conclu-
sion.
41See, for example, Hirsch and Smale (1974), pp. 89-97.
95
Proposition 1. Consider the case of a shock sequence {gt} that converges exponen-
tially, and let the forward path of policy be specified by a sequence of reaction functions
(2.8), where the coefficients (φπ, φx) are constant over time and satisfy (2.14), and
the sequence of perturbations {ı̄t} converges exponentially. Then in the case of any
initial conjecture {et(0)} regarding average expectations that converges exponentially,
the belief revision dynamics (2.21) converge as n grows without bound to the belief
sequence {ePFt } associated with the FS-PFE.
The implied reflective equilibrium paths for output, inflation and the nominal in-
terest rate similarly converge to the FS-PFE paths for these variables. This means
that for any ε > 0, there exists a finite n(ε) such that for any degree of reflection
n > n(ε), the reflective equilibrium value will be within a distance ε of the FS-PFE
prediction for each of the three variables and at all horizons t ≥ 0.
Further details of the proof are given in the Appendix.
This result has several implications. First, it shows how a PFE can arise through
a process of reflection of the kind proposed in section 2.3 above. But further, it
indicates that only one of the two-dimensional continuum of solutions to the difference
equations (2.13) represents a PFE that can be reached in this way, at least if we accept
the reasonableness of starting from an initial conjecture that is well-behaved in the
sense assumed in the proposition.42 Thus it provides a justification for selecting the
FS-PFE as the relevant perfect-foresight prediction of the model, if by such an exercise
we understand the “perfect foresight” prediction to actually mean the limiting case
of a reflective equilibrium, in which the degree of reflection is unboundedly large.
Proposition 1 also shows that the proposal to use reflective equilibrium, as defined
above, as one’s prediction of what should happen under a given policy need not mean
that one cannot obtain predictions of any precision. In the case considered here, the
42This includes, for example, the “naive” hypothesis that people’s expectations should be unaf-
fected by either the shock that has occurred or the resulting change in policy. This is the specific
initial hypothesis assumed in the numerical illustrations below.
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reflective equilibrium predictions are quite similar, for all sufficiently large values of n,
rather than depending on the precise value of n that is assumed. They are also similar
(in the case of a large enough degree of reflection) regardless of the initial conjecture
that is assumed, as long as the initial conjecture is not extremely distant from the
beliefs associated with the long-run steady state, and the initial conjecture regarding
beliefs about the distant future is well-behaved in the specified sense. Finally, in this
case where the concept of a reflective equilibrium with a relatively high degree of
reflection leads to a sharply-defined prediction, we see that the FS-PFE provides a
useful approximation to that prediction; the accuracy of this approximation should
be greater the greater the degree of reflection that one assumes.
These conclusions refer to the predictions obtained from the theory of reflective
equilibrium in the case that n is “large enough”; an obvious question is how large
n must be for reflective equilibrium to resemble the FS-PFE. The answer to this
will depend on parameter values; but at least in some cases, the required degree of
reflection may not be implausibly large. We illustrate this by considering a numerical
example.
Figure 2.1 considers an experiment in which the intercept ı̄t is lowered for 8
quarters (periods t = 0 through 7 of the quarterly model), but is expected to return to
its normal level from quarter 8 onward. The policy to which the central bank returns
in the long run is specified in accordance with Taylor (1993): the implicit inflation
target π∗ is 2 percent per annum, and the reaction coefficients are φπ = 1.5, φy =
0.5/4.43 The model’s other structural parameters are those used by Denes et al. (2013),
to show that the ZLB can produce a contraction similar in magnitude to the U.S.
“Great Recession,” in the case of a shock to the path of {gt} of suitable magnitude
43The division of φy by 4, relative to the value quoted by , reflects the fact that periods in our
model are quarters, so that it and πt in (2.8) are quarterly rates rather than the annual rates used
in Taylor’s formula.
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and persistence: α = 0.784, β = 0.997, σ−1 = 1.22, and ξ = 0.125.44 Among other
things, these imply a long-run steady-state value for the nominal interest rate of 3.23
percent per annum.45
We assume that ı̄t is reduced by 0.008 (in quarterly units) for the first 8 quarters;
this is the maximum size of policy shift (given the above parameters) for which the
ZLB does not bind in the reflective equilibria associated with any degree of reflection
n ≥ 0.46 In computing the reflective equilibria shown in Figure 2.1, we assume an ini-
tial “naive” conjecture under which expectations continue to be those that are correct
in the steady state with 2 percent inflation. Finally, for simplicity we consider only a
pure temporary loosening of monetary policy, not motivated by any real disturbance
(so that gt = 0 for all t). Because our model is linear, we can separately compute the
perturbations of the steady-state paths of all variables implied by a pure monetary
policy shift (assuming no real disturbance and no change in the initial conjecture),
the perturbations implied by a real disturbance (assuming no change in monetary
policy and no change in the initial conjecture), and the perturbations implied by a
change in the initial conjecture (assuming no real disturbance or change in monetary
policy), and sum these to obtain the predicted effects of a scenario under which a
real disturbance provokes both a change in monetary policy and a shift in the initial
44We do not pretend to offer a quantitatively realistic analysis of alternative policies that should
have been available during the Great Recession; our goal in this paper is purely to explicate the con-
ditions under which perfect foresight analysis of monetary policy commitments makes a greater or
lesser amount of sense. The parameter values proposed by are of interest as a case in which an expec-
tation of remaining at the ZLB for several quarters has very substantial effects — and in which, more
generally, monetary policy anticipations have large effects — under a rational-expectations analysis.
It is in this sort of case that it matters most exactly how one models expectation determination.
45This means that the intercept of the central-bank reaction function assumed in the long run
is smaller here than in Taylor (1993); we assume the value that (in our model) is consistent with
achievement of the 2 percent inflation target in the long-run steady state.
46As shown in Figure 2.1, the shock results in a zero nominal interest rate in each of the first 8
quarters, when n = 0. In quarter 7, the nominal interest rate is also zero for all n ≥ 0 (and also
in the FS-PFE), since the belief-revision dynamics do not change expectations regarding any of the
periods from t = 8 onward.
98
Figure 2.1: Reflective Equilibrium of reducing the Taylor-rule intercept for 8 quar-
ters



























Note: The lines represent reflective equilibrium outcomes for n = 0 through 4 (progressively darker
lines) compared with the FS-PFE solution (dash-dotted line).
conjecture.47 In the figure, we isolate the pure effect of an announced loosening of
monetary policy, to last for a known length of time.
The three panels of the figure show the TE paths of output, inflation and the
nominal interest rate,48 in reflective equilibria corresponding to successively higher
47Of course, in order for the ZLB not to bind in the reflective equilibria, one must bound the
cumulative impact of each of these three perturbations. For example, it will not be possible to loosen
policy (reduce the intercept of the policy reaction function) by as much as is assumed in Figure 2.1
if a shock has occurred that also lowers gt. Indeed, a sufficiently sharp temporary reduction in gt
may require the intercept of the monetary policy reaction function to be raised in order for the ZLB
not to make implementation of the reaction function (2.8) infeasible.
48Here yt is measured in percentage points of deviation from the steady-state level of output:
for example, “2” means 2 percent higher than the steady-state level. The variables πt and it are
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degrees of reflection. The lightest of the solid lines (most yellow, if viewed in color)
corresponds to n = 0; these are the outcomes that are expected to occur under
the “naive” conjecture about average expectations (namely, that these do not take
account of the policy shift at all), but taking account of the announced change in
the central bank’s behavior in the TE analysis under those expectations. (Thus the
n = 0 paths do not represent the naive beliefs, but rather the paths that it would
be correct to expect, if people on average hold the naive beliefs.) The relatively
aggressive reduction in the interest rate has some stimulative effect on output even
in the absence of any change in expectations, but this effect is the same in each of
the first 8 quarters; the effect of the loosening of policy is the same, regardless of the
number of additional quarters for which the loose policy will continue.
As n increases, the effects on output and inflation become greater in quarters zero
through 6; and the extent to which this is so is greater, the larger the number of
quarters for which the looser policy is expected to continue. There are no changes
in the expected paths from quarter 8 onward, as n increases; this is because we have
assumed reversion to the long-run steady-state policy in quarter 8, and the initial
“naive” conjecture already corresponds to a PFE from quarter 8 onward, so that
beliefs do not change as n increases.49 There are similarly no changes in the expected
outcomes in quarter 7, because quarter 7 expectations about later quarters do not
change, in the absence of any outcomes different from those expected in any of those
later quarters. However, the fact that outcomes are different in quarter 7 and earlier
than those anticipated under the “naive” expectations causes beliefs to be revised
in quarters 6 and earlier. As expectations shift toward expecting higher output and
reported as annualized rates, and the units are again percentage points; thus “2” means two percent
per annum. Note that in this and all later figures, yt is reported as a log deviation from steady-state
output, as in the model equations, but πt and it in the figures are shown in absolute terms, not as
deviations from the steady-state values of these variables.
49Because the model is purely forward-looking, revisions of expectations about earlier periods
have no effects on equilibrium determination from period 8 onward.
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inflation in one or more later periods, the TE levels of output and inflation in the
earlier quarters increase (and the nominal interest rate increases as well, through an
endogenous policy reaction). This effect is greater the larger the number of future
quarters about which expectations of output and inflation are revised upward.
The progressively darker solid lines in the figure plot the reflective equilibrium
outcomes for degrees of reflection n = 0, 0.4, 0.8, and so on up to n = 4.0. The FS-
PFE paths are also shown by dark dash-dotted lines. One sees from the figure that
the reflective equilibrium paths converge to the FS-PFE solution as n increases, in
accordance with Proposition 1. Moreover, the convergence is relatively fast, for this
kind of policy experiment. Already when n = 2, the predicted reflective equilibrium
responses for both output and inflation differ from the PFE responses by less than
10 percent (in fact, by less than 7.5 percent) in any quarter. This means that if
the average member of the population is expected to be capable of iterating the Ψ
mapping at least twice,50 one should predict outcomes approximately the size of the
PFE outcomes. When n = 4, the reflective equilibrium output responses differ from
the PFE outcomes by only 1 percent or less, and except in quarter zero (when the
discrepancy is closer to 2 percent), the same is true of the inflation responses.
Higher degrees of reflection would only make the FS-PFE prediction even more
accurate. This provides a good example of the kind of situation in which, in our
view, a perfect foresight equilibrium analysis of the effects of a monetary policy
commitment can make sense. Note that is specifically the FS-PFE, rather than any
other solution to the difference equations (2.13), that provides a good approximation
50Here it is worth recalling that Arad and Rubinstein (2012) find that their subjects have a mean
“level of thinking” of 2.2. Camerer et al. (2004), however, conclude that “an average of 1.5 steps
[of iterated best response] fits data from many games” [p. 861]. It should be noted that these
experimental results relate to subjects’ play in one-shot games, where the strategic considerations
have been explained to the players, but they have no experience on the basis of which to calculate
their best action. One might expect that the realistic mean (effective) degree of reflection n will be
higher in cases where people have some degree of prior experience with the policy regime in question,
as discussed further in section 3.4.
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to a reflective equilibrium (as long as n is not extremely low). This provides an answer
to the question raised by Cochrane (2011) about the justification of appealing to the
FS-PFE in monetary policy analysis.
2.3.3 Effects of a Policy Change Far in the Future
The paradox posed in section 1 involves arguments about the effects of an expec-
tation that policy will be changed permanently, rather than for only a few quarters
as in Figure 2.1, and questions about how much it can matter what is assumed about
policy extremely far in the future. Here we consider these issues in the case of the
class of policies discussed above, where (temporary or permanent) policy changes are
understood simply to involve changes in the intercept of the monetary policy reaction
function.
For the sake of specificity, we consider the following special class of policy ex-
periments. Suppose that ı̄t is expected to take one value (̄ıSR) for all t < T, and
another value (̄ıLR) for all t ≥ T. (The policy experiment considered in Figure 2.1 is
one example of a policy in this class, with ı̄SR < 0, ı̄LR = 0, and T = 8. In this more
general discussion, we again assume that both ı̄SR and ı̄LR are high enough that the
ZLB never binds.) How does the effect of such a policy commitment vary depending
on the choice of the horizon T? In particular, should the effect be similar for all large
enough values of T?
As in the case considered in Figure 2.1, we consider the effects of a pure policy
change, assuming gt = 0 for all t and an initial “naive” conjecture in which average
expectations are consistent with the steady state in which the inflation target π∗ is
achieved at all times.51 Because our model is purely forward-looking, and ı̄t, gt, and
51As in the case discussed above, we can determine the effect of varying the length T of the policy
commitment in the case of a given real disturbance (represented by a sequence {gt}) by summing
the effect of the pure policy change (computed here as a function of T ) and the effect of the real
disturbance in the absence of any policy change (which will be independent of T ).
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et(0) are each the same for all t ≥ T, it is easy to see that the belief-revision dynamics
(2.21) result in et(n) having the same value for all t ≥ T. Let this value be denoted
eLR(n). We see that it must evolve according to
ėLR = [M − I] eLR + m2 ı̄LR (2.29)
starting from the initial condition eLR(0) = 0, where m2 is the second column of the
matrix m in (2.10).
Let us suppose that the quantity on the left-hand side of (2.14) is not exactly
equal to 1;52 in this case we can show (see the Appendix) that M − I is non-singular.
The solution to (2.29) is then easily seen to be53
eLR(n) = [I − exp[n(M − I)]] ēPFLR (2.30)
for all n ≥ 0, where
ēPFLR ≡ [I −M ]−1m2 ı̄LR (2.31)
is the unique rest point of the dynamics (2.29).
Note that ēPFLR is also the stationary vector of average expectations associated with
the unique PFE steady state, in the case that the policy ı̄t = ı̄LR is expected to be
maintained forever. If the reaction coefficients (φπ, φy) satisfy the Taylor Principle




exp[n(M − I)] = 0. (2.32)






52Note that this condition is satisfied by generic reaction functions of the form (2.8) whether the
Taylor Principle is satisfied or not. Hence we do not discuss the knife-edge case in which M − I is
singular, though our methods can easily be applied to that case as well.
53See, for example, Hirsch and Smale (1974), p. 90.
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so that the reflective equilibrium in any period t ≥ T converges to the PFE steady
state associated with the long-run policy (which is also the FS-PFE solution for this
policy). This is of course as we should expect from Proposition 1.
We turn now to the characterization of reflective equilibrium in periods t < T. The
forward-looking structure of the model similarly implies that the solution for et(n)
depends only on how many periods prior to period T the period t is, and not on the
dates of either t or T . If we adopt the alternative numbering scheme τ ≡ T − t (i.e.,
we number periods according to the number remaining until the shift to the long-run
policy), then the solution for eτ (n) for any τ ≥ 1 will be independent of T . Moreover,
in terms of this notation, the belief-revision dynamics (2.21) can be written in the
form
ėτ (n) = −eτ (n) +
τ−1∑
j=1




for each τ ≥ 1, where ϕj2 is the second column of the matrix ϕj. These dynamics can
equivalently be written in the form
ėτ (n) = −eτ (n) + (I − Λ)
τ−1∑
j=1
Λj−1 [Meτ−j(n) + m2ı̄SR]
+ Λτ−1 [MeLR(n) + m2ı̄LR], (2.33)
and integrated forward from the initial conditions eτ (0) = 0 for all τ ≥ 1, using
solution (2.30) for eLR(n).
We observe that for τ = 1, the linear differential equation (2.33) can be solved
uniquely for the function e1(n), given that eLR(n) is already known. Then the equa-
tion for τ = 2 can be solved uniquely for the function e2(n), given that e1(n) and
eLR(n) are already known; and proceeding recursively in this way, one can solve
uniquely for the {eτ (n)} for all values of τ up to any given bound T (corresponding
to the initial period t = 0). In this way, we obtain a unique solution for et(n) for all
t ≥ 0.
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Note further that considering how et(n) changes (for any fixed t) as T is increased
is equivalent to considering how the solution to the system of differential equations
(2.33) changes for progressively larger values of τ. In particular, the behavior of et(n)
as T is made unboundedly large can be determined by calculating the behavior of the
solution to the system (2.33) as τ →∞. This yields the following simple result.
Proposition 2. Consider the case in which gt = 0 for all t, and let the forward path
of policy be specified by a sequence of reaction functions (2.8), where the coefficients
(φπ, φx) are constant over time and such that the left-hand side of (2.14) is non-zero,
and suppose that ı̄t = ı̄SR for all t < T while ı̄t = ı̄LR for all t ≥ T. Then if the initial
conjecture is given by et(0) = 0 for all t, the reflective equilibrium beliefs {et(n)} for




that is independent of t, and this limit is given by
eSR(n) = [I − exp[n(M − I)]] ēPFSR , (2.34)
where
ēPFSR ≡ [I −M ]−1m2 ı̄SR. (2.35)
The reflective equilibrium outcomes for output, inflation and the nominal interest rate
then converge as well as T is made large, to the values obtained by substituting the
beliefs eSR(n) into the TE relations (2.10) and the reaction function (2.8).
The proof is given in the Appendix. This result implies that our concept of re-
flective equilibrium, for any given degree of reflection n, has the intuitively appealing
property that a commitment to follow a given policy (a given intercept for the reac-
tion function, or a given implicit inflation target) for a time horizon T has similar
consequences for all large enough values of T ; moreover, for any large enough value
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of T , the policy that is expected to be followed after date T has little effect on equi-
librium outcomes. Comparison of expressions (2.34)–(2.35) with (2.30)–(2.31) also
shows that the predicted outcomes in the case of any long enough horizon T for
maintenance of the “temporary” policy are close to the predicted outcomes (under a
reflective equilibrium with the same degree of reflection n) in the case that the policy
is expected to be permanent. In the case of policies in the class considered here,
there is no relevant difference between a commitment to a given reaction function for
a long but finite time and a commitment to follow the rule forever.
Next, we consider how the reflective equilibrium prediction in the case of a long
horizon T changes as the degree of reflection n increases. If the coefficients (φπ, φy)






Moreover, the beliefs ēPFSR defined in (2.35) are simply the steady-state PFE beliefs
(or FS-PFE beliefs) in the case of a permanent commitment to the reaction function
(2.8) with ı̄t = ı̄SR. Thus we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that in addition to the hypotheses of Proposition 2, the




















are well-defined and equal to one another. Moreover, both are independent of t, and
equal to the FS-PFE expectations in the case of a permanent commitment to the
reaction function (2.8) with ı̄t = ı̄SR.
Proposition 3 identifies a case in which the thought experiment of considering the
PFE consistent with a permanent commitment to a given policy rule does not lead
106
Figure 2.2: Reflective Equilibrium of Reducing the Taylor-rule Intercept for 200
Quarters




























Note: The lines represent reflective equilibrium outcomes for n = 0 through 20 (progressively darker
lines) compared with the FS-PFE solution (dash-dotted line).
to paradoxical conclusions. Not only does the question have a unique, well-behaved
answer (if one selects the FS-PFE solution, as is conventional in the NK literature),
but this answer provides a good approximation to the reflective equilibrium outcome
in the case of any large enough degree of reflection n and any long enough horizon T
for maintenance of the policy.
Figure 2.2 provides a numerical illustration of these results. The policy experiment
is the same as in Figure 2.1, as are the assumed numerical parameter values, except
that in Figure 2.2 the commitment to the intercept ı̄ < 0 is expected to last for 50
years. (This is not forever, but it should already be evident from the figure that
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further increases in the length of the commitment will make little difference in the
predicted outcomes over the first decade or two of the commitment to looser policy;
consideration of a finite value of T makes it still possible to show how the reflective
equilibrium outcomes change for smaller values of τ, so that the results for all values of
T of 50 years or less can be shown in a single figure.) Again the reflective equilibrium
paths are shown for progressively higher values of n.54 The figure shows not only
the convergence of the reflective equilibrium outcomes for all three variables as T is
made large, for each of the possible values of n, but also the convergence of reflective
equilibrium to the FS-PFE predictions, for each of the possible values of τ (and hence
for each possible value of T ). Not only is eτ (n) close to e
PF
τ for all large enough n in
the case of any single value of τ, but there exists a value of n for which eτ (n) is close
to ePFτ for all τ (and hence for all possible commitment lengths T ).
While a calculation of the FS-PFE implied by a permanent commitment to a
Taylor rule clearly represents a meaningful limiting case, one can not necessarily con-
clude that it should provide a good quantitative prediction about the effects of a
policy change that is expected to be long-lasting. Figure 2.2 shows that (for the pa-
rameter values assumed) the FS-PFE provides a good approximation to the reflective
equilibrium outcome if the degree of reflection is on the order of n = 20 (or even
higher values that are not shown); but this would involve a degree of reflection that
seems fairly unrealistic, if it is taken to represent a purely prospective calculation on
the part of people who have learned about an announced policy change, but not yet
had occasion to observe what actually happens under the new regime. If the degree
of reflection equals only n = 2,55 for example, then if the commitment is to change
policy for only two years (as in Figure 2.1), the reflective equilibrium outcomes are
54Again, the movement from lighter to darker lines corresponds to increasing n. The lines shown
in the figure correspond to the values n = 0, 2, 4, and so on up to n = 20.
55In the figure, this is the line for which the output response is largest, while the inflation and
interest-rate responses are the second-lowest.
108
not too different from the FS-PFE predictions; but when the new policy is expected
to last for decades (as in Figure 2.2), the predicted outcomes are quite different, even
if the responses to the policy change under reflective equilibrium have the same sign
as the FS-PFE predictions. (The output increase predicted by the reflective equilib-
rium is many times larger than the FS-PFE prediction, while the inflation increase
is only a fraction of the FS-PFE prediction.)
This illustrates a general point: in judging the practical relevance of the PFE
prediction, it matters not only whether reflective equilibrium should converge to the
PFE as n is made large enough, but also how quickly such convergence should occur.
The speed of convergence is not too great an issue in the case of a commitment to a
new policy to be maintained for only a few quarters, when the new policy is a Taylor
rule, and when the temporary policy is to be followed by a reversion to a policy
regime that the public already understands well on the basis of past experience (the
experiment considered in Figure 2.1). It is a bigger issue, however, in the case of
a commitment to a new permanent (or at any rate long-lasting) regime that differs
non-trivially from past policy (for example, adoption of a new inflation target that
is announced as a permanent change), even when both the old and the new policies
conform to the Taylor principle. And, as we show in the next section, it is a still
larger issue in the case of a temporary regime under which the Taylor principle is not
expected to be satisfied, as in the case of a commitment to a fixed interest rate for a
significant period of time.
2.3.4 The Fisher Equation and Long-Lasting Shifts in
Policy
We can now address a question posed in the title of our paper: what should happen
if people come to expect (whether as a result of a central-bank announcement, or on
the basis of experience) that a “loose” monetary policy will be maintained for several
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more years? Should such a shift in understanding of the outlook for future policy be
inflationary, or can it be deflationary? If policy is expected to follow a Taylor rule,
and “looser policy” means a lower intercept in that rule (and thus a lower nominal
interest rate f or any given outcomes for inflation and output, but not necessarily a
lower nominal interest given the endogenous effects on inflation and output), then we
can answer the question using the results above.
Our results show that in our model, an expectation that the reaction-function
intercept will be kept lower than usual for the next several years should lead to
higher inflation and output, regardless of the degree of reflection, and regardless of
the length of time for which the looser policy is expected to be maintained. (In this
respect, the FS-PFE solution gives the correct answer, at least as regards the sign
of the effects.) If the loosening of policy is expected to be sufficiently transitory
(though it may last for some years), as in Figure 2.1, then the policy change will be
associated with a temporarily lower nominal interest rate, regardless of the degree of
reflection. But if the shift in the policy rule is expected to last for a sufficiently long
(though possibly finite) period of time, the higher inflation rate and output will be
associated with a higher nominal interest rate, despite the reduction in the intercept
of the central bank’s reaction function, except in the case of a degree of reflection
that is very low. (Figure 2.2 shows that when n = 2 or greater, even a commitment
to maintain looser policy for five years results in a higher nominal interest rate than
the steady-state level that would represent the reflective equilibrium in the absence
of a policy change.56 Longer commitments would result in even greater increases in
the nominal interest rate.)
In the case of a permanent increase in the inflation target, the FS-PFE prediction
is that the nominal interest rate should increase one-for-one with the increase in
56The effect of a commitment that lasts for T = 20 quarters can be read off from the figure by
observing the predictions for quarter 180, which corresponds to τ = 20.
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inflation (which increases by exactly the increase in the target); the relationship
between the permanent change in the inflation rate and the permanent change in the
level of nominal interest rates satisfies the Fisher equation. In the case of a reflective
equilibrium with only a finite degree of reflection n, the Fisher equation need not be
satisfied (it depends on expectations being correct, at least on average), though it
will hold approximately, if n is large. But even for modest values of n, a permanent
increase in the inflation target, which permanently raises inflation, is likely to be
associated with an increase, rather than a decrease, in nominal interest rates.
These results do not involve any discontinuity in the predicted effects of a policy
change as one passes from the case of a long-lasting (but still temporary) change to
the case of a permanent change in policy; Figure 2.2 shows how the predicted effects
on output, inflation and the nominal interest rate all vary continuously as τ increases
(and hence as T increases, for a fixed value of t). Nor do they involve any failure of
the conventional expectation that reducing the intercept of the interest-rate reaction
function represents a more expansionary (and more inflationary) policy, regardless of
the length of time that the policy shift is expected to last. They do, however, indicate
that the change in the nominal interest rate is not necessarily a good measure of the
degree to which policy is loosened, as a shift down in the reaction function may
be associated with an increase in the nominal interest rate. Indeed, this is almost
certainly what should be observed, in the case of a sufficiently long-lasting change in
policy.
Rather than supposing that the degree of reflection n is fixed, as in our formal
analysis above, it is plausible to suppose that in the case of a long-lasting shift in
policy, average expectations at the time of the initial announcement of the novel
policy will correspond to a relatively low value of n, but that over time the value
of n should increase. The reason is not simply that people would have more time
to think through the implications of the new policy regime, but (more importantly)
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that observation of economic outcomes under the new regime should lead people to
adjust their expectations in the same direction as is implied by an increase in n.57
Consider, for simplicity, the case of a permanent shift in the intercept ı̄LR, and
suppose that the initial conjecture e(0) is that expectations do not change at all
(et(0) = 0 for all t). The reflective equilibrium for some low value of n involves
et(n) = eLR(n) for all t, where eLR(n) is defined in (2.30). This will imply constant
levels of output, inflation and the nominal interest rate corresponding to that value
of n (the values that can be read off from the extreme left points of the responses
shown in Figure 2.2). But, given these constant levels of output, inflation and interest
rates, the correct expectations e∗t (n) will also be the same for all t, but different from
average expectations eLR(n). And observing actual output, inflation and interest rates
for even a few periods should indicate the direction in which outcomes under the new
regime are different from those that have been expected on average.
If we suppose that as a result, people’s expectations (at least on average) should
shift in the direction of the discrepancy — specifically, that et continues to be the
same for all future dates t, but that the constant value changes in proportion to the
constant difference
e∗(n) − eLR(n) = [M − I] eLR + m2 ı̄LR
— then the new time-invariant value for et should correspond to eLR(n) for a some-
what higher value of n, given that the evolution of eLR(n) in response to increases in
n is given by (2.29). But in subsequent periods, observation of the outcomes resulting
57In the experimental game theory literature, it is often observed that when subjects get to play
a given game repeatedly, observed play deviates much less from the Nash equilibrium prediction
after a few repetitions (see, e.g., Nagel, 1995). In the games in question, this is what the theory of
reflective equilibrium would predict, with a fixed initial conjecture, if the average level of reflection
n were to increase on each repetition. However, it could also occur without any increase in the
average level of reflection, if one supposes that the initial conjecture changes on each repetition,
being determined by average behavior on the previous instance; this is essentially the interpretation
of her data proposed by Nagel. Stahl (1996) interprets the same data in terms of an alternative
learning model, in which there is an increase over time in players’ “level of thinking.”
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from expectations eLR(n) with this higher value of n should lead expectations to be
revised in a way that corresponds to a still higher value of n, and so on indefinitely
if the new regime continues without further changes.
In this way, one might expect to observe over time, not the reflective equilibrium
(as defined above) corresponding to a single value of n, but rather a progression from
lower to steadily higher values of n. If the initial level of reflection when the policy
shift is announced is quite low, then even a permanent reduction in the reaction-
function intercept might initially be associated with a decrease, rather than an in-
crease, in the nominal interest rate (as shown, for example, in Figure 2.2 for the case
n = 0). However, observation of the outcomes produced by the new policy (which
differ from average expectations) should cause n to increase; and at first, this should
result in increases in output, inflation and the nominal interest rate required by the
new reaction function (as shown in Figure 2.2 by the difference between the responses
for n = 2 compared to those for n = 0).
As n increases still further (as it should with sufficient experience of the new
policy), the output effect of the policy change should decrease, while inflation and
the nominal interest rate continue to increase (as shown in Figure 2.2 by the movement
from n = 2 to the cases n = 4, n = 6, and so on). Hence such a permanent shift
in policy could be associated with an initial decrease in the nominal interest rate,
though the nominal interest rate should eventually (and permanently) be increased.
The policy shift should increase both output and inflation, but if the effective degree
of reflection increases with experience, one would observe a much stronger output
effect in the beginning, while the eventual effect would be a permanent increase in
inflation and the nominal interest rate while most of the output effect would prove
temporary.58
58If one further supposes that the automatic rate of price increase π∗ between occasions on which
prices are re-optimized would eventually increase in the case of a permanently higher inflation rate,
then the output effect would eventually disappear altogether. This is not seen in Figure 2.2 even as
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Thus a permanent (or long-lasting) “loosening” of policy, in the sense of a reduc-
tion of the reaction-function intercept, need not mean permanently lower nominal
interest rates. (Indeed, if the change in policy is immediately understood to be per-
manent, and a sufficiently large part of the population engages in a sufficient degree
of reflection, the period for which the nominal interest rate is reduced might not be
very long.) But this doesn’t mean that a central bank couldn’t decide to maintain
a lower nominal interest-rate target for many years, and that it could not credibly
announce an intention to do so. However, such a policy (or such an understanding of
policy) is not equivalent to any particular degree of adjustment of the intercept of a
Taylor-type rule, and our results above need not apply. We turn next to an analysis
of reflective equilibrium in this alternative case.
2.4 Consequences of a Temporarily Fixed
Nominal Interest Rate
We now consider the case in which it comes to be understood (either as a result
of a shock, or a policy announcement) that the nominal interest rate will be fixed at
some level ı̄SR up to some date T , while it will again be determined by the “normal”
central bank reaction function from date T onward. (The latter policy is assumed
to be a rule of the form (2.8), in which the response coefficients satisfy the Taylor
Principle (2.14), and the intercept is consistent with the inflation target π∗.) There
are various reasons for interest in this case. First, a real disturbance may create a
situation in which the interest rate prescribed by the Taylor rule violates the ZLB
for some time; in such a case, it may be reasonable to suppose that the central bank
will set the nominal interest rate at the lowest possible rate, regardless of the exact
outcomes for output and inflation, as long as the situation persists, but return to
T →∞ and n→∞, because of the assumption of indexation at the fixed rate π∗.
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implementation of its normal reaction function once this is feasible. And second, a
central bank may commit itself to maintain the nominal interest rate at its lower
bound for a specific period of time, even if this is lower than the rate that the Taylor
rule would prescribe. The “date-based forward guidance” provided by several central
banks in the aftermath of the global financial crisis arguably involved commitments
of this kind; and while no explicit promises were made about how policy would be
conducted beyond the horizons in question, one might suppose that people would
expect the central bank to revert to its usual approach to policy once there ceased
to be any explicit commitment to behave otherwise. We are interested in the extent
to which such a temporary change in policy should have effects similar or different
from the effects of a temporary shift in the intercept of the monetary policy reaction
function, analyzed above.
We are interested in two kinds of questions about the effects of such policies. One
is what the effect should be of changing ı̄SR, taking the horizon T as given (perhaps
by the expected persistence of an exogenous real disturbance). While there might
seem to be no room to vary the short-run level of the interest rate, if we imagine a
case in which it is already at the ZLB, it would even in that case always be possible to
commit to a higher (though still fixed) interest-rate target, and some have suggested
that (at least when the situation of being constrained by the ZLB persists for a long
enough time) it might actually be expansionary to do so. A second question is the
effect of changing T, the length of time that the interest rate is held fixed, taking as
given the time path of the real disturbance. To what extent can a commitment to
keep the interest rate low for a longer time substitute for an ability to cut rates more
sharply right away (which may be infeasible due to the ZLB)?
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2.4.1 Convergence to Perfect-Foresight Equilibrium
We first consider whether reflective equilibrium converges to a PFE again in this
case, as n grows, and if so to which of the possible PFE paths. The question of
equilibrium selection is of particular interest in this policy experiment, since here,
unlike the case considered in section 3, the “backward stability” selection criterion
proposed by Cochrane (2015b) would imply a different solution than the conventional
“forward stability” (or local determinacy) criterion.59
Because of the forward-looking character of our model, the determination of re-
flective equilibrium from period T onward depends only on the specification of policy
from period T onward. Since we again assume a reaction function that satisfies the
Taylor Principle over this period, the results of section 3 continue to apply; specifi-
cally, Proposition 1 implies that in the case of any initial conjecture that converges
exponentially, reflective equilibrium outcomes will converge to the unique FS-PFE
outcomes as n increases. If we suppose that gt = 0 for all t ≥ T , this means that
the reflective equilibrium outcomes for all t ≥ T will converge to the steady state
consistent with the inflation target π∗. Note that this simple result already tells us
that reflective equilibrium cannot generally converge to the “backward stable” solu-
tion proposed by , as this does not generally imply that the long-run steady state is
reached from date T onward. Instead, if reflective equilibrium converges to any PFE,
it can only converge to the FS-PFE, which does imply steady-state outcomes from
date T onward in the case just discussed.
The analysis of convergence prior to date T requires an extension of our previous
result, because now we assume that the response coefficients (φπ, φy) differ before
and after date T . Nonetheless, as shown in the Appendix, the methods used to prove
Proposition 1 can be extended to establish convergence in this case as well.
59See the discussion of this point by , sec. 4.1.
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Proposition 4. Consider the case of a shock sequence {gt} that converges exponen-
tially, and let the forward path of policy be specified by a fixed interest rate ı̄SR for all
0 ≤ t < T, but by a reaction function of the form (2.8) for all t ≥ T, where the coeffi-
cients (φπ, φx) of the latter function satisfy (2.14), and the intercept is consistent with
the inflation target π∗. Then in the case of any initial conjecture {et(0)} regarding
average expectations that converges exponentially, the belief revision dynamics (2.21)
converge as n grows without bound to the belief sequence {ePFt } associated with the
FS-PFE.
The implied reflective equilibrium paths for output, inflation and the nominal in-
terest rate similarly converge to the FS-PFE paths for these variables. This means
that for any ε > 0, there exists a finite n(ε) such that for any degree of reflection
n > n(ε), the reflective equilibrium value will be within a distance ε of the FS-PFE
prediction for each of the three variables and at all horizons t ≥ 0.
Figure 2.3 provides a numerical illustration of this result. The model parameters
are as in the previous numerical examples, and for simplicity we again show the effects
of a pure shift in monetary policy, assuming gt = 0 for all t and an initial conjecture
under which et(0) = 0 for all t. As in Figure 2.1, it is again assumed that monetary
policy is expected to depart from the “normal” Taylor rule for 8 quarters, and then
to revert to the “normal” reaction function thereafter. The only difference is that in
Figure 2.3 it is assumed that the nominal interest rate is fixed at zero for the first 8
quarters.
For the case n = 0 (the lightest of the lines in the figure), the responses are
identical to those in Figure 2.1: the two shifts in monetary policy have been chosen
to lower the nominal interest rate to the same extent (i.e., to zero), in the absence of
any change in average expectations. For higher values of n, the effects of the policy
change are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 2.1, but not exactly the same: the
output and inflation increases are somewhat larger when the interest rate is expected
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Figure 2.3: Reflective Equilibrium of Fixing the Nominal Interest Rate for 8 Quar-
ters


























Note: The lines represent reflective equilibrium outcomes for n = 0 through 4 (progressively darker
lines) compared with the FS-PFE solution (dash-dotted line).
to remain fixed, because now there is no expectation of endogenous interest-rate
increases in subsequent periods in response to the increases in output and inflation.
Because these stronger effects depend on reflection about what should happen in
the future, given what is understood about future monetary policy, they are larger
the greater the degree of reflection, and strongest under the assumption of perfect
foresight. (They are also larger the longer the time for which the interest rate is
expected to remain fixed, as this increases the degree to which reflection about the
effects of future policy matters.) This means that in the case of a temporarily fixed
interest rate, the difference between the PFE predictions and those obtained from a
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given finite degree of reflection is greater than that obtained in the case of a temporary
shift in the Taylor-rule intercept.
In Figure 2.3, as in Figure 2.1, an average degree of reflection of n = 4 results in
TE outcomes that are similar to the PFE predictions. But the reflective equilibrium
outcomes when n = 2 are not as close to the PFE outcomes as they are in Figure 2.1,
especially in the first quarters (when the anomalous policy is still expected to last for
more than a year). In quarter zero, the output response when n = 2 is 14 percent
smaller than the PFE prediction, and the inflation response is 10 percent smaller; and
even when n = 4, the output and inflation responses are both about 3 percent smaller
than the PFE predictions (whereas output differs by less than 1 percent in Figure 2.1,
and inflation by less than 2 percent). Moreover, these discrepancies rapidly become
much larger if the interest rate is expected to be fixed for an even longer period of
time.
2.4.2 Very Long Periods with a Fixed Nominal Interest
Rate
Much recent criticism of the implications of standard New Keynesian models re-
garding the effects of “forward guidance” have focused on the implications of such
models (when solved under the assumption of perfect foresight or rational expecta-
tions) if one assumes that the nominal interest rate would be fixed for several years.60
It should be noted that no central banks have actually experimented with date-based
forward guidance that referred to dates more than about two years in the future;
and while the period in which the U.S. federal funds rate target has remained at its
lower bound has (as of the time of writing) lasted for more than six years, there was
little reason for anyone to expect it to remain at this level for so long when the lower
60See, for example, Chung (2015), Del Negro et al. (2013), McKay et al. (2015), and Cochrane
(2015b).
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Figure 2.4: Reflective Equilibrium of Fixing the Interest Rate for 15 Years

















Nite: The lines represent reflective equilibrium outcomes for n = 0 through 4 (progressively darker
lines) compared with the FS-PFE solution (dash-dotted line).
bound was reached at the end of 2008. Nonetheless, as discussed in section 1, thought
experiments involving long-lasting periods at the ZLB remain useful for clarifying the
theoretical coherence of proposed solution concepts.
If one assumes a date T many years in the future, the FS-PFE predicted effects
on both output and inflation rapidly become extremely large. However, the effects
predicted by reflective equilibrium with some modest (though positive) degree of
reflection n do not grow in the same way, so that the PFE prediction rapidly becomes
a worse and worse approximation to what one should expect in a reflective equilibrium
with a modest level of n, if the horizon T is very long. Figure 2.4 illustrates this, in
the case of the same model calibration as used in previous figures, by considering a
(certainly unrealistic) situation in which the nominal interest rate is expected to be
fixed for 15 years.61
61The third panel of the figure is omitted, since the expected path of the nominal interest rate
is independent of the degree of reflection, as in Figure 2.3. Note also that now only the degrees of
reflection n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 are shown in the figure, in order to allow the successive lines to be clearly
distinguished from one another.
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According to the log-linearized model, an expectation of remaining at the ZLB
for such a long time would, under the FS-PFE analysis, imply extremely large effects
in the initial quarter: log output higher than its steady-state level by 4.36 (output
78 times its steady-state level), and an inflation rate of 442 percent.62 Of course,
such extreme predictions make it foolish to believe the assumptions made in this
calculation (even given the assumption about policy): log-linearization of the model
cannot be expected to yield even a roughly accurate result in the case of such a
massive departure from steady-state conditions, nor do even the assumptions of the
exact NK model — such as the assumption that the fraction 1 − α of firms that
do not reconsider their prices during the quarter simply supply whatever demand
they receive at those prices — make sense under such extreme circumstances. We
mention them only to point out that even granting the validity of our log-linearized
model for purposes of such an exercise, the FS-PFE predictions are not at all a close
approximation to the reflective equilibrium predictions.
Even if we assume n = 4 (a rather high average degree of reflection), the predicted
increase in log output in quarter zero is instead only 1.11 (output 3 times its steady-
state level), while the inflation rate is predicted to increase only to 31.5 percent per
annum. If we assume a more modest degree of reflection, n = 2, the predicted increase
in log output is only 0.53 (output 1.7 times its steady-state level), and inflation is
predicted to increase only to 10.6 percent. This is still quite a large increase in output
(large enough to make one doubt the realism of using the model for such an analysis),
but these results are not close to the shocking predictions of the FS-PFE analysis.
The FS-PFE predictions of the log-linearized model become even more extreme
if a longer period at the ZLB is contemplated: both the predicted effects on output
62Note that here, as in previous figures, πt is reported as a conventional annualized rate, so that
“πt = 100” means that the price level will be twice as high (100 percent greater) after a year, while
“yt = 100” means that the log of output exceeds its steady-state value by 1.00, so that output is
2.72 times its steady-state level.
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and inflation grow without bound (and quite rapidly) as T is increased. For the kind
of situation described in Proposition 4, but with gt = 0 for all t, the FS-PFE paths
for inflation and output are found by solving (2.13) for all t < T, working backward
from the terminal condition xT = 0 (which represents the unique FS-PFE given the





for all τ ≥ 1, where τ ≡ T − t is again the number of periods remaining until policy
is expected to revert to the Taylor rule, and the matrix B and vector b are the ones
corresponding to policy response coefficients φπ = φy = 0. We show in the Appendix
that in this case the matrix B has an eigenvalue µ2 > 1, and that the left eigenvector
e′2 associated with this eigenvalue satisfies e
′
2b 6= 0. It follows that the solution (2.36)
contains a component that grows as µτ2 as τ is made larger (which is to say, as T is
made larger, for any value of t). Thus both elements of xt grow exponentially as T is
increased.63
objects to the FS-PFE as a solution concept on this ground, noting that it is
implausible to suppose that changes in the specification of policy only very far in the
future (say, a commitment to maintain the low interest rate for 1001 quarters instead
of for only 1000 quarters) should have any significant effect on current economic
outcomes. But this unpalatable feature of the FS-PFE is not a property of our
concept of reflective equilibrium, assuming a fixed degree of reflection n as the length
of the policy commitment is increased. Methods similar to those used to establish
Proposition 2 also allow us to show the following.
Proposition 5. Consider the case in which gt = 0 for all t, and let the forward
63Note further that the elements of xt are the logarithm of output and the continuously com-
pounded rate of inflation; these quantities must both be exponentiated to obtain the level of output
and the factor by which prices increase relative to the previous year’s prices. Thus even if the ele-
ments of xt only grew l inearly with T , output and the conventional measure of inflation would both
grow exponentially. Instead, here the latter quantities grow as the exponential of an exponential.
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path of policy be specified as in Proposition 4.Then if the initial conjecture is given by
et(0) = 0 for all t, the reflective equilibrium beliefs {et(n)} for any degree of reflection




that is independent of n, and this limit is again given by (2.34), where ēPFSR is again
defined in (2.35). The reflective equilibrium outcomes for output, inflation and the
nominal interest rate then converge as well as T is made large, to the values obtained
by substituting the beliefs eSR(n) into the TE relations (2.10) and the reaction function
(2.8).
The proof is given in the Appendix. The result is similar to the one stated in Propo-
sition 2.64 There is one important difference, however: in the present case, the sta-
tionary expectations ēPFSR no longer correspond to a unique FS-PFE associated with
permanent maintenance of the interest rate it = ı̄SR. (There is no unique FS-PFE
under such a policy; instead, as discussed in section 2.2, there is a continuum of PFE
that all converge asymptotically to the steady state in which expectations are given
by ēPFSR .)
Thus if we consider the reflective equilibrium associated with any given finite
degree of reflection n, we find that equilibrium outcomes are essentially the same for
any long enough horizon T . Moreover, for any long enough T , reflective equilibrium
outcomes are nearly constant over time, and close to the constant outcomes that
occur under a reflective equilibrium of the same degree in the case of a permanent
commitment to the fixed interest rate it = ı̄SR. (This last observation follows from
a comparison of (2.34)–(2.35) with (2.30)–(2.31), where the latter equations define
64Note that Proposition 2, as stated earlier, did not require that the reaction function coefficients
satisfy (2.14); it would apply, in particular, to the case φπ = φy = 0, corresponding to fixed interest
rates before and after date T . The only difference here is that Proposition 5 establishes a similar
result even when the response coefficients prior to date T differ from those from date T onward.
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the reflective equilibrium of degree n in the case of a permanent commitment to a
given reaction function.) Thus there is no material difference, as far as reflective
equilibrium is concerned, between commitment to a fixed interest rate for a long but
finite time and a commitment to fix the interest rate permanently.
This attractive feature of reflective equilibrium does not, however, mean that
it leads to predictions similar to those of the “backward stable” PFE solution of
. In those cases where the degree of reflection n is large enough for the reflective
equilibrium to correspond nearly to a PFE (as, for example, in the case that n = 4
or larger, for the parameter values and policy experiment considered in Figure 2.3),
the PFE that it approximates is the FS-PFE (uniquely defined in the case of a finite-
length interest-rate peg), and not the backward-stable PFE. These solutions are in
fact quite different — not only in the case of large values of T , but even when T
is very short.65 It is thus important to note that one need not accept Cochrane’s
solution concept as a sensible one, in order to avoid the unpalatable prediction of
explosive behavior as T is made large.
2.4.3 The Paradox Explained
We can now explain the error in the reasoning sketched in the introduction. It is
true that under the assumption of a permanent interest-rate peg, the only forward-
stable PFE are ones that converge asymptotically to an inflation rate determined by
the Fisher equation and the interest-rate target (and thus, lower by one percentage
point for every one percent reduction in the interest rate). But for most possible
65They imply quite different equilibrium responses even when T is arbitrarily short: in a
continuous-time version of the model, they would imply different responses even in the limit as
the continuous length of time T is made infinitesimally small (which is possible because under the
“backward stable” solution, outcomes after date T depend on the policy pursued before that date).
This is one of the especially unattractive features of the “backward stable solution” as a solution
concept: it implies that pegging the interest rate at different levels should lead to different equilib-
rium outcomes over a period of years, even when the pegs in question are to last for only one second!
The concept of a reflective equilibrium for some given degree of reflection n avoids this undesirable
prediction, while also yielding predictions that converge as T is made unboundedly large.
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initial conjectures (as starting points for the process of belief revision proposed above),
none of these perfect foresight equilibria correspond, even approximately, to reflective
equilibria — even to reflective equilibria for some very high degree of reflection n.
Nor is this because in such cases high-n reflective equilibria correspond to some other
kind of PFE; instead, one generally finds that the belief-revision dynamics f ail to
converge to any PFE as n increases, in the case of a permanent interest-rate peg.
This failure of convergence can be illustrated using results already presented
above. In the case of a policy under which it = ı̄LR forever, if we further assume
that gt = 0 for all t and start from an initial conjecture under which et = 0 for all
t, then the belief-revision dynamics are given by (2.29) for all t, where M in this
equation is now the matrix corresponding to response coefficients φπ = φy = 0, and
we now have et(n) = eLR(n) for all t.
66 The solution for general n is again given by
(2.30), where ēPFLR is again defined by (2.31). However, whereas in the Taylor-rule
case considered in section 3, this solution implied that eLR(n)→ ēPFLR as n→∞, this
is no longer true in the case of an interest-rate peg. When φπ = φy = 0, we show
in the Appendix that the matrix M − I has a positive real eigenvalue. This in turn
means that the elements of the matrix exp[n(M − I)] grow explosively as n is made
large, and eLR(n) diverges from ē
PF
LR , rather than converging to it. Nor does eLR(n)
approach any PFE: the distance between eLR(n) and e
∗
LR(n) also grows explosively
as n increases.
It similarly follows (using Proposition 5) that the nearly-stationary outcomes ob-
tained in the case of any long enough finite-length interest-rate peg under a fixed
degree of reflection n do not converge to any limit as n is made large. Thus neither








66The case considered now is of the same kind as was considered in deriving (2.29), except that










is well-defined in the case of a temporary interest-rate peg.67 It is true (for any finite
length of peg) that a high enough degree of reflection leads to an outcome indis-
tinguishable from a forward-stable PFE; and it is also true (for any finite degree of
reflection) that a long enough finite-length peg leads to reflective equilibrium out-
comes that are indistinguishable from those under a permanent peg. But it does not
follow from these observations that a long enough peg together with a high enough
degree of reflection must lead to anything similar to a forward-stable PFE associated
with a permanent interest-rate peg. It is the failure to recognize this that leads to
paradoxical conclusions in the argument sketched in the introduction.
2.4.4 Consequences of Maintaining a Low Interest Rate for
Longer
Consideration of the possible PFE in the case of a permanently fixed interest rate
thus need not provides a correct conclusion as to the likely effects of a commitment
to maintain the nominal interest rate at a low level for a longer time than that for
which the zero lower bound prevents a central bank from implementing its normal
reaction function. In fact, one can easily show that for any given degree of reflection,
commitment to keep the nominal interest rate at a low level for a longer period of
time is necessarily both expansionary and inflationary, at least in the case where (at
the future horizon at which one is lengthening the commitment to fixed-interest-rate
policy) neither exogenous disturbances nor the assumed initial conjecture are sources
of deflationary pressures.
67Note that ēPFSR , the common limit given in Proposition 3, is still well-defined in this case. But
eSR(n) no longer converges to it as n is made large, nor does e
PF
t converge to it as T is made
large. Failure of the “Taylor Principle” invalidates both of those convergence results, relied upon in
Proposition 3.
126
Proposition 6. For a given shock sequence {gt} and a given initial conjecture {et(0)},
consider monetary policies of the kind described in Proposition 4, with ı̄SR < 0 (that
is, an initial fixed interest rate at a level lower than the steady-state nominal interest
rate associated with the long-run inflation target π∗). Suppose also that gt = 0 and
et(0) = 0 for all t ≥ T.68 Then for any fixed ı̄SR and fixed level of reflection n > 0,
increasing the length of the commitment from T to T ′ > T increases both inflation
and output in the reflective equilibrium, in all periods 0 ≤ t < T ′, while it has no
effect on either variable from date T ′ onward.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the effect indicated in Proposition 6, for the case of a pure
shift in monetary policy (that is, one in which gt = 0 and et(0) = 0 for all t).
Model parameters are as in the earlier numerical examples, and as in Figures 2.3 and
2.4, ı̄SR is set at the lowest rate allowed by the zero lower bound. In each panel,
the equilibrium paths for output are compared in the case of alternative values of
T , ranging from 8 quarters up to 14 quarters. The successive panels indicate the
outcomes under different degrees of reflection: in panel (a), the FS-PFE outcomes
are shown (corresponding to the limit as n → ∞, given Proposition 4); in panel
(b), the reflective equilibrium outcomes for the case n = 4; and in panel (c), the
corresponding outcomes if instead n = 0.5.
One sees that with each successive increase in the length of time for which the
low interest rate is to be maintained, output is increased, in each of the periods in
which the interest rate is fixed; this is true regardless of the assumed value of n.69
68In fact, it should be evident from the proof given in the Appendix that it suffices that gt ≥ 0
and et(0) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ T. What matters for the proof is that there not be factors tending to reduce
output or inflation, apart from the effects of monetary policy, that are anticipated to affect periods
beyond date T .
69Except, of course, in the limiting case n = 0. When n = 0, as illustrated in Figure 2.3, the
effects on output and inflation are independent of the number of remaining periods for which the
interest rate is expected to be fixed, as expectations regarding future policy have no influence.
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Figure 2.5: Output Responses of Fixing the Interest Rate for T Quarters






























Note: T takes values between 8 and 14. Panel (a): PFE; panel (b): n = 4; panel (c): n = 0.5.
(Inflation is similarly increased, though we do not show the corresponding responses
for inflation.) In the case of a high enough degree of reflection (such as the case
n = 4, shown in the figure), the reflective equilibrium outcomes are similar to the
FS-PFE outcomes. But even when the degree of reflection is much lower, the out-
comes qualitatively resemble those predicted by the FS-PFE analysis, even if the
quantitative magnitude of the effects is quite different.
The quantitative effects can, however, be quite different from those implied by
the FS-PFE analysis; they are particularly different in the case of long periods with a
fixed interest rate. Indeed, while the FS-PFE analysis implies that the effects of any
contractionary shock, no matter how severe, can necessarily be completely counter-
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Figure 2.6: Reflective Equilibrium when There is a Shock to ρt and the Interest
Rate is Fixed for T quarters
















Note: n = 0.1, ρt is reduced for 8 quarters. Darker lines indicate progressively longer periods T (to
infinity).
acted by a sufficiently long-lasting commitment to a low interest rate (albeit one that
remains non-negative) — and in fact, that a sufficiently long-lasting commitment can
produce an inflationary boom of arbitrary size — it is possible, under the reflective
equilibrium analysis, to find (if the degree of reflection is small enough) that even a
promise to keep the interest rate permanently at zero would be insufficient to prevent
output and inflation from both falling below their target values. Proposition 5 implies
that there will be only a finite amount of stimulus provided even by a permanent
interest-rate peg, and this need not be enough to prevent output and inflation from
falling in response to a disturbance.
Figure 2.6 illustrates this possibility. The model parameters are the same as in the
previous numerical illustrations, but we now consider a real disturbance that lowers
the discount rate ρt by 5 percentage points per quarter, and that lasts for 8 quarters.
(The discount rate returns to its low normal value again in quarter 8.) This is a
“Great Depression” magnitude of disturbance: as shown in the figure, in the absence
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of any commitment to depart from the normal reaction function after quarter 8 (the
time at which it becomes possible again to implement a standard Taylor rule), this
disturbance causes output to contract by more than 30 percent. The figure shows
the responses of output and inflation to this shock, under a variety of assumptions
about the length of time T for which it is announced that the nominal interest rate
will be held at its lower bound, after which the central bank will revert to its normal
(Taylor-rule) reaction function. In each case, the outcomes shown are for a reflective
equilibrium in which the degree of reflection is only n = 0.1.70
The lightest lines correspond to the case T = 8 quarters: that is, the interest
rate will remain at the lower bound only for as long as the Taylor rule would require
an even lower rate than that (which cannot be implemented). Progressively darker
lines indicate the effects of progressively longer commitments; the lines shown are
for periods of 50 years, 100 years, 150 years and so on. The final dash-dotted line
indicates the effect of a commitment to keep the interest rate permanently at the
zero lower bound. In accordance with Proposition 6, each lengthening of the com-
mitment increases both output and inflation; but, in accordance with Proposition 5,
the outcomes associated with all long enough commitments converge to the outcomes
predicted in the case of a permanent commitment. In this example (involving a very
low, though positive, degree of reflection), even the permanent commitment is insuffi-
cient to prevent both output and inflation from falling below their target values in the
quarter of the shock (quarter zero), though the long-lasting low-interest-rate regimes
result in very substantial output booms, and persistently above-target inflation, later
on (that last for decades).
Thus while our reflective equilibrium analysis confirms the result of PFE anal-
yses using the conventional (FS-PFE) equilibrium selection, according to which a
commitment to keep the interest rate at its lower bound for a longer time should
70This is quite a low level of reflection, but is chosen to illustrate our point.
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be expansionary, it also indicates that — given that it is realistic to assume that
people would truncate the belief-revision process at some finite level of reflection,
and quite possibly at a relatively low one — rational-expectations analyses almost
certainly overstate the magnitude of stimulus that one can expect to obtain from
such commitments, even when understood and believed by all individuals. This can
be added to the varied list of reasons that other authors have proposed for doubting
that forward guidance should be as extraordinarily powerful as rational-expectations
analyses using highly forward-looking NK models sometimes suggest.71 While our
analysis still implies that commitments of this kind should provide a potentially pow-
erful tool, of particular usefulness when a central bank is constrained by the zero
lower bound, it increases the possible scope for using other tools, such as fiscal policy,
under such circumstances as well.
2.5 Conclusion
Is there, then, reason to fear that a commitment to keep nominal interest rates low
for a longer period of time will be deflationary, rather than inflationary? There is one
way in which such an outcome could easily occur, and that is if the announcement
of the policy change were taken to reveal negative information (previously known
only to the central bank) about the outlook for economic fundamentals, rather than
representing a pure change in policy intentions of the kind analyzed above.72 This
may well have been a problem with the way in which “date-based forward guidance”
was used by the U.S. Federal Reserve during the period 2011-12, as discussed by
Woodford (2012); but it is not an inherent problem with announcing a change in
future policy intentions, only with a particular way of explaining what has changed.
71Again see Del Negro et al. (2013), Chung (2015), and McKay et al. (2015).
72For further discussion of the way in which the revelation of central-bank information by an-
nounced policy decisions can result in perverse effects, see Garćıa-Schmidt (2015).
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The idea that a commitment to keep nominal interest rates low for a longer time
should be deflationary, even when understood to represent a pure change in monetary
policy — simply because the only rational-expectations equilibria in which nominal
interest rates remain forever low involve deflation — is instead mistaken, in our view.
If people believe the central bank’s statements about its future policy intentions, and
believe that it will indeed succeed in maintaining a low nominal interest rate, it does
not follow that they must expect a deflationary equilibrium; this does not follow,
even if we suppose that they reason about the economy’s likely future path using a
correct model of how inflation and aggregate output are determined.
If their reasoning occurs through a process of reflection of the kind modeled in this
paper, then an increase in the expected length of time for which the nominal interest
rate is expected to remain at some effective lower bound should result in expectations
of higher income and higher inflation, regardless of the degree of reflection (as long
as n > 0); and according to our model of temporary equilibrium resulting from
optimizing spending and pricing decisions, such a change in expectations should result
in higher output and inflation. This outcome may or may not approximate the
outcome associated with a perfect foresight equilibrium, depending on the degree of
reflection; in the case of a commitment to keep the nominal interest rate low for a long
enough period, it almost certainly will not resemble any PFE, even approximately.
This is why it is important to explicitly model the process of belief revision as a
result of further reflection, rather than simply assuming that the PFE must yield a
correct prediction. Some macroeconomists may find the proposed alternative solution
concept (reflective equilibrium for some finite degree of reflection n) unappealing, on
the ground that it yields a less definite prediction than the assumption of perfect
foresight (or rational expectations) equilibrium. But while it is true that our con-
clusions about the effects of a given policy commitment depend both on the exact
choice of an initial conjecture and on exactly how far one supposes that people should
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continue the belief-revision process, this does not mean that we are unable to draw
any conclusions of relevance to policy deliberations. Our conclusions as to the s igns
of the effects just mentioned are independent of those details of the specification of
the reflective equilibrium. Hence it is possible to obtain conclusions of a useful degree
of specificity even when one has little ground for insisting on a single precise model
of expectation formation.
It should also be noted that while our concept of reflective equilibrium can yield
quite various predictions (for differing assumptions about the initial conjecture and
the degree of reflection) under some circumstances, because the belief-revision dy-
namics diverge (or converge quite slowly), under other circumstances much tighter
predictions are obtained, because of relatively rapid convergence of the belief-revision
dynamics. It can then be a goal of policy design to choose a policy with the property
that the belief-revision dynamics should converge reliably, leading to less uncertainty
about the outcome that should be expected under the policy.
In the case of a central bank that finds itself seeking additional demand stimulus
when it has already cut its short-term nominal interest rate instrument to its effective
lower bound, a commitment to maintain the instrument at the lower bound for a
long time that can be announced in advance, regardless of how economic conditions
develop, is not an ideal policy response, according to this criterion. Such a policy
should be expected to be stimulative, according to the analysis in this paper; but the
exact degree of stimulus is difficult to predict. It may not be possible to choose a
length of time for which to commit to the ultra-low interest rate that does not run
simultaneously the risk of being too short to be effective, if the degree of reflection n
is too low, and the opposite risk of being wildly inflationary, if the degree of reflection
n is too high.
But one could achieve a less uncertain outcome, according to the reflective equi-
librium analysis, by committing to maintain a low nominal interest rate until some
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macroeconomic target is reached, such as the price-level target proposed by Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2003), or the nominal-GDP target path proposed by Woodford
(2012).73 In the case that people carry the belief-revision process forward to a high
degree, they should expect interest rates to be raised relatively soon, under such a
commitment; but if instead they truncate the process at a relatively low degree of
reflection, they should expected interest rates to remain low for much longer. In
either case, belief that the central bank is serious about the policy should change
expectations in a way that results in a substantial, but not extravagant, increase in
current aggregate demand.
Thus even though the approach proposed here leads to a set of possible predictions
in the case of a given policy specification rather than a point prediction, this does
not mean that the approach yields no conclusions that are useful for policy design.
Instead, insisting on the use of perfect foresight equilibrium analysis simply because
it yields a more precise prediction may lead to large errors. One is reminded of the
dictum of the British logician Carveth Read:74 “It is better to be vaguely right than
exactly wrong.”
73This alternative to date-based forward guidance would also have the advantage of being less
likely to be misunderstood as revealing negative central-bank information about fundamentals, as
discussed by .
74Read (1920), p. 351. The aphorism is often mis-attributed to John Maynard Keynes.
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Chapter 3
Volatility of Sovereign Spreads
with Asymmetric Information
3.1 Introduction
Emerging sovereign debt contracts are subject to high and volatile spreads. Start-
ing with the seminal paper of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), papers including default
as an equilibrium outcome have endogeneized the spread, making it reflect the prob-
ability that the country will default on the contracted debt. With the exception
of assuming a very long duration bond, this literature has not been able to match
the standard deviation and mean of the spread seen in emerging economies, while
matching other statistics1.
1The statistics generally matched are the higher volatility of consumption relative to output,
the counterciclicality of the trade balance and the association of default with negative deviations of
output.
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One strong assumption and possibly one of the reasons for the low spread volatility
in the models is perfect and symmetric information between foreign lenders and the
government. Recent events have shown that there is a gap between what foreign
investors know about the economic conditions of emerging countries and the actual
statistics. One example is Greece, when the government revealed in 2009 that the
deficit and debt were much higher than previously thought. The other example
is Argentina, whose government has published non-credible inflation figures since
2007. Because investors seek to maximize the return of their portfolios, they try
to do the best possible estimate of the country’s conditions, but they do so with
incomplete information, specifically with less information than what the government
of the country, that is issuing debt, has.
To assess the implications that such an asymmetry has on the behavior of spreads,
this paper introduces a gap between the information that foreign lenders and the
government have when making their decisions in the small open economy model of
Arellano (2008). When foreign lenders price assets contracted today and payable
tomorrow they will have imperfect information of the country’s current output, while
when the government makes its decisions it will have perfect information.
Price schedules faced by the government depend in this case on the expectation
that foreign lenders have about current output and not on its realization. It is as-
sumed that this expectations depends on past information and on a noisy observation
of current output. The variance of that noisy observation is what will be referred to
as noise and is what controls the level of asymmetry, since more noise imply a less
accurate signal of current output and therefore more imperfection. Note that foreign
lenders still have a lot of information since they know previous output and the signal2.
The baseline calibration shows that the asymmetry increases the volatility of
2Previous output gives relevant information about current output since it is assumed that the
log of output follows an AR(1) process.
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equilibrium spreads when compared to the symmetric version of the model, while it
does not worsen other matched statistics. When the case of Argentina is simulated,
the most important change is an increase in the volatility of spreads by 50 percent
from the symmetric version. Additionally, there is a small increase in the means of
debt and spread during the non-default period and an increase in the spread that
would have been in place at the period when the country defaulted. Other statistics
are not greatly affected.
The main reason behind the increase in spread volatility compared to the sym-
metric model is an increase in debt chosen by the government when the country’s
output is relatively low, but foreign lenders believe it is higher. When the govern-
ment has low current output, the need for financing is high and it demands more
debt particularly when it faces relatively good prices. This results in a low price of
debt in equilibrium (high spreads) to take into account the higher default probability
when contracting high levels of debt.
For many combinations of the initial states the behavior of the government is
similar to the perfect information case. When output is lower or equal to its mean
and expected output is higher or equal, or when output is high and for every expected
output, the behavior of the government is not far from the perfect information model,
making assets and spreads behave in a similar fashion.
Compared to the perfect information model with the same initial assets and out-
put, the equilibrium spread can be higher or lower depending on the expected value of
output. There are two effects happening in this model: the price effect and the policy
effect. The price effect is the change in spreads due to a change in the price schedule
when expected output is different from current output. When expected output is
above current output, prices are higher than the symmetric model implying lower
spreads and when it is lower, prices are lower and spreads higher. The policy effect
is the change in spreads caused by a movement in the quantity of assets demanded
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because the government faces a different price schedule. When the expectation of
output is higher than its realization, prices, for all debt contracts, are higher than
the perfect information case and this makes the government decrease its demand for
assets –increases its demand for debt. This causes a higher default probability and
higher spreads. Conversely when prices are lower, demand for assets increases lead-
ing to lower default probabilities and lower spreads. In equilibrium, which effect is
stronger depends critically on current output. When output is below or around its
mean, the policy effect more than outweighs the price effect and so if the expected
value of output is higher, equilibrium spreads increase and when it is lower they
decrease. When output is high the opposite is true.
The analysis shows that the volatility and mean spread have a non-monotonic
behavior when increasing the asymmetry. Starting from the symmetric case with
zero noise a small increase in noise, decreases both. Then, for low levels of noise,
adding more, increases both until a certain level when they decrease again. Other
statistics like the mean debt and the default rate also show a non-monotonic behavior,
decreasing for low levels of noise and increasing afterward.
This paper in addition to improving the fit in critical statistics, does not worsen
the fit in the regularly matched ones. Since the initial papers of and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006), this literature has been able to match the countercyclicality of the
trade balance, the higher volatility of consumption than output and default periods
occurring on average in bad times. These are emerging economies’ facts and since
they are achieved by the baseline model, in order to make additional progress, it is
important that those statistics are not worsen.
This approach sheds some light on the gap between theory and data. In order
to get non-negligible volatility of spreads, previous models relied on very long term
debt contracts as in Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), Hatchondo and Martinez
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(2009), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012)3. While it is true that the assumption of
one-period non-contingent bond is strict and not a perfect match to reality, the one
of perpetuities is also too strong4.
Although other papers have added asymmetric information in an endogenous de-
fault model, they have done so at the cost of including additional variables not at the
core of the problem. D’Erasmo (2011) included an asymmetry in the discount factor
of the government in power to include a political aspect of this relation and was able
to increase the debt-to-output ratio significantly. Atkeson (1991), Dovis (2012) and
Tsyrennikov (2013) include asymmetric information in a complete market setup with
limited enforcement. The first two papers investigate optimal capital flows and risk
sharing mechanism of such an environment and analyzes the predictions of such a
model when limited enforcement and imperfect information are included in the model
separately.
Signals have also been added to endogenous default models, but not as part of
the asymmetry problem. On the one hand, Guzman (2013) develops a model with
imperfect, but symmetric information in which neither the government, nor foreign
investors know the composition between a permanent and transitory component of
the output shock and so they need to make predictions. On the other hand Durdu
et al. (2013) examine the role of news shocks in the endogenous default framework
when the government and foreign lenders receive a signal in the current period about
future output.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the endogenous default model
with asymmetric information. It first describes the local economy, then the problem
3This fact is correcting for the solution method, since Hatchondo et al. (2010) show that discrete
state space techniques create spurious interest rate movements when using a small number of grid
points for assets.
4And even stronger than one-period since in general emerging economies borrow short term as
documented by Broner et al. (2013).
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of foreign lenders, states the recursive formulation and finally defines the equilibrium.
Next, in order to analyze an empirically relevant case, Section 3.3 presents an esti-
mation of noise for 11 Latin American countries using forecast data. It also describes
the functional forms and calibrates the rest of the parameters. Section 3.4 presents
the numerical analysis. It first shows the results for the baseline calibration, which
is the case of Argentina before 2002. It discusses the differences in the solution of
the model comparing price schedules, policy functions, equilibrium spreads and de-
fault sets to the perfect information model. It then shows the quantitative effects of
simulating both economies. Secondly, it shows how the statistics generated by the
model are affected by varied levels of noise and it finalizes by presenting an alternative
asymmetric model based on the model by , where the asymmetric version also shows
an increase in the volatility of spread when compared to its symmetric counterpart.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Endogeneous Default Model with
Asymmetric Information
This section develops a small open economy endogenous default model based on
Arellano (2008), that includes the fact that foreign investors have less information
than the government. The model presented includes asymmetric information while
preserving simplicity and tractability. First, Section 3.2.1 describes the small open
economy and the decision problem of the government, highlighting the repercus-
sions of asymmetric information. Then, Section 3.2.2 explains the problem of foreign
lenders, focusing on the pricing equation with less information. The last two sections
state the recursive formulation and the equilibrium.
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3.2.1 The Small Open Economy
The small open economy receives a stochastic stream of income and can borrow
and lend one-period non-contingent bonds in international financial markets. Finan-
cial markets have limited enforcement and so the economy is free to default. When
defaulting, the economy does not pay its debt, so the haircut is 100%, and is excluded
from financial markets for a random number of periods5.
The stochastic stream of income received by the economy is ŷt ∈ Y ⊂ R++. The
log of this endowment, yt ≡ log(ŷt), follows an AR(1) process:
yt = ρyt−1 + εt (3.1)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) and εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε ), is an iid shock.





where ct is consumption, β ∈ (0, 1) and the momentary utility function u(.) : [0,∞)→
R is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave.
The government is the decision maker of this economy. It receives the endow-
ment, makes borrowing and default decisions and gives the household the amount to
consume with a lump-sum transfer each period. It is benevolent, so it maximizes the
utility of households. Its decisions are different if it is excluded or participating from
financial markets.
When the government is being excluded from financial markets, there is no deci-
sion to make. It cannot borrow or lend and so, it can only give the households the
income it receives. During this excluded period, the endowment is given by ŷdeft ≤ ŷt,
5This is the most simplified version of the endogenous default model. Cruces and Trebesch
(2013) estimate haircuts for restructurings and show first that they are not 100% and that higher
haircuts are associated with longer periods of exclusions. For models that endogeneize the period
of exclusion refer to Yue (2010), D’Erasmo (2011) or Alessandro et al. (2011).
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which includes an output cost. The cost represents the disruptions that happen in
the economy after defaulting6.
When the government has not defaulted in the recent past and is participating in
the financial market, it has two decisions to make. First, it has to decide to default
or not and second, if it does not default, it has to decide the new amount of assets
(or debt). When it defaults, it goes to the excluded case, with no further decisions to
make. If the government does not default, it faces the following budget constraint:
ŷt +Bt = q(Bt+1, It)Bt+1 + ct
where Bt is the amount of outstanding assets (debt when Bt < 0) and q(Bt+1, .) is the
price schedule for assets Bt+1
7. The price schedule depends on the information that
foreign lenders have when pricing the contracts, It, and will be defined below. Note
that in the symmetric information case of this model It = yt, since foreign lenders
see current output and with that information, they calculate the probability that the
sovereign government defaults in the next period for each Bt+1.
3.2.2 Foreign Lenders
In the symmetric information model, foreign lenders price the assets contracted
in t knowing current output. The price reflects the probability that the government
will default in t + 1 holding Bt+1 assets. For each asset Bt+1 the default probability
depends on tomorrow’s output, yt+1 and because output is autoregressive, foreign
lenders use yt to calculate it.
The asymmetric version of this model is going to include uncertainty about current
output. Instead of having perfect information about it when pricing debt, foreign
6Arteta and Hale (2008) show evidence of declines in foreign credit after debt crises and Rose
(2005) shows evidence of declines in trade after defaults. For a model that endogeneizes the costs
refer to Mendoza and Yue (2012) and Park (2014).
7The model is written in terms of assets, which is common in the literature.
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Notes: FL = Foreign Lender. Gov = Government. D = default, C = continuing. HH =
households.
lenders will get the signal:
st = yt + et
with iid et ∼ N(0, σ2e), where σ2e is called noise. In addition and since output is
regularly seen without uncertainty with a lag, foreign lenders will see the realization
of output, but after they priced assets. Hence, relevant information at time t about
the distribution of yt+1 at the time foreign lenders price assets is It = {st, yt−1}8.
Figure 3.1 shows the timeline of decisions and information in order to understand
the asymmetry as a timing mismatch. When entering period t, foreign lenders and
the government see the signal of current output st, then foreign lenders set their price
schedule based on the information until that moment. After prices are set, output is
realized and the government makes its decisions, and this is why the government has
all the relevant information of the current period. As implied from the timeline, the
current realization of output will be part of period t + 1 information set of foreign
lenders.
Foreign lenders are rational and will get their estimated posterior distribution of
current output by solving a signal extraction problem stated in Appendix C.1. This
8Foreign lenders’ information set can be defined in terms of all the history of signals up to time
t and output up to time t− 1, It = {st, yt−1}, but since the problem is Markovian, we need to keep
track of only the last two.
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is assumed, because the focus of the paper is to limit information of foreign lenders
without limiting their rationality.
Foreign lenders are risk neutral and have access to a risk-free interest rate to lend
or borrow. These two assumptions give rise to a pricing equation that calculates the
price of each asset implied by the break even point, when the expected return from
investing in the sovereign bond is the same as from investing in the risk-free interest
rate:
(1 + r) = δ(Bt+1, It)
0
q(Bt+1, It)
+ (1− δ(Bt+1, It))
1
q(Bt+1, It)
where δ(Bt+1, It) is the probability calculated by foreign lenders that a country de-
faults the next period holding the amount of assets Bt+1, given their information set
It. When Bt+1 > 0, the government will be contracting assets and so, the default
probability will be zero. When Bt+1 < 0, the sovereign government is entering a debt
contract and can have a positive default probability. When foreign lenders invest in
the risk-free interest rate, the gross rentability is (1 + r), while when investing in
the debt of sovereign government, they paid q(Bt+1, It) in period t and are expected
to receive 1 if the government does not default and zero otherwise. So, given the






With the current setup, the states of the economy include the amount of assets the
economy arrives, Bt, the log of current output, yt and relevant variables for the pricing
equation of foreign lenders, (yt−1, st). So, the state space consist of one endogenous
and three exogenous variables Ŝt = {Bt, yt, yt−1, st}.
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The state space can be reduced because the solution of the signal extraction
problem results in a fixed combination of lagged output and the signal. As it is
shown in Appendix C.2 the posterior distribution of current output is p(yt|yt−1, st) ∼
N(µt, σ
2
∗), where µt is a fixed combination of lagged output and the signal, and σ
2
∗ is
constant. As a consequence, price schedules can be written as q(Bt+1, µt) and since
there is no loss of information to get tomorrow’s distributions using µt instead of
(yt−1, st) separately, the problem will have the states St = {Bt, yt, µt}. The implied
distributions used in the solution of the problem can be found in the same Appendix.
Define V g(B, y, µ) as the value function when the government is in a good state,
which means participating in the credit market. The government has the option to
default or not and will choose the best choice between V c(B, y, µ) and V d(y), which
are the value functions of continuing in the credit relation and entering a default state
respectively9:
V g(B, y, µ) = max{V c(B, y, µ), V d(y)}
When continuing, the government has to choose the new asset contract and so,
its value function is defined as:
V c(B, y, µ) = maxB′{u(ŷ +B − q(µ,B′)B′) + βEy′,µ′|y,µV g(B′, y′, µ′)} (3.3)
where can be seen that it chooses the new amount of assets B′ taking into account
the different prices for B′. When defaulting or if the government is being excluded
from the international financial markets, the value function is defined as:
V d(y) = u(ŷdef ) + βEy′,µ′|y,µ[θV g(0, y′, µ′) + (1− θ)V d(y′)] (3.4)
9Starting this point, period t will be denoted without subscripts or superscripts while t + 1
variables will be denoted with a prime.
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where the representative agent consumes the output that includes the cost of default
and there is a probability θ of reentering the credit market, in which case, it is assumed
that the government starts with zero assets10.
With all these value functions, the default decision can be defined as:
d(B, y, µ) =
 1 if V
d(y) > V c(B, y, µ)
0 otherwise
Finally, foreign lenders calculate the default probability δ(B′, µ), to price assets
in equation (3.2), as:
δ(B′, µ) = Ey′,µ′|µd(B′, y′, µ′) (3.5)
Note the difference in the expected values taken by the government in equa-
tions (3.3) and (3.4) and by foreign lenders in (3.5). While the government uses
information (y, µ), foreign lenders only use µ11.
3.2.4 Definition of Equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium used is Markov Perfect Equilibrium, so it is assumed
that in each period the government’s equilibrium default and borrowing decisions
depend only on payoff-relevant state variables. The Markov Perfect Equilibrium of
this model is characterized by value functions {V g(B, y, µ), V c(B, y, µ), V d(y)}, de-
fault decision d(B, y, µ), policy function B′(B, y, µ) and a bond price function q(B′, µ)
such that
1. Given the bond price function, the policy function, the default decision and the
value functions solve the government’s problem.
10The expectation term is written explicitly as calculating the probabilities of (y′, µ′) given (y, µ),
but it actually only uses y and that is the relevant state in this case is only y.
11Again, for completeness is written this way, but the government actually calculates its expected
values using only y since µ is not necessary when y is known.
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2. Given the policy function, default decision and value functions, the bond price
function satisfies the pricing equation.
3.3 Estimation of Noise and Calibration
The most important component of the model and what drives the differences
between the presented model and the symmetric information case is the noise, which
is standard deviation of the signal that foreign lenders receive when pricing debt.
To do an analysis with an empirically relevant number, the noise is estimated using
forecast data. Because observations of forecast data are limited, the noise estimated is
the mean of the results obtained for 11 Latin American countries that had comparable
forecast data. This section shows the estimation and at the end defines the functional
forms and the calibration of the remaining parameters for the numerical exercise.
3.3.1 Estimation of Noise
The noise, σe, captures the asymmetry of information that exists in the relation
between the sovereign government and foreign investors. When σe = 0, the model
goes back to the symmetric case, because the signal informs perfectly about current
output, therefore both government and lenders have the same information. When
σe = ∞ the signal provides no information and so foreign lenders only have past
output to make their estimations. Actual noise will be between those extreme cases
and most likely will vary depending on the country.
There is no direct measure of noise from empirical studies, but it can be recovered
from forecast data. Given the assumed processes of output and the signal, the forecast
of output that is optimal, in the sense of minimizing the mean squared error, is the
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st = w1yt−1 + w2st
Since st is not measurable, we can get a measurable implied forecast by replacing
it with its equation:
µt = w1yt−1 + w2yt + w2et
The model assumes that the error of the signal is uncorrelated with current and
past output and so, this equation can be estimated as:
ft = α + βyt−1 + γyt + ξt (3.6)
where ft is the forecast of output in period t. If no extra measurement error is
assumed, an estimate of noise is σ̂e = σ̂ξ/γ̂
13. This noise depends on the country
under study, the information used in the forecast, the frequency of the forecasted
series and the forecasted series itself, since it is natural to expect that more variable
series may have more noise.
Available forecast data for Latin American countries comes from World Economic
Outlook (WEO) of the World Bank. Each issue of the WEO since 1991 has growth
forecasts for 11 Latin American countries for the year of the issue and also forecasts
or first estimates of the growth in the previous year14. Available series are forecasts
made in April/May and in September/October of year t about output growth of year
t and a forecast or first estimate made in April/May of year t+1 about output growth
of year t. This leads to around 20 observations per forecast and country15. Yearly
output since 1991 is also available from the same source.
12For the derivation, refer to Appendix C.1.
13Or part of the asymmetric problem is measurement error from part of foreign lenders.
14The noise using this last measure can also be interpreted as coming from approximating the
growth of the country under study until two digits instead of the exact number.
15There are additional WEOs before that, but do not include Latin American countries.
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The numerical analysis is applied to Argentina, but because of limited observa-
tions, the estimation is made for the 11 countries and the noise finally used in the
analysis comes from an average of all estimations. On the one hand, this procedure
increases the confidence in the estimate, since it decreases biases because of sample
size. On the other hand, for this procedure not to produce additional biases, we need
to assume that Latin American countries have comparable noise,
Instead of assuming that noises themselves are comparable among series, it will be
assumed that signal-to-noise ratios are. The reason behind this is to control for the
dependence between the noisy signal of a series and the series itself, since as argued
above, noise is potentially dependent on the variability of the series. The estimated




where ρ̂, σ̂2ε are results of the estimation of an AR(1) output equation.
Since available data is yearly and the model is quarterly, it is also assumed that
signal-to-noise ratios are comparable among yearly and quarterly frequencies. It is
important to note that the assumption is that two signals of comparable uncertainty
should give the same ratios, not that any two signals of a yearly and of a quarterly
process should give the same signal-to-noise ratio. This is a lower bound for quarterly
noise, since if one does a simulation to get the desired yearly noise from quarterly
observations (with quarterly signals), the implied quarterly noise is much higher than
the one implied by the same yearly signal-to-noise ratio16.
The noise for the baseline case was chose from the first estimate of growth in year
t made in April/May of year t+ 1. This choice was made because of 3 reasons. First,
it is the most conservative approach in order to see the effect of the asymmetry in
the default model without imposing too much noise. Second, when a country is in
16This is the case if one assumes that the yearly signal is 4 quarterly signals or if it is a mixture
between realized data and signals.
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quarter t choosing a debt payable in quarter t+1 it actually does not know output of
t, but the intuition says that it has more information about it than foreign investors.
Because of this, σe can be interpreted as a relative noise, which means the additional
noise that foreign lenders have above the government. For this to be translated to the
data, an estimation is needed that shows this relative noise and the only one available
without imposing special abilities of the government is the chosen one. And third, it
is the most reliable one since there is more availability of data.
The list of countries and the procedure of estimation can be found in Ap-
pendix C.3. The equations estimated are the forecast equation (3.6) and the yearly
version of equation (3.1). Both were estimated by Bayesian methods assuming a nor-




When estimating the output equation Ω = {ρ, σ2ε} and ω = ε and when estimating
the forecast equation, Ω = {α, β, γ, σ2ξ} and ω = ξ.
Table 3.1 presents the results for the estimation of the equation for output and
the forecast equation using forecasts or first estimates made in year t about output
in year t + 1. Both forecast data made in year t about output of the same year was
also used in estimating the forecast equation in order to provide sensitive numbers
to study the effects of different noise levels in the solution of the model studied in
Section 3.4.2. Estimation for those cases is presented in Appendix C.4.
Table 3.1 shows the posterior mean and standard deviations of the parameters
for both equations, the estimated noise and the yearly signal-to-noise ratio for every
country in the sample. As can be seen from the results of the output equation, most
autoregressive components are significant, with the only exception of Mexico. In
the forecast equation, all γ coefficients are significant and only in Peru is the lagged
output still significant after including current output. It can also be seen that the
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Table 3.1: Baseline Estimation of Noise
Output Equation Forecast Equation
Yearly σe
Signal-to-
ρ̂ σ̂ε β̂ γ̂ σ̂ξ noise: φ̂
ARG 0.77 5.72 0.09 0.93 1.35
1.44 38.23
(0.13) (0.98) (0.05) (0.05) (0.23)
BRA 0.52 2.09 0.03 1.06 0.51
0.49 25.33
(0.2) (0.36) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
CHL 0.72 2.67 0.1 0.96 0.8
0.83 21.54
(0.14) (0.46) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13)
COL 0.8 2.48 -0.06 1.11 0.62
0.56 54.75
(0.12) (0.45) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12)
DOM 0.64 2.68 0.08 0.99 1.11
1.12 9.74
(0.18) (0.51) (0.11) (0.11) (0.21)
ECU 0.61 2.55 -0.1 0.93 1.08
1.16 7.7
(0.18) (0.48) (0.11) (0.11) (0.21)
GUA 0.52 1.16 0.26 0.99 0.72
0.73 3.46
(0.21) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14)
MEX 0.34 3.09 -0.02 1.04 0.74
0.72 21.08
(0.22) (0.53) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12)
PER 0.65 3.35 0.14 0.91 0.81
0.89 24.91
(0.16) (0.61) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
URU 0.83 4.22 -0.13 1.04 2.53
2.42 9.65
(0.11) (0.79) (0.15) (0.15) (0.48)
VEN 0.64 6.28 0 1.02 0.75
0.73 124.27
(0.17) (1.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13)
Average 30.97
Notes: The second to sixth column of the table show estimated posterior means with the
posterior standard deviations in parenthesis. All standard deviations estimates are in per-
centage terms.
implied signal-to-noise ratios are varied, ranging from around 3.46 (Guatemala) to
124.27 (Venezuela) meaning that in the case of Guatemala the first estimate of output
is very poor while for Venezuela is very accurate. Argentina, is around the mean of
the estimates.
The baseline estimate of noise is obtained using the average of the signal-to-noise
ratios. To get the implied noise given the ratio, the estimates for the quarterly output
process for Argentina are needed. To make this study comparable with the general
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default literature and with Argentinean data, the output estimates will be the ones








Appendix C.4 shows that when using the alternative forecasts, the implied noise is
2.75% when using the forecast of year t made in September/October of the same year
and 4.48% when using forecasts made in April/May of the same year.
3.3.2 Functional Forms and Calibration
The functional forms and rest of the parameters are chosen to be comparable to the
majority of the default literature to isolate the effect of noise in the baseline default
model. For this reason, this paper uses the same functional forms and parameters as






 λE(ŷ) if ŷ > λE(ŷ)ŷ otherwise
All the parameters are shown in Table 3.2. For the analysis varying noise, σe was
varied from values close to zero until a completely useless signal is received, while
reporting also values implied by the estimations described in the previous section.
The model was solved using discrete state spacing, but paying special attention to
the sensitivity of the definitions of the grids in the results, in particular the standard
17Where 2002 : Q1 is defined as the period of default, since the actual default happened at the




Risk free interest rate r = 1.7%
Risk aversion σ = 2
Output Equation ρ = 0.945
σε = 2.5%
Probability Reentry θ = 0.282
Discount Factor β = 0.953
Output Costs λ = 0.969
Noise of signal σe = 1.37%
deviation of the spread (or the interest rate)18. For this reason, the final specification
included 201 points for the grid of output and µ and 411 points for the grid of assets.
In addition, because the price schedule of asset contracts is more sensitive in some
parts of the grid, an asymmetric grid was used with more points concentrated in the
most sensitive parts19.
3.4 Numerical Analysis
Three sets of results are presented. The first part reports the results for the base-
line calibration. It shows that the pricing schedule is sensitive to the expectation that
foreign lenders have about current output, implying better prices when this expec-
tation is relatively good and worse prices when it is bad. The sovereign government
takes advantage of this, contracting higher debt in the first case and lower in the
second. This translates to more volatility in the implicit interest rate faced by the
country than in the symmetric information case. The second part analyzes the results
18Because of the additional exogenous state variable, µ, and the sensitivity of the choices to
it, it was faster to solve it with discrete state spacing than with interpolation methods (given the
availability of computers capable to handle big matrices).
19The final specification of the grid had 105 points between -3.25 and -0.5, 200 points between
-0.5 and -0.05, 100 points between -0.05 and 0. The rest was put in lower and higher points. Many
different specifications were tried and there were not significant changes. The simulations never
touched the lowest and highest point in the asset grid.
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for different levels of noise and shows that many statistics, including the volatility
of spreads, have a non-monotonic relation with the level of noise. And finally, this
section presents the result of including a similar asymmetry in an alternative model
showing that compared with its symmetric version, there is also an increase in the
volatility of the spread.
3.4.1 Baseline Calibration
This section presents and discusses how the baseline noise affects the results pro-
duced by the model compared to its symmetric version. Since price schedules faced
by the government depend on the expected value of current output held by foreign
investors, the policy functions and final spreads are sensitive to it. The simulation
results show that compared to the symmetric information model, the standard devi-
ation of the spread increases substantially while other statistics behave in a similar
fashion.
3.4.1.1 Effect of Noise in the Solution of the Model
The main difference with the symmetric case is that the price schedule faced by
the sovereign government depends on the expected value that foreign lenders have
about current output, and not current output directly. The asymmetry of information
produces differences in these two values and so, the final policy choice and spread
are sensitive not only to output and current assets, but also to the expected value of
current output held by foreign lenders.









H and are all negative (B
′
L represents the highest debt). The
symmetric information, presented in a blue solid line, graphs q(y,B′) as a function
of y and the asymmetric information, presented in a red dashed line, graphs q(µ,B′)
as a function of µ.
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Figure 3.2: Price Schedules



















































Symm. info:   q(B′,y)
Asymm. info: q(B′,µ)
Notes: Price shedules are graphed for 3 different amount of assets. Case a) is for B′L/E(y) =
−10%, b) is for B′M/E(y) = −5% and c) is for B′H/E(y) = −1%. The limits in the axis are
put so that the maximum implied spread is 70%. The axis for the symmetric information
case are (y, q(y,B′)) and for the asymmetric information case (µ, q(µ,B′))
In general, prices are similar between the asymmetric and symmetric models for
the same expected value of output and output respectively. However the asymmetric
price is lower almost everywhere, implying a higher default probability for each con-
tract in the asymmetric model. Additionally, when comparing panel a) with b) and
c), it can be seen that it is true for both models that prices are lower for lower values
of assets, and are increasing in output in the symmetric case and the expected value
of output in the asymmetric case.
It is important to highlight that even if the country has the same output and
initial assets in two different moments in time, it will face different prices in the
asymmetric model unless the expected value of output is also equal. Additionally
note that the higher is the difference between µ and y, the higher is the difference of
price schedules between models. However, it is important to highlight that current
output and its expected value are correlated and so, in general their values are close.
The difference between the policy functions depends critically on the expected
value of current output held by foreign lenders. Figure 3.3 shows the policy function
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Notes: The graphs show the policy functions in red dashed line. Each graph represents
a pair of a specific level of initial assets and output. The levels of assets graphed are
B′L/E(y) = −10%, B′M/E(y) = −5% and B′H/E(y) = −1%, and three levels of output,
yL, yM , yH which are two standard deviations below the mean, the mean and two standard
deviations above the mean. Only the cases when there is no default are graphed. The
horizontal blue solid line represents the policy function in the symmetric information case
and the vertical black dotted line represents when the expected value of output, µ coincides
with its realization.
levels, yL, yM , yH , which are respectively 2 standard deviations below the mean, the
mean and two standard deviations above the mean. It only graphs the policy when
the country does not default. The graphs have a vertical black dotted line when the
expected value of output matches the true value. To compare with the symmetric
information case, the horizontal blue line, shows the policy of the corresponding
symmetric states.
When output and assets are low, as shown in panel a), the government chooses
to default in both models. When output is low and assets are at the medium value
graphed, panel b), the symmetric case defaults, and the asymmetric does not default
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only when the signal is substantially higher than output. And finally for low output
and high assets, policies are similar until the expected value is about 2 percent above
output, where the policy starts decreasing substantially.
When output is at the mean, the government will contract less debt when prices
are relatively bad and more debt when prices are relatively good20. For the three
levels of assets, panels d), e), f) of Figure 3.3 show that when the expected value is
below current output, the policy is generally higher, specially when assets are low. In
addition the policy decreases when the expected value is above current output, but
in a different way depending on asset levels. When assets are low, the policy starts
decreasing at the point when the expected value is equal to output, but when assets
are at the medium and high levels, it takes a little longer. Note that the decrease in
policy experienced when the expected value is higher is much larger than the increase
when the expected value is lower.
Finally, when output is high, the government increases its assets when prices are
relatively bad and does not decrease them substantially when prices are relatively
good. Panels g)− i) of Figure 3.3 show that when output is high, for the three asset
levels, when the expected value is below output, the policy is higher in the three
cases, but specially when assets are low. When the expected value of output is above
output, policy is lower only in the low asset case, but comparable with symmetric
information with medium and high initial assets.
To sum up, when the expected value of output is below output, the policy is higher
than the symmetric case and when the expected value is above output, it is lower.
The magnitude of the change in policy can be understood depending on the need for
financing. On the one hand, when this need is high, which occurs when output and/or
assets are low, if prices are relatively good, the government will decrease its policy
20Government will increase its contracted assets when prices are bad and decrease them when
prices are good.
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substantially. If prices are relatively bad, the need is still there, so it will not increase
its policy considerably. On the other hand when this need is low, which happens
when output and assets are relatively high, if prices are good, the government will
not decrease its policy, and if prices are bad it will increase its assets, since it has
room to.
The effect on spreads in each case is ambiguous because it depends on two opposing
effects, the price effect and the policy effect21. The price effect is the change in spreads
compared with the symmetric case due to the difference between the expected value
of output and current output22. This effect implies that when the expected value of
output is lower than output, prices are also lower and so spreads are higher. The
opposite happens when the expected value is above output. The policy effect is
the change in spreads implied by the change in policy due to facing different price
schedules. When price schedules are less favorable, the government will demand more
assets implying a lower spread and the opposite is true when prices are better. So, if
spread increases or decreases in equilibrium depends on which effect is stronger.
Figure 3.4 shows that what finally happens with spreads depends critically on
current output. On the one hand, panels c) − f) show that when output is low or
at its mean, and the expected value is above output, the policy effect clearly wins,
implying much higher spreads. When the expected value is lower than output, prices
are similar to the price implied by the symmetric model. On the other hand, panels
g)− i) show that when output is high the price effect wins, since when the expected
value is lower than output, spreads are higher. There is no significant difference when
the expected value is above output.
So, in general as compared with the symmetric case, we see that spreads can be
21The spread is defined as rs = q(µ,B′(B, y, µ))−4 − r4.
22We are omitting from the discussion that prices are in general a little lower in the asymmetric
case, shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.4: Spreads
























































































































































Notes: The graphs show the equilibrium spread in red dashed line. The spread is defined as
(1/q(µ,B′(y, µ,B)))4 − (r)4. Each graph represents a pair of a specific level of initial assets
and output. The levels of assets graphed are B′L/E(y) = −10%, B′M/E(y) = −5% and
B′H/E(y) = −1%, and three levels of output, yL, yM , yH which are two standard deviations
below the mean, the mean and two standard deviations above. Only the cases when there is
no default are graphed. The horizontal blue solid line represents the spread in the symmetric
information case, that is defined as (1/q(y,B′(y,B)))4 − (r)4, and the vertical black dotted
line represents when the expected value of output, µ coincides with its realization.
lower, the same or higher. It is worth noticing however, that the absolute change in
spreads is higher when spreads increase than when they decrease. This fact explains
the increase in mean spreads that is found in the next section.
Default sets have different shapes and are dependent on expected output. Fig-
ure 3.5 shows the default set for the symmetric information case in panel a) and for
the asymmetric information case in panel b). The asymmetric case is graphed for
three expected outputs, below 5 percent of the mean, the mean and above 5 percent.
It is shown that the lower is the expected value of output, the larger is the default
set. When the expected value is high, the default set is empty for assets higher than
159
Figure 3.5: Default Sets
































Notes: Panel a) shows the default set for the symmetric information model. Panel b) shows
default sets for 3 different µ in the asymmetric information model. They are defined as
2 standard deviations below its mean, at the mean and two standard deviation above the
mean of output.
-1 and when expected output is low, there are still values of negative assets that is
empty, which does not happen in the symmetric case. Also note that if the default
set is non-empty for a particular asset, the country defaults for more realizations of
output than in the symmetric model, which explains the lower price schedules in the
asymmetric model seen in Figure 3.2.
3.4.1.2 Simulations
The numerical results show improvements in the simulations for the Argentinean
economy particularly in the standard deviation of spread. To compare to quarterly
Argentinean business cycle statistics until the default period, as in and many other
papers, samples for the simulated economy were defined as periods that met the
following conditions: (i) the sample ends with a default, (ii) the sample contains 74
periods without default, and (iii) the last exclusion period was observed at least two
periods before the beginning of the sample. The economy was simulated until 2000
periods that met those conditions were found.
As can be inferred from the previous section, the price schedule is particularly
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sensitive when there are differences in output and the expected value of output in the
samples. Because of that and since in some cases the spread reached levels not seen
in reality, a condition was put in which all episodes that had an equivalent annual
spread above 70% were taken out of the sample. That number was chosen because
the highest spread seen in the Argentinean default period was around that number23.
The results can be seen in Table 3.3.
Many results that are a good match to empirical numbers that have already been
found by the literature do not change. Both versions of the model show consumption
more volatile than output and very strongly correlated, the trade balance less volatile
than output and negatively correlated. There is a negative correlation between output
and the spread. The correlation between spread and the trade balance is weakened
in the asymmetric model, but is still positive.
The major difference is the behavior of the spread. The standard deviation is
increased from 2.99% to 4.49%, which goes in direction of data. It is important to
highlight that this results is particularly significant because of the assumption of a
one-period bond. There is also an increase in means of debt and the spread from
3.75% to 4.47% and from 3.65% to 4.01% respectively, which are still low relative to
data. The asymmetric model produces a higher default rate, since the asymmetry
increases the default set for each asset level as long as it is non-empty.
At the default period, there is an increase in the spread that the country would
have faced when compared with the symmetric model from 7% to 16%, which goes
in the direction of data24. As in the symmetric model and in line with data the trade
balance at the period previous to the default is positive, even though the asymmetric
23The results are not sensitive to the chosen threshold unless it is lower than 25%. Argentina
reached an annual spread of 7000 basis points in 2002, period in which it was excluded from the
financial markets.
24Spread in the default period is calculated as the one that would have been in place if the country
had not defaulted. As such, it is not directly comparable with data.
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Table 3.3: Main Statistics
Data σe = 0% σe = 1.37%
Standard deviations
y 7.35 5.31 5.31
c 8.37 5.76 5.76
tb/y 2.58 1.17 1.25
rs 5.71 2.99 4.49
Correlations
(y, c) 0.98 0.98 0.98
(y, tb/y) -0.91 -0.24 -0.24
(y, rs) -0.84 -0.49 -0.48
(tb/y, rs) 0.9 0.81 0.53
Means
B/y -37.1 -3.75 -4.47
rs 11.56 3.65 4.01
Default rate 2.94 6.19
Default Episode
y -15.75 -7.94 -6.97
c -14.09 -7.85 -6.91
tb/y 3.24 0.33 0.12
B/y -53.3 -1.42 -2.02
rs 29.72 6.98 18.11
Notes: The simulated data is the median of the respective standard deviations, autocorrela-
tions and means calculated over 2000 episodes. Standard deviations, means and the default
rate are in percentage. For the default episode, y, c represent deviations from non-default
averages, and all variables are in percentage.
Data source for Argentina: Neumeyer and Perri (2005) for output, total consumption, ex-
ports and imports from 1980:Q1-1992:Q4 and spread from 1983:Q1-1993:Q4. For the rest of
the observations of output, total consumption, exports and imports until the end of 2001 the
data was obtained from Mecon, which is the Ministry of Economy and Public Finances of
Argentina. For the rest of the observations of the spread, the EMBI+ was used. Population
figures came from IFS. Mean debt in non-default periods are from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2015) and at the time of default are from Reinhart et al. (2003).
Output, total consumption, exports and imports were put in per capita terms and season-
ally adjusted. Then the seasonally adjusted figures of output, total consumption and the
trade-balance-to-output ratio were quadratically detrended to get the statistics. The default
statistics are percentage deviations from the figures in the first quarter of 2002 with respect
to the means of observations before that. Spread figures are in percentage.
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Figure 3.6: Mean Spread and (5%, 95%) quantiles as a function of µ
















Notes: The figure shows the 5% quantile, mean and 95% quantile of the annual spread
in percentage from the simulations as a function of the difference between output and the
expected value of output. The vertical black line shows when output and its expected value
are equal and the three blue dots show the 5% quantile, mean and 95% quantile of the
annual spread in percentage from the symmetric model.
model presents a lower value. As documented by Tomz and Wright (2007) defaults
occur normally during recessions, which is found in both models, since output and
consumption are lower than in normal times25. There is a decrease in assets held
previous to the default.
The improvement in the standard deviation of the spread comes mostly because
when the government has a relatively low output, but expected output is not as low,
the government can take on more debt and spreads increase significantly as seen in
the last subsection. This causes a larger variation of spreads when facing different
scenarios. Figure 3.6 shows the 5 and 95 percent quantiles and the mean of spreads
as a function of simulated differences between output and its expected value. It is
shown that when the difference is negative, the expected value is lower than output,
each quantile and the mean are comparable to the symmetric information numbers,
which are represented by the three blue dots. In contrast, when this difference starts
to be positive, there is a slight increase in the mean and a big increase in the 95
25The fact that output is lower than the non-defaulted mean is generated by the output cost
introduced since in the period the country defaulted is truncated for never exceeding the mean.
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percent quantile.
To sum up, in general the model does a better job than the symmetric information
model, improving the fit in the statistics regarding the spread and not significantly
altering the others.
3.4.2 Effects of different levels of noise
Different countries face different noise levels that depends on the quality and
quantity of information that is available for foreign lenders to price their assets. The
above case was the average of the Latin American countries, but as can be seen in
the estimation of the signal-to-noise ratios of Section 3.3, there is a lot of variability.
This section presents the effects that different levels of noise have on the results of
the model.
The statistics are calculated for the non-default period without imposing the 3
conditions set in the last subsection. The reason behind this is twofold. First, the
focus of this section is to compare between noise levels and not to data. And second,
the idea is to change only the noise level without altering the other exogenous pro-
cesses. When the three conditions are put and noise increases, the condition of 74
periods without default becomes harder to obtain, since more noise implies more dif-
ference between output and its expected value and makes the country default more
frequently. As this happens, only periods with relative good output observations
are chosen and so the distribution of output used to calculate the statistics moves
considerably to the right for high noise levels26.
Table 3.4 presents the results and shows that the standard deviation of the spread
is the most affected and it shows a non-monotonic behavior. Spread becomes more
volatile than the symmetric case when noise is larger than 0.4%, being slightly lower
26The condition of a maximum annualized spread of 70% was kept in order to avoid showing
statistics biased by very few and extreme observations.
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with lower noise level. Then it increases until reaching a noise level of around 2% and
decreases with higher numbers. The standard deviation of output and consumption
decrease with higher noise levels, because more observations of relatively bad output
(and consumption) are part of default episodes and are excluded from the calculations.
The standard deviation of the trade-balance to output ratio show a little increase as
noise increases above 1.5%. The ordering of the standard deviations is not altered
throughout the different noise levels.
The correlations of output with consumption and with the trade balance-to-output
ratio are not significantly altered, while with the spread decreases as noise increases,
but maintains its sign. There is a non-monotonic behavior of the correlation between
the spread and the trade balance-to-output ratio, decreasing in most of the reported
noise levels, but increasing when noise becomes very high.
Mean assets and mean spread show a non-monotonic behavior. Assets show an
upside-down U-shape increasing initially and decreasing after a noise level of 1.5%.
The mean spread decreases for a very low level of noise, but as noise gets higher than
0.1%, average spread increases until a noise level of 1.5%. After that it decreases
again, resulting in a lower spread than the symmetric information case when the
noise level is high.
The default rate shows an initial decrease when noise is close to zero, but after
0.4%, it increases monotonically. At the default episode, output and consumption
show comparable deviations with respect to their non-default averages. The trade
balance-to-output ratio shows a decrease as noise increases, starting in a positive
number in the symmetric information case and when noise is lower than 1 percent,
but changing to a deficit when it is higher. And finally the asset level that the country
arrives in the default period shows a monotonic decrease and the spread shows a
monotonic increase starting from 0.7% of noise and 0.1% of noise respectively.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ing. The last line of table 3.4 shows the unconditional mean of the percent increase
in consumption stream for the representative household living in the corresponding
asymmetric case model that would make him as happy as living in the symmetric case.
This implies that a negative value correspond to the case that households are better
off in the asymmetric information. The percent increase depends on the current state
of the economy, including the defaulting state. It can be defined as:
λ(B, y, µ, ds) =
 λ
g(B, y, µ) when ds = 0
λd(y) when ds = 1
where each λ is respectively:
λg(B, y, µ, 0) =
(
(1− β)(1− σ)V gsym(B, y) + 1






(1− β)(1− σ)V dsym(y) + 1




V gsym(B, y), V
d
sym(y) are the two value functions in the symmetric model and
V gasym(B, y, µ), V
d
asym(y) are the value functions of the asymmetric model, which is
explained in Appendix C.5.
All the values reported are small as expected, but the interesting part is that
excluding when noise is at 1.15% and 1.37%, having noise is generally better than
perfect information. The behavior of the improvement in welfare is non-monotonic.
As seen in Table 3.4, the increase in welfare is the largest when the signal provides
no information.
3.4.3 Robustness: Alternative Model
To see the robustness of the effect that asymmetric information has on the default
model, this section analyzes an alternative model. The setup is similar to the main
model, but there are two differences. First, all agents can see current output when
making their decisions, and second, the government will have more information in
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the form of a noisy signal about future output. This model is the asymmetric version
of Durdu et al. (2013)27. The exogenous processes of the model are then the process
for output (same as before) and the signal of future output:
s = y′ + η
with iid η ∼ N(0, σ2η).
The equations and distributions of this model can be found in Appendix C.6, but
in general it is almost equivalent to the main model, only the signal s about future
output replaces µ as a state. One important difference is that now the noise, σ2η in
this case, has the opposite effect in the asymmetry. When ση = 0, it means that the
asymmetry is the highest, since the government can now see future output perfectly in
period t, but foreign lenders cannot see anything beyond current output. In contrast,
when ση = ∞, the government gets a useless signal of future output and so both, it
and foreign lenders, have the same amount of information and the model goes back
to the perfect information of the previous case.
The amount of information held by agents in this model is different from the main
model. Comparing to Arellano (2008) the main model produces the asymmetry by
taking away information from foreign lenders, because they now see a noisy signal
of current output instead of its realization. In contrast, this model produces the
asymmetry by giving more information to the government by making them see a
signal of future output. Because the information generated in the models are different,
so will be their symmetric versions, and in order to compare the results, the sensible
comparison is between each model and their corresponding symmetric cases.
To make the models comparable, this noise will be set such that the differences
in the variances between foreign lenders and the government, of the variable that is
affected by the asymmetry, is the same as in the baseline calibration of the main
27There is only one minor difference, which is the distribution of the signal given future output.
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model. The main model produces differences in the variances of current output held
by agents. While foreign lenders face a positive variance, the government sees current
output and so has a degenerate distribution. In contrast, in the alternative model,
the variance affected is of future output and the government has a lower variance,
because it additionally sees the signal. This equalization, explained in Appendix C.7,





The alternative model for a comparable level of noise produces changes in the
volatility of spreads in the same direction as the main model, but of lower magnitude.
Table 3.5 reproduces the statistics calculated for the main model for the symmetric
and baseline case, reported in Table 3.4, and the ones calculated with the alternative
model for each version. The standard deviations for output and consumption do not
change significantly from the symmetric versions in both models. There is a decrease
in the standard deviation of the trade-balance to output ratio in the alternative
model. Note first that the symmetric version of the alternative model implies a higher
volatility of spreads than the one of the symmetric main model. Both asymmetric
versions increase this volatility, but the main model does it in a 72 percent and
the alternative model in 20 percent. So, even though the change goes in the same
direction, the final volatility and its increase is much higher in the main model.
Both models produce small changes in correlations with output. The correlation
with consumption does not change much, with the trade balance-to-output ratio
increases for the main model and decreases for the alternative, but all versions show
a relatively small negative value. The correlation of output with spread changes in
the same direction and for a similar magnitude. The major difference in change of
correlations is the one between trade balance-to-output ratio and the spread, that
shows a much higher decrease in the main model. Since the symmetric version of
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Table 3.5: Comparison between Models
Main Model Alternative Model
Symm. Asymm. Symm. Asymm.
Standard deviations
y 7.54 7.46 7.57 7.58
c 7.77 7.68 7.75 7.76
tb/y 1.11 1.12 1.49 1.22
rs 3.01 5.18 3.33 4.01
Correlations
(y, c) 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
(y, tb/y) -0.14 -0.12 -0.03 -0.07
(y, rs) -0.46 -0.36 -0.4 -0.33
(tb/y, rs) 0.75 0.38 0.47 0.36
Means
B/y -3.91 -3.67 -4.33 -3.75
rs 3.48 4.21 3.43 3.51
Default rate 2.93 6.15 2.91 4.87
Default Episode
y -9.49 -9.29 -8.02 -7.97
c -9.4 -9.21 -7.92 -7.88
tb/y 0.79 -0.53 0.74 -0.76
B/y -2.12 -2.84 -2.15 -3.51
rs 9.6 48.91 6.25 49.55
Notes: The statistics for the main model are the same as shown in Table 3.4 for the case
of σe = 0%, which is the symmetric version and σe = 1.37%, which is the asymmetric
version. The statistics of the alternative model are calculated for ση = 4.56%. Based
on 1 million simulations. Standard deviations, correlations and means were calculated for
periods that the economy did not default,was not excluded from the financial international
market, and the annualized spread reached in the period was below 70%. All variables
except correlations are in percentage. For the default episode, y, c represent deviations from
non-default averages.
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the alternative model has a lower value of this correlation, the final correlation of the
asymmetric versions are similar.
Mean assets and mean spread increase in both models. Assets of the symmetric
version of the alternative model are lower than the same version of the main model,
but since the increase in assets is larger in the second case, the assets of the asym-
metric versions are similar. The increase in mean spread is higher in the case of the
main model.
There is an increase in the default rate of both models and a similar change in the
statistics during default periods when compared to their symmetric versions. Both
symmetric versions show similar initial default rates, but the main model increase
to a higher value. During the default episodes, there is a lower deviation of output
and consumption with respective to their non-default averages in both versions of
the alternative model, which supports the finding in Durdu et al. (2013) that news
make defaults occurs also in good times. The change in the trade balance-to-output
ratio is similar in both models, going from a superavit to deficit when introducing
asymmetric information. There is a higher increase in debt before the default in the
alternative model. And finally the increase in spreads of the default period from the
symmetric versions is comparable between models.
To sum up, in general changes are qualitatively comparable, which supports the
findings of effects that asymmetric information produce on default models, but par-
ticularly the findings related to the spread are stronger in the main model.
3.5 Conclusion
The endogenous default literature finds in general a low volatility of spreads in
their models unless a very long duration bond is assumed. One important assumption
generally made is that the country and its foreign lenders hold the same amount of
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information when making their decisions. As the cases like Argentina and Greece
have shown, this assumption is too strong to represent the reality of international
financial markets and this is why this paper introduces asymmetric information in
a canonical endogenous default model. This paper assumes that when making their
decisions, foreign lenders instead of having perfect information about current output,
only see a noisy signal, while the government sees all. Both agents know this and so,
their decisions and equilibrium outcomes are affected.
As compared to the symmetric version, the baseline calibrated model shows that
for an empirically estimated level of noise, the government’s decisions depend on the
expectation about current output held by foreign lenders. When output is relatively
low and foreign lenders believe it is higher, the government chooses a lower amount of
assets, which makes the equilibrium spread increase significantly. In other cases, the
behavior of the government is similar to the symmetric case. By taking advantage
of the relatively more information, the simulated statistics show that the standard
deviation of spread increases while not affecting other statistics significantly.
Many statistics of the model show a non-monotonic behavior when noise increases.
The standard deviation of spreads and mean spread reach their maximum value near
the baseline noise level. Mean assets show an upside-down U shape. The default rate
increases monotonically for values of noise strictly higher than zero and welfare in
general improves with noise. In the default period, there is a decrease in the trade
balance-to-output ratio and in assets and an increase in the spread.
Finally, when including a comparable asymmetry in an alternative endogenous
default model and compare to its symmetric version, the changes in the statistics go
in the same direction, in general, as the main model. Nonetheless, the increase in
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A.2 Solution of the Symmetric Information
Model
Because shocks are allowed to be autoregressive (when ρx > 0) and there is news










for x = {ut, r∗t , εt} and j ≥ 1.










































Γ(ρ) ≡ −A−1(I − A−1ρ)−1
Ξ(ρ) ≡ −A−2(I − A−1ρ)−1
where A is defined in the main text and I is a 2x2 identity matrix. Defining Γij(ρ)
as element (i, j) of matrix Γ(ρ) and the same for matrix Ξ(ρ), we have that the



















































and for the interest rate:










for ω∗ = {u, r∗, sε, su, sr∗}.
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A.3 Analytical Expressions of Coefficients of
Table 1.2
Current Shocks
• Monetary Shock, εt. When ρε = 0:
χπ = −σκ χx = −σ
And when 1 > ρε > 0:
χπ = −
σκ
(1− ρε)(1− ρεβ)− ρεσκ
χx = −
σ(1− βρε)
(1− ρε)(1− ρεβ)− ρεσκ





and when 1 > ρu > 0:
χπ =
1− ρu + σφx
φπ(1− ρu) + σφxρu
χx = −
σ(φπ − ρu)
φπ(1− ρu) + σφxρu
















• Signal of future monetary shock, sεt. When ρε = 0:
χπ =
κ(1 + β + σ(βφx + κ))
κφπ(1 + β + σκ) + φx(1 + σκ)
χx =
1 + σκ(1− βφπ)
κφπ(1 + β + σκ) + φx(1 + σκ)
and when 1 > ρε > 0:
χπ =
κ(1 + β − βρε + σκ+ σβφx)
κφπ(1 + β + σκ− βρε) + φx(1 + σκ− βρε)
χx =
1 + σκ(1− βφπ)− βρε
κφπ(1 + β + σκ− βρε) + φx(1 + σκ− βρε)
• Signal of future cost push shock, sut . When ρu = 0:
χπ =
(β + σ(βφx + κ))(1 + σφx)− σκφπ
(σφx + σκφπ)(1 + σφx − φπ) + βφπ(1 + σφx)
χx = −σ
(βφπ − 1)(1 + σφx) + φπ
(σφx + σκφπ)(1 + σφx − φπ) + βφπ(1 + σφx)
and when 1 > ρu > 0:
χπ =
(β + σ(βφx + κ)− βρu)(1 + σφx)− σκφπ
(σφx + σκφπ)(1 + σφx − φπ) + βφπ(1− ρu + σφx)
χx = −σ
(βφπ − 1)(1 + σφx) + φπ(1− βρu)
(σφx + σκφπ)(1 + σφx − φπ) + βφπ(1− ρu + σφx)
• Signal of future natural rate of interest, sr∗t . When ρr∗ = 0:
χπ =
κ(1 + β + σ(βφx + κ))
κφπ(1 + β + σκ) + φx(1 + σκ)
χx =
1 + σκ(1− βφπ)
κφπ(1 + β + σκ) + φx(1 + σκ)
and when 1 > ρr∗ > 0:
χπ =
κ(1 + β − βρr∗ + σκ+ σβφx)
κφπ(1 + β + σκ− βρr∗) + φx(1 + σκ− βρr∗)
χx =
1 + σκ(1− βφπ)− βρr∗
κφπ(1 + β + σκ− βρr∗) + φx(1 + σκ− βρr∗)
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A.4 Parameter Ranges for Results about News
Shocks
α β σ κ φx φπ
0.6− 0.9 0.99 0.5− 10 0.01−0.05 0.05− 0.5 1.1− 2
A.5 Equations and Results for Example

























































And then after some calculations, we get that the relation between the updates
in expectations and the surprise in the interest rate are:





















t,d = 0. So the sign depends on σφxσ
2
ν,r∗−σ2ν,ε
(which gives the sign for Ω11 − Ω21).
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Matrices of Coefficients and their Properties
B.1.1 Temporary Equilibrium Solution
The system of three equations given in the text can be solved to obtain
xt = Cet + cωt (B.1)




 , et =
e1,t
e2,t








κ (1 + σφy)(1− α)β





and use the shorthand notation ∆ ≡ 1 + σφy + σκφπ ≥ 1. (This last inequality, that
allows us to divide by ∆, holds under the sign restrictions maintained in the text.)
Given this solution for xt, the solution for the nominal interest rate is obtained by
substituting the solutions for inflation and output into the reaction function (2.8).
This solution also allows us to solve for the summary variables at that decision-
makers need to forecast, resulting in
















B.1.2 Perfect Foresight Equilibrium Dynamics
It follows from the discussion in the text (citing Woodford 2003, chap. 4) that
the PFE dynamics can be written in the form





κ σκ+ β(1 + σφy)




Alternatively, we can characterize PFE dynamics by the requirement that et must
equal e∗t for all t. From (2.20) it follows that a sequence of vectors of expectations










= ψ1et+1 + ϕ1ωt+1 + Λ et+1
= (I − Λ)M et+1 + (I − Λ)mωt+1 + Λ et+1
= [(I − Λ)M + Λ] et+1 + (I − Λ)mωt+1 (B.3)
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for all t ≥ 0.
The dynamics implied by (B.3) are in fact equivalent to those implied by (B.2).
Using (B.1) together with (B.3) implies that the PFE dynamics of output and inflation
must satisfy
xt = C [(I − Λ)M + Λ] et+1 + C(I − Λ)mωt+1 + c ωt
= C [(I − Λ)M + Λ]C−1 [xt+1 − cωt+1] + C(I − Λ)mωt+1 + c ωt.
But this relation is in fact equivalent to (B.2), given that our definitions above imply
that
C [(I − Λ)M + Λ]C−1 = B, (B.4)
C (I − Λ)m = Bc + b · [−βσ−1 0],
c = b · [σ−1 − 1].
B.1.3 Properties of the Matrix M
A number of results turn on the eigenvalues of the matrix








We first note that the determinant of the matrix is given by









Under our sign assumptions, the factor pre-multiplying the factor in parentheses





φy − 1 6= 0. (B.5)
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(In this case the steady-state vector of expectations (2.31) is well-defined, as asserted
in the text.)
For any 2× 2 real matrix A, both eigenvalues have negative real part if and only
if Det[A] > 0 and Tr[A] < 0.1 From the result above, the first of these conditions
is satisfied if the left-hand side of (B.5) is positive, which is to say, if the Taylor
Principle (2.14) is satisfied. The trace of M − I is given by
Tr(M − I) = − 1
∆
(
σ(φy + κφπ − κ)
1− β
+




The second term inside the parentheses is necessarily positive under our sign as-
sumptions, and the first term is positive as well if the Taylor Principle is satisfied,
since















Hence the Taylor Principle is a sufficient condition for Tr[M − I] < 0. It follows
that (given our other sign assumptions) the Taylor Principle is both necessary and
sufficient for both eigenvalues of M − I to have negative real part.
If instead the left-hand side of (B.5) is negative, Det[M − I] < 0, and as a
consequence the matrix must have two real eigenvalues of opposite sign.2 Thus one
eigenvalue is positive in this case, as asserted in the text. Note that this is the case
that obtains if φπ = φy = 0.
1See, for example, Hirsch and Smale (1974, p. 96).
2Again see Hirsch and Smale (1974), p. 96.
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B.1.4 A Further Implication of the Taylor Principle
We are also interested in the eigenvalues of the related matrix A(λ)M − I, where






(Note that in the limiting case λ = 1, this reduces to the matrix M−I, just discussed.)
In the case that the Taylor principle (2.14) is satisfied, we can show that for any
−1 ≤ λ ≤ 1, both eigenvalues of A(λ)M − I have negative real part. This follows
again from a consideration of the determinant and trace of the matrix (generalizing
the above discussion).
Since













Note that under our sign assumptions, the denominator is necessarily positive. The
numerator defines a function g(λ), a convex function (a parabola) with the properties










so that g(1) > 0 if and only if the Taylor Principle is satisfied. Hence the function
g(λ) > 0 for all λ ≤ 1, with the consequence that Det[A(λ)M−I] > 0 for all |λ| ≤ 1,
if and only if the Taylor Principle is satisfied.
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The trace of the matrix is given by
Tr(A(λ)M − I) = − 1
∆
(
∆− λ(1 + σκ)
1− βλ
+




The denominators of both terms inside the parentheses are positive for all |λ| ≤ 1,
and we necessarily have ∆ > 0 under our sign assumptions as well. The numerator
of the first term inside the parentheses is also positive, since
∆− λ(1 + σκ) = σ [κφπ + φy − κ] + (1− λ)(1 + σκ) ≥ σ [κφπ + φy − κ] > 0
if the Taylor Principle is satisfied, again using (B.6). And the numerator of the second
term inside the parentheses is positive as well, since
∆− βλ(1 + σφy) = (1− βλ)(1 + σφy) + κσφπ > 0
under our sign assumptions. Thus the Taylor Principle is also a sufficient condition
for Tr[A(λ)M − I] < 0 for all |λ| ≤ 1.
It then follows that the Taylor Principle is necessary and sufficient for both eigen-
values of the matrix A(λ)M − I to have negative real part, in the case of any |λ| < 1.
We use this result in the proof of Proposition 1.
B.1.5 Properties of the Matrix B
Necessary and sufficient conditions for both eigenvalues of a 2 × 2 matrix B to
have modulus less than 1 are that (i) DetB < 1; (ii) DetB + TrB > −1; and (iii)
DetB − TrB > −1. In the case of the matrix B defined above, we observe that
∆ DetB = β, (B.7)
∆ TrB = 1 + κσ + β(1 + σφy).
From these facts we observe that our general sign assumptions imply that
∆ DetB < ∆,
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∆ (DetB + TrB + 1) > 0.
Thus (since ∆ is positive) conditions (i) and (ii) from the previous paragraph neces-
sarily hold. We also find that










from which it follows that condition (iii) is also satisfied if and only if the quantity
in the square brackets is positive. Thus we conclude that both eigenvalues of B have
modulus less than 1 if and only if the Taylor Principle (2.14) is satisfied.
In the case that the Taylor Principle is violated (as in the case of a fixed interest
rate, in which case φπ = φy = 0), since DetB = µ1µ2 and TrB = µ1 + µ2, where
(µ1, µ2) are the two eigenvalues of B, the fact that condition (iii) fails to hold implies
that
(µ1 − 1)(µ2 − 1) < 0. (B.8)
This condition is inconsistent with the eigenvalues being a pair of complex conjugates,
so in this case there must be two real eigenvalues. Condition (B.8) further implies that
one must be greater than 1, while the other is less than 1. Condition (B.7) implies that
DetB > 0, which requires that the two real eigenvalues both be non-zero and of the
same sign; hence both must be positive. Thus when the Taylor Principle is violated
(i.e., the quantity in (B.5) is negative), there are two real eigenvalues satisfying
0 < µ1 < 1 < µ2,
as asserted in section 2.2.
We further note that in this case, e′2, the (real) left eigenvector associated with
eigenvalue µ2, must be such that e
′
2b 6= 0 (a result that is relied upon in section 4.2).
The vector v′2 6= 0 must satisfy
e′2 [B − µ2I] = 0
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to be a left eigenvector. The first column of this relation implies that (1− µ2)e2,1 +
κe2,2 = 0, where we use the notation e2,j for the jth element of eigenvector e
′
2. Since
κ > 0 and µ2 > 1, this requires that e2,1 and e2,2 must both be non-zero and have the
same sign. But since both elements of b have the same sign, this implies that e′2b 6= 0.
Finally, we note that whenever (B.5) holds, regardless of the sign, the eigenvalues
must satisfy
(µ1 − 1)(µ2 − 1) 6= 0,
so that B has no eigenvalue equal exactly to 1. This means that the matrix B − I
must be non-singular, which is the condition needed for existence of unique steady-
state levels of output and inflation consistent with a PFE. In the case of constant
fundamentals ωt = ω̄ for all t, the unique steady-state solution to (B.2) is then given
by xt = x̄ for all t, where
x̄ ≡ (I −B)−1 b [(1− β)σ−1ḡ − ı̄]. (B.9)
Note that condition (B.5) is also the condition under which M−I is non-singular,
as shown above. Moreover, since I − Λ is non-singular, M − I is non-singular if and
only if (I −Λ)(M − I) = [(I −Λ)M + Λ] − I is non-singular. This is the condition
under which equation (B.3) has a unique steady-state solution, in which et = ē for
all t, with
ē ≡ (I −M)−1mω̄.
This solution for steady-state PFE expectations is consistent with (B.9) because of
the identities linking the M and B matrices noted above.
B.1.6 Convergence of the PFE Dynamics
As noted in the text in section 2.2, in the case that φπ = φy = 0, there exists a
continuum of PFE solutions that remain bounded for all t, described by equations
(2.16) for alternative values of the coefficient χ. Here we show that if after some finite
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date T , both ı̄t and ρt take constant values, then each of this continuum of solutions
has the property that
lim
t→∞
πt = πLR, lim
y→∞
yt = yLR,
where the limiting values are independent of χ and are given by (2.17). Moreover, the
limiting values to which the PFE dynamics converge correspond to the PFE steady
state (B.9).










µ−j2 · (ρLR − ı̄LR) +
t∑
j=t+1−T























has a value independent of t. Given that 0 < µ−12 < 1, we see immediately from this













· (ρLR − ı̄LR)
as t→∞. This limiting vector is independent of the value of χ.
Finally, we note that


























2b)] · (ρLR − ı̄LR)
= b · (ρLR − ı̄LR),
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so that xLR is just the vector of steady-state values defined in (B.9). Our definitions
of B and b above further imply that when φπ = φy = 0,




so that (B.9) implies the values given in (2.17).
B.2 Proofs of Propositions
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
As discussed in the text, under the hypotheses of the proposition, there must exist
a date T̄ such that the fundamental disturbances {ωt} can be written in the form






for all t ≥ T̄ , and the initial conjecture can also be written in the form






for all t ≥ T̄ , where |λk| < 1 for all k = 1, . . . , K. (There is no loss of generality
in using the same date T̄ and the same finite set of convergence rates {λk} in both
expressions.) With a driving process and initial condition of this special form, the
solution to the system of differential equations (2.21) will be of the form






for all t ≥ T̄ , for each n ≥ 0. We then need simply determine the evolution as n
increases of the finite set of values et(n) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T −1, together with the finite set
of coefficients e∞(n) and ae,k(n). This is a set of 2(T̄ +K + 1) functions of n, which
we write as the vector-valued function e(n) in the text.
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In the case of any belief sequences and disturbances of the form assumed in the
above paragraph, it follows from (2.20) that the implied correct beliefs will be of the
form








for all t ≥ T̄ , where
e∗∞(n) = M e∞(n) + mω∞,
and
a∗e,k(n) = A(λk) [M ae,k(n) + maω,k]




[ψjet+j(n) + ϕjωt+j] + Λ





T̄−t−1A(λk) [Mae,k(n) + maω,k].
Thus the sequence {e∗t (n)} can also be summarized by a set of 2(T̄ +K+1) functions
of n, and each of these is a linear function of the elements of the vectors e(n) and ω.
It then follows that the dynamics (2.21) can be written in the more compact form
ė(n) = V e(n) +W ω, (B.10)
where the elements of the matrices V and W are given by the coefficients of the
equations in the previous paragraph. Suppose that we order the elements of e(n) as
follows: the first two elements are the elements of e0, the next two elements are the
elements of e1, and so on, through the elements of eT̄−1; the next two elements are
the elements of ae,1, the two elements after that are the elements of ae,2, and so on,
through the elements of ae,K ; and the final two elements are the elements of e∞. Then






where the first 2T̄ rows are partitioned from the last 2(K + 1) rows, and the columns
are similarly partitioned.
Moreover, the block V11 of the matrix is of the block upper-triangular form
V11 =

−I v12 · · · v1,T̄−1 v1,T̄






0 0 · · · −I vT̄−1,T̄
0 0 · · · 0 −I

, (B.12)
where now each block of the matrix is 2 × 2. Furthermore, when V22 is similarly
partitioned into 2× 2 blocks, it takes the block-diagonal form
V22 =






0 · · · A(λK)M − I 0
0 · · · 0 M − I

. (B.13)
These results allow us to determine the eigenvalues of V . The block-triangular
form (B.11) implies that the eigenvalues of V consist of the 2T̄ eigenvalues of V11
and the 2(K + 1) eigenalues of V22 (the two diagonal blocks). Similarly, the block-
triangular form (B.12) implies that the eigenvalues of V11 consist of the eigenvalues
of the diagonal blocks (each of which is −I), which means that the eigenvalue -
1 is repeated 2T̄ times. Finally, the block-diagonal form (B.13) implies that the
eigenvalues of V22 consist of the eigenvalues of the diagonal blocks: the two eigenvalues
of A(λk)M − I, for each k = 1, . . . , K, and the two eigenvalues of M − I.
Using the results in section B.1.3, it follows from the hypothesis that the reaction
function coefficients satisfy (2.14) and the hypothesis that |λk| < 1 for each k that
all of the eigenvalues of M − I and of each of the matrices A(λk)M − I have negative
real part. Since all of the other eigenvalues of V are equal to -1, all 2(T̄ + K + 1)
eigenvalues of V have negative real part. This implies that V is non-singular, so that
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there is a unique rest point for the dynamics (B.10), defined by (2.27) in the text. It
also implies that the dynamics (B.10) converge asymptotically to that rest point as
n goes to infinity, for any initial condition e(0) (Hirsch and Smale, 1974, pp. 90-95).3
The rest point to which e(n) converges is easily seen to correspond to the unique
PFE that belongs to the same linear space L2. Beliefs in L2 constitute a PFE if
and only if e∗ = e. From our characterization above of e∗, this is equivalent to the
requirement that V e + W = 0, which holds if and only if e = ePF , the unique rest
point of the system (B.10).
Finally, the paths of output and inflation in any reflective equilibrium are given
by (B.1), given the solution for {et(n)}. Using (2.8), one obtains a similar linear
equation for the nominal interest rate each period. It then follows that for any t, the
reflective equilibrium values for yt, πt, and it converge to the FS-PFE values as n is
made large. Furthermore, the complete sequences of values for these three variables
for any value of n depend on only the finite number of elements of the vector e(n), in
such a way that for any ε > 0, there exists an ε̃ > 0 such that it is guaranteed that
each of the variables yt, πt, and it are within distance ε of their FS-PFE values for
all t as long as |e(n) − ePF | < ε̃. The convergence of e(n) to ePF then implies the
existence of a finite n(ε) for which the latter condition is satisfied, regardless of how
small ε̃ needs to be. This proves the proposition.
3Of course, it is important to recognize that this result only establishes convergence for initial
conjectures that belong to the linear space L2. The result also only establishes convergence under
the assumption that the linear dynamics (B.10) apply at all times; this depends on assuming that
the reaction function (2.8) can be implemented at all times, which requires that the zero lower
bound never bind. Thus we only establish convergence for all those initial conjectures such that the
dynamics implied by (2.21) never cause the zero lower bound to bind. There is however a large set
of initial conditions for which this is true, given that the unconstrained dynamics are asymptotically
convergent.
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Figure B.1: Reflective Equilibrium of Discrete Process of Belief Revision

















Note: The graphs show Reflective equilibrium outcomes for N = 0 through 4 (progressively darker
lines) when the Taylor-rule intercept is reduced for 200 quarters, as in Figure 2.2; but a discrete
process of iterative belief revision is assumed.
B.2.2 Comparison with a Discrete Model of Belief Revision
Here we note that the convergence result in Proposition 1 would not hold with the
same generality were we instead to assume a discrete model of belief revision in which,
instead of the continuous model of belief revision (2.21), we iterate the mapping
et(N + 1) = e
∗
t (N) (B.14)
for N = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where for each N , {e∗t (N)} is the sequence of correct beliefs
implied by average expectations specified by the sequence {et(N)}. As with the con-
tinuous model, we might take as given some “naive” initial conjecture, and then
consider how it evolves as a result of further iterations of the mapping. And as with
the continuous model, i f the process converges to a fixed point, such a fixed point
must correspond to PFE beliefs.
However, the conditions for convergence of the discrete process, while related to
the conditions under which the continuous process converges, are more stringent.
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Convergence need not obtain under the conditions hypothesized in Proposition 1,
as the following numerical example illustrates. In Figure B.1, the same policy ex-
periment is considered as in Figure 2.2, namely, the intercept of the Taylor rule is
expected to be lowered for 200 quarters, after which it is expected to return to the
level consistent with the inflation target π∗. All model parameters are also the same
as in Figure 2.2, and the initial conjecture is assumed to be et(0) = 0 for all t, also as
in the Figure 2.2. However, in Figure B.1 the iterative model of belief revision (B.14)
is assumed, whereas the continuous model (2.21) is assumed in Figure 2.2.
The figure plots the implied TE dynamics of output and inflation for iterations
N = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. The belief-revision dynamics are seen to be explosive. The first
revision of the initial conjecture (which takes account of the fact that it is predictable
that if people maintain the initial beliefs, consistent with the unperturbed steady
state, the temporary policy will lead to higher inflation and output) raises both
output and inflation further. But anticipation of these effects (and the associated
increase in the interest rate that they must provoke) should actually lead output and
inflation to be lower in stage N = 2. Anticipation of the N = 2 outcomes (which
imply an even deeper cut in the interest rate) then leads output and inflation to
be high again in stage N = 3, and to an even greater extent than in stage N = 1.
Anticipating of this then leads output and inflation to be low again in stage N = 4, to
an even greater extent than in stage N = 2. The oscillations continue, growing larger
and larger, as N is increased; but as the figure shows, the predicted expectations are
already very extreme after only four iterations of the belief updating mapping.
It is not accidental that the unstable dynamics of belief revision in this case are
oscillatory. In terms of the compact notation introduced in the proof of Proposition 1
(under the assumption of exponentially convergent fundamentals and average beliefs),
the discrete model of belief revision (B.14) replaces the continuous dynamics (B.16)
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by the discrete process
e(N + 1) = (I + V ) e(N) +W ω. (B.15)
This process is unstable if not all eigenvalues of I + V are of modulus less than 1.
Since the eigenvalues of I+V are equal to 1 +µi, where µi is an eigenvalue of V , and
we have shown above that all eigenvalues of V have negative real part, I + V cannot
have a real eigenvalue greater than 1. It can, however, have a real eigenvalue with
modulus greater than 1, if V has a real eigenvalue that is less than -2. This is the
case shown in Figure B.1, in which a large negative eigenvalue results in explosive
oscillations.
We feel, however, that the kind of unstable process of belief revision illustrated
by Figure B.1 is unrealistic, as it is requires that at each stage in the reasoning, one
must conjecture that everyone else should reason in one precise way, even though that
assumed reasoning changes dramatically from each stage in the process of reflection
to the next. The continuous process of belief revision proposed in the text avoids
making such an implausible assumption.
B.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2
It has already been shown in the text that under the assumptions of the propo-
sition, we have et(n) = eLR(n) for all t ≥ T, where eLR(n) is given by (2.30). It
has also been shown that for any τ ≥ 1, the solution for eτ (n), where τ ≡ T − t is
the number of periods remaining until the regime change, is independent of T . The
functions {eτ (n)} further satisfy the system of differential equations
ėτ (n) = −eτ (n) + (I − Λ)
τ−1∑
j=1
Λj−1 [Meτ−j(n) + m2ı̄SR]
+ Λτ−1 [MeLR(n) + m2ı̄LR] (B.16)
derived in the text, together with the initial conditions eτ (0) = 0 for all τ ≥ 1.
(Equation (B.16) repeats equation (2.33) from the text.)
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We wish to calculate the behavior of the solution to this system as τ →∞ for an
arbitrary value of n. It is convenient to use the method of z-transforms (Jury, 1964).







Here Xn(z) is a vector-valued function; each element is a function of the complex
number z, defined for complex numbers |z| > 1/ρ, where ρ is the minimum of the
radii of the convergence of the two series.
Differentiating (B.17) with respect to n, and substituting (B.16) for ėτ (n) in the






















Λjz−j [M eLR(n) + m2ı̄LR]
= −Xn(z) + (I − Λ)(I − Λz−1)−1
[
z−1M Xn(z) + (z − 1)−1m2ı̄SR
]
+ (I − Λz−1)−1 [MeLR(n) + m2ı̄LR] , (B.18)
which holds for any n > 0 and any z in the region of convergence. We note that the
right-hand side of (B.18) is well-defined for all |z| > 1.
The z-transform of the initial condition is simply X0(z) = 0 for all z. Thus we
wish to find functions {Xn(z)} for all n ≥ 0, each defined on the region |z| > 1, that
satisfy (B.18) for all n and all |z| > 1, together with the initial condition X0(z) = 0
for all z. If we can find such a solution, then for any n we can find the implied
sequence {et(n)} by inverse z-transformation of the function Xn(z).
We note that the dynamics of Xn(z) implied by (B.18) is independent for each
value of z. (This is the advantage of z-transformation of the original system of
equations (B.16).) Thus for each value of z such that |z| > 1, we have an independent
first-order ordinary differential equation to solve for Xn(z), with the single initial
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condition X0(z) = 0. This equation has a closed-form solution for each z, given by
Xn(z) = (1− z−1)−1 [I − exp(n(M − I))] (I −M)−1 ·m2ı̄LR
+ (z − 1)−1 [I − exp(−nΦ(z))] Φ(z)−1 (I − Λ)(I − Λz−1)−1
·m2(̄ıSR − ı̄LR) (B.19)
for all n ≥ 0, where
Φ(z) ≡ I − (I − Λ)(I − Λz−1)−1z−1M.
Note also that the expression on the right-hand side of (B.19) is an analytic function
of z everywhere in the complex plane outside the unit circle, and can be expressed
as a sum of powers of z−1 that converges everywhere in that region. Such a series
expansion of Xn(z) for any n allows us to recover the series of coefficients {eτ (n)}
associated with the reflective equilibrium with degree of reflection n.






The final value theorem for z-transforms4 implies that
lim
τ→∞
eτ (n) = lim
z→1
(z − 1)Xn(z)
if the limit on the right-hand side exists. In the case of the solution (B.19), we observe
that the limit is well-defined, and equal to
lim
z→1
(z − 1)Xn(z) = [I − exp(n(M − I))] (I −M)−1m2ı̄SR.
Hence for any t and any n, et(n) converges to a well-defined (finite) limit as T is
made large, and the limit is the one given in the statement of the proposition.
4See, for example, Jury (1964), p. 6.
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for all t and n follows from Proposition 2. If in addition, the Taylor Principle (2.14)
is satisfied, then as shown in section B.1.3 above, both eigenvalues of M − I have














for all t follows from Proposition 1. Establishing the second double limit thus requires
us to consider how ePFt changes as T is made large.
As discussed in section B.1.2 above, the FS-PFE dynamics {ePFt } satisfy equation
(B.3) for all t. Under the kind of regime assumed in this proposition (with ωt equal
to a constant vector ω̄ for all t ≥ T ), the FS-PFE (obtained by “solving forward”
the difference equation) involves a constant vector of expectations, ePFt = ē
PF
LR for all
t ≥ T − 1, where
ēPFLR ≡ [I −M ]−1m2ı̄LR
is the same as the vector defined in (2.31).
For periods t < T − 1, one must instead solve the difference equation backward
from the terminal condition ePFT−1 = ē
PF
LR . We thus obtain a difference equation of the
form
eτ = [(I − Λ)M + Λ] eτ−1 + (I − Λ)m2ı̄SR (B.20)
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for all τ ≥ 2, with initial condition e1 = ēPFLR . The asymptotic behavior of these
dynamics as τ is made large depends on the eigenvalues of the matrix
(I − Λ)M + Λ = C−1BC, (B.21)
which must be the same as the eigenvalues of B. (Note that (B.21) follows from
(B.4).)
Under the hypothesis that the response coefficients satisfy the Taylor Principle
(2.14), both eigenvalues of B are inside the unit circle. It then follows that the
dynamics (B.20) converge as τ → ∞ to the steady-state vector of expectations ēPFSR






for any t. This establishes the second double limit.
B.2.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of this proposition follows exactly the same lines as the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. While the definition of the matrices of coefficients V and W must be modified,
it continues to be possible to write the belief revision dynamics in the compact form
(B.10), for an appropriate definition of these matrices. (This depends on the fact
that we have chosen T̄ ≥ T, so that the coefficients of the monetary policy reaction
function do not change over time during periods t ≥ T̄ . Variation over time in the
reaction function coefficients does not prevent us from writing the dynamics in the
compact form, as long as it occurs only prior to date T̄ ; and our method of analysis
requires only that T̄ be finite.)
Moreover, it continues to be the case that V will have the block-triangular form
indicated in equations (B.11)–(B.13). In equation (B.13), the matrix M is defined
using the coefficients (φπ, φy) that apply after date T , and thus that satisfy the Taylor
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Principle (2.14), according to the hypotheses of the proposition. The eigenvalues of V
again consist of -1 (repeated 2T̄ times); the eigenvalues of A(λk)M, for k = 1, . . . , K,
and the eigenvalues of M . Because M is defined using coefficients that satisfy the
Taylor Principle, we again find that all of the eigenvalues of M and of A(λk)M
have negative real part. Hence all of the eigenvalues of V have negative real part.
This again implies that the dynamics (B.10) are asymptotically stable, and the fixed
point to which they converge again corresponds to the FS-PFE expectations. This
establishes the proposition.
Note that this result depends on the hypothesis that from date T onward, mon-
etary policy is determined by a reaction function with coefficients that satisfy the
Taylor Principle. If we assumed instead (as in the case emphasized in Cochrane,
2015a) that after date T , policy again consists of a fixed interest rate, but one that
is consistent with the long-run inflation target (i.e., ı̄LR = 0), the belief-revision dy-
namics would not converge. (See the discussion in section 4.3 of the text of the case
in which an interest-rate peg differs temporarily from the long-run interest-rate peg.)
If the interest rate is also fixed after date T (albeit at some level ı̄LR 6= ı̄SR), the
belief-revision dynamics can again be written in the compact form (B.10), and the
matrix V will again have the form (B.11)–(B.13). But in this case, the matrix M in
(B.13) would be defined using the response coefficients φπ = φy = 0, so that the
Taylor Principle is violated. It then follows from our results above that M will have
a positive real eigenvalue. (By continuity, one can show that A(λk)M will also have
a positive real eigenvalue for all values of λk near enough to 1.) Hence V will have
at least one (and possibly several) eigenvalues with positive real part, and the belief-
revision dynamics (B.10) will be explosive in the case of almost all initial conjectures
(even restricting our attention to conjectures within the specified finite-dimensional
family).
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B.2.6 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of this proposition follows similar lines as the proof of Proposition
2. In general, the characterization of reflective equilibrium is more complex when
the monetary policy response coefficients are not time-invariant, as in the situation
considered here. However, in the case hypothesized in the proposition, gt = 0 and
from period T onward, monetary policy is consistent with constant inflation at the
rate π∗. Under these circumstances, and initial conjecture under which et = 0 for all
t ≥ T implies correct beliefs e∗t = 0 for all t ≥ T as well. Hence under the belief-
revision dynamics, the conjectured beliefs are never revised, and et(n) = 0 for all
degrees of reflection n ≥ 0, and any t ≥ T. This result would be the same if we were
to assume a fixed interest rate for all t ≥ T (that is, if we were to assume response
coefficients φπ = φy = 0 after date T , just like we do for dates prior to T ), but a fixed
interest rate ı̄t = 0 for all t ≥ T (that is, the fixed interest rate consistent with the
steady state with inflation rate π∗).
Thus the reflective equilibrium is the same (in this very special case) as if we
assumed a fixed interest rate in all periods (and thus the same response coefficients
in all periods), but ı̄t = ı̄SR for t < T while ı̄t = 0 for t ≥ T.5 And the latter is a case
to which Proposition 2 applies. (Note that Proposition 2 requires no assumptions
about the response coefficients except that they are constant over time, and that
they satisfy (B.5). Hence the case in which φπ = φy = 0 in all periods is consistent
with the hypotheses of that proposition.)
Proposition 2 can then be used to show that the reflective equilibrium beliefs
{et(n)} for any degree of reflection n converge to a well-defined limiting value eSR(n),
5Note that these two different specifications of monetary policy would not lead to the same
reflective equilibrium expectations, under most assumptions about the real shocks or about the
initial conjecture; see the discussion at the end of the proof of Proposition 4. Here we get the same
result only because we assume gt = 0 (exactly) for all t ≥ T and an initial conjecture under which
et(0) = 0 (exactly) for all t ≥ T.
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which is given by (2.34)–(2.35). This establishes the proposition.
B.2.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Let {e1t} be the sequence of expectations in a reflective equilibrium when the
date of the regime change is T , and {e2t} be the expectations in the equilibrium
corresponding to the same degree of reflection n when the date of the regime change
is T ′ > T. Similarly, let {a1t} and {a2t} be the evolution of the vectors of summary
variables that decisionmakers need to forecast in the two equilibria, and {e∗1t } and
{e∗2t } the implied sequences of correct forecasts in the two equilibria. We similarly use
the notation M (i),m(i), C(i), c(i) to refer to the matrices M,m,C, and c respectively,
defined using the monetary policy response coefficients associated with regime i (for
i = 1, 2).6
Let us first consider the predictions regarding reflective equilibrium in periods
t ≥ T ′. Under both of the assumptions about policy, policy is expected to be the
same at all dates t ≥ T ′. Since it is assumed that we start from the same initial
conjecture {et(0)} in both cases, and the model is purely forward-looking, it follows
that the belief-revision dynamics will also be the same for all t ≥ T ′ in both cases.
Hence we obtain the same sequences {et(n)} in both cases, for all t ≥ T ′; and since the
outcomes for output and inflation are then given by (B.1), these are the same for all
t ≥ T ′ as well. Moreover, it is easily shown that under our assumptions, the common
solution is one in which et(n) = 0 for all t ≥ T ′, and correspondingly xt(n) = 0 for
all t ≥ T ′.
Moreover, since outcomes for output and inflation are the same for all t ≥ T ′ in
the two cases, it follows that the sequences of correct forecasts {e∗t} are the same in
both cases for all t ≥ T ′− 1. (Note that the correct forecasts in period T ′− 1 depend
6By “regime 1” we mean the Taylor rule (the regime in place in periods T ≤ t < T ′ under policy
1); by “regime 2” we mean the interest-rate peg at ı̄SR.
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only on the equilibrium outcomes in period T ′ and later.) Hence the belief-revision
dynamics for period T ′ − 1 will also be the same in both cases, and we obtain the
same vector eT ′−1(n) for all n; and again the common beliefs are eT ′−1(n) = 0.
Let us next consider reflective equilibrium in periods T ≤ t ≤ T ′ − 1. Suppose
that for some such t and some n, e2t ≥ e1t ≥ 0 (in both components). Then
a2t − a1t = M (2) (e2 − e1t ) + [M (2) −M (1)] e1t |+ m
(2)
2 ı̄SR.
Moreover, we observe from the above definitions of M and m that M (2) is positive
in all elements; M (2) −M (1) is positive in all elements; and m(2)2 is negative in both
elements. Under the hypotheses that e2t ≥ e1t ≥ 0 and ı̄SR < 0, it follows that
a2t − a1t >> 0, where we use the symbol >> to indicate that the first vector is
greater in both elements.
Now suppose that for some n, e2t ≥ e1t ≥ 0 for all T ≤ t ≤ T ′ − 1. It follows from
our conclusions above that these inequalities then must hold for all t ≥ T. It also
follows from the argument in the paragraph above that we must have a2t >> a
1
t for all
T ≤ t ≤ T ′ − 1, along with a2t = a1t for all t ≥ T ′. This implies that e∗2t (n) >> e∗1t (n)
for all T ≤ t < T ′ − 1, while e∗2t (n) = e∗1t (n) for t = T ′ − 1.
The fact that e∗2t (n) = e
∗1
t (n) for t = T
′−1 means that the belief-revision dynamics
for period T ′− 1 will again be the same in both cases, and we obtain the same vector
eT ′−1(n) for all n; and again the common beliefs are eT ′−1(n) = 0. For periods T ≤
t < T ′−1, we continue to have e∗1t (n) = 0 for all n, for the same reason as in the case
of periods t ≥ T ′. But now the fact that we start from the common initial conjecture
e2t (0) = e
1
t (0) = 0 implies that e
∗2
t (0) >> e
∗1
t (0) = 0 and hence ė
2
t (0) >> ė
1
t (0) = 0.
This implies that for small enough n > 0, we will have e2t (n) >> e
1
t (n) = 0 for all
T ≤ t < T ′ − 1.
Moreover, for any n, as long as we continue to have e2t (n) ≥ e1t (n) = 0 for all
t ≥ T, we will continue to have e∗2t (n) >> e∗1t (n) = 0 for all T ≤ t < T ′−1. Since the
belief-revision dynamics (2.21) imply that for any n > 0, et(n) is an average of et(0)
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and the vectors e∗t (ñ) for values 0 ≤ ñ < n, as long as we have had e∗2t (ñ) >> 0 for
all 0 ≤ ñ < n, we will necessarily have e2t (n) >> 0. Thus we conclude by induction
that e2t (n) >> e
1
t (n) = 0 for all n > 0, and any T ≤ t < T ′ − 1.
The associated reflective equilibrium outcomes are given by (B.1) in each case.
This implies that
x2t − x1t = C(2) (e2 − e1t ) + [C(2) − C(1)] e1t |+ c
(2)
2 ı̄SR.
Note furthermore that all elements of C(2) are non-negative, with at least one positive
element in each row; that all elements of C(2)−C(1) are positive; and that all elements
of c
(2)
2 are negative. Then the fact that e
2
t (n) ≥ e1t (n) = 0 for all T ≤ t ≤ T ′ − 1 and




t for all T ≤ t ≤ T ′ − 1.
Finally, let us consider reflective equilibrium in periods 0 ≤ t < T. In these
periods, the monetary policy is expected to be the same in both cases (the fixed
interest rate). Suppose that for some such t and some n, e2t ≥ e1t . Then
a2t − a1t = M (2) (e2 − e1t ) ≥ 0,
because all elements of M (2) are positive. Since we have already concluded above
that a2t >> a
1
t for all T ≤ t ≤ T ′ − 1, and that a2t = a1t for all t ≥ T ′, this implies
that e∗2t >> e
∗1
t for all 0 ≤ t < T.
We can then use an inductive argument, as above, to show that e2t (n) >> e
1
t (n)
for any n > 0, and any 0 ≤ t < T. It follows from this that
x2t − x1t = C(2) (e2 − e1t ) >> 0
for any n > 0, and any 0 ≤ t < T, given that all elements of C(2) are non-negative,
with at least one positive element in each row. This establishes the proposition.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Signal Extraction Problem
Given the signal s and with the information of lagged output y−1, the posterior
distribution of current output is:























































C.2 Reduction of the State Space and implied
distributions
With the initial 3 exogenous states Ŝ = {y, y−1, s}, the necessary distributions to
solve the problem are:
• For the Government: f(y′, y, s′|y, y−1, s), which translate into
f(y′, y, s′|y, y−1, s) ∝ f(s′|y′)f(y′|y)
So, no need to use (y−1, s).
• For Foreign Lenders: f(y′, y, s′|y−1, s), which translate into
f(y′, y, s′|y−1, s) ∝ f(s′|y′)f(y′|y)f(y′|y−1, s)
The first two are the same as in the government’s problem and the last, as shown
in the previous subsection only depend on a fixed combination of (y−1, s). As
long as y−1 and s are such that they imply the same µ, this distribution is the
same implying that we can redefine the exogenous states to be S = {y, µ}
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Redefining the problem with only 2 exogenous states S = {y, µ}, the following
distributions are used:
• For the Government: f(y′, µ′|y, µ), which translate into
f(y′, µ′|y, µ) ∝ f(µ′|y′, y)f(y′|y)
Where can be shown that:
f(µ′|y′, y) ∼ N(w1y + w2y′, w22σ2e)
f(y′|y) ∼ N(ρy, σ2ε )
• For Foreign Lenders: f(y′, µ′|µ), which translate into
f(y′, µ′|µ) ∝ f(µ′|y′, µ)f(y′|µ)
Where can be shown that:
f(µ′|y′, µ) ∼ N(w1µy + w2y′, w21σ2y∗ + w22σ2e)
f(y′|µ) ∼ N(ρµ, ρ2σ2∗ + σ2ε )
C.3 Data and procedure
Defining:
• fypa: Forecast of growth for year t made in apr/may year t.
• fyps: Forecast of growth for year t made in sep/oct year t.
• fyfa: Forecast of growth for year t made in apr/may year t+ 1.
The available starting years for estimation are presented in Table C.1. The sample
ends in 2012 for all countries and forecasts.
In order to get the data ready for estimation, the following steps were followed
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Table C.1: Available Forecasts
Country fypa fyps fyfa
Argentina 1993 1992 1990
Brazil 1994 1992 1990
Chile 1993 1992 1990
Colombia 1995 1994 1994
Dom. Rep. 1995 1995 1994
Ecuador 1995 1995 1994
Guatemala 1995 1995 1994
Mexico 1993 1992 1990
Peru 1995 1994 1994
Uruguay 1995 1995 1994
Venezuela 1993 1994 1990
• log(y) was quadratically detrended: trend, yT , and cycle, yc, were saved.
• the forecast of output, yF , was constructed using the forecasted growth rate
and the information of the lag of each year’s GDP (initial, in levels with trend).
• The cycle of the forecast was saved: log(yF )− yT .
• With that information all the parameters were estimated.
C.4 Further Noise Estimation
The results of the forecasts made in Apr/May and Sept/Oct are shown in Ta-
ble C.2. As can be seen the noise is much higher in these estimations than in the
case presented in the main part of the paper. The ordering of the found noise is in
the intuitive direction meaning that less information produces higher noise and lower
signal-to-noise ratios. Even though the average signal-to-noise values differ greatly,
the implied estimation of noise does not vary that much as can be seern in Table C.3.
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Table C.2: Additional Estimations of Noise
Forecast Eqn: Apr-May Forecast Eqn: Sep-Oct
β̂ γ̂ σ̂ξ σ̂e φ̂ β̂ γ̂ σ̂ξ σ̂e φ̂




(0.11) (0.11) (0.48) (0.09) (0.09) (0.38)




(0.24) (0.24) (0.35) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)




(0.12) (0.11) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.25)




(0.13) (0.13) (0.24) (0.12) (0.12) (0.22)




(0.15) (0.15) (0.3) (0.14) (0.14) (0.27)




(0.17) (0.17) (0.33) (0.14) (0.14) (0.27)




(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14)




(0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.09) (0.09) (0.21)




(0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15)




(0.12) (0.13) (0.39) (0.19) (0.19) (0.59)




(0.14) (0.14) (0.62) (0.1) (0.1) (0.47)
Av. 2.91 Av. 7.75
Notes: The parameters estimates are estimated posterior means with the posterior standard
deviations in parenthesis. All standard deviations estimates are in percentage terms.
Table C.3: Implied Quarterly Estimations of Noise using different data
φ̂ σ̂e




fypa and fyps 5.33 3.31
fyps and fyfa 19.36 1.74
Notes: The table shows the implied quarterly signal-to-noise ratios, φ̂ and quarterly noise,
σ̂e implied by different estimates of yearly data.
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C.5 Computing Welfare
The model has different value functions depending on the state, which is going to
be defined as ds = 1 when in defaulting state and ds = 0 when in continuing state.
The value functions of the economy are:
V (B, y, µ, ds) =
 V
g(B, y, µ) when ds = 0
V d(y) when ds = 1
so, we have two cases:
Vasym(B, y, µ, 0) = V
g
















The same way, we can define for the symmetric case:














We can also write the symmetric case in terms of asymmetric consumption:
• When ds = 1






[casymt+s (1)(1 + λ(y, 1))]
1−σ − 1
1− σ
• When ds = 0:
Vsym(B, y, 0) = V
g








So λ depends on all the states, including the defaulting states. We can then calculate
the λ’s of each state as:
λd(y, 1) =
(
(1− β)(1− σ)V dsym(y) + 1




λg(B, y, µ, 0) =
(
(1− β)(1− σ)V gsym(B, y) + 1




C.6 Alternative Default Model
The difference between the alternative model and the one presented in the main paper
is twofold. First, the current signal is about output in the next period, s = y′ + η and
second, both agents see current output when making its decisions in the current period,
but the government sees the signal in addition. The timeline of this model is presented in
Figure C.1, where it is made clear that the signal is revealed after foreign lenders price the
asset and before the government decides whether to default or not and the new amount of
assets.












Notes: FL = foreign lender. Gov = government. D = default, C = continuing. HH =
households.
The recursive formulation of the problem is as follows; when the government is in a
good state, it has to compare the options of continuing or defaulting.
V g(B, y, s) = max{V c(B, y, s), V d(y)}
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with V g(B, y, s), V c(B, y, s) and V d(y) the value functions of good state, continuing and
defaulting respectively. The continuing value function is:
V c(B, y, s) = maxB′{u(y +B − q(y,B′)B′) + βEy′,s′|y,sV g(B′, y′, s′)}
The defaulting value function is:
V d(y) = u(ydef ) + βEy′,s′|y[θV g(0, y′, s′) + (1− θ)V d(y′)]
And the default decision is:
d(B, y, s) =
 1 if V
d(y) > V c(B, y, s)
0 otherwise
The default probability calculated by foreign lender is:
δ(B′, y) = Ey′,s′|yd(B′, y′, s′)
All the variables are defined the same way as the main model. Finally, the distribution
functions used by each agents are:
• For the Government: f(y′, s′|y, s), which translate into
f(y′, s′|y, s) ∝ f(s′|y′)f(y′|y, s)
Where can be shown that:
f(s′|y′) ∼ N(ρy′, σ2η + σ2ε )




















• For Foreign Lenders: f(y′, s′|y), which translate into
f(y′, s′|y) ∝ f(s′|y′)f(y′|y)
Where can be shown that:
f(s′|y′) ∼ N(ρy′, σ2e + σ2ε )
f(y′|y) ∼ N(ρy, σ2ε )
C.7 Equalizing Level of Asymmetry between
Main and Alternative Models
For a sensible comparison between models, the asymmetry in each of them has to be
comparable by some measure. Both models have an asymmetry, because the information set
of the government has an additional variable than the information set from foreign lenders
when making their decisions. Because of this additional variable, the government can make
a better forecast of the future exogenous states, which affects the way it behaves.
The main model has the asymmetry in the information used to calculate current out-
put. The government and foreign lenders’ probability functions when they calculate the
expectation of being in different states tomorrow can be written as:
f(y′, y, s′|y, y−1, s) ∝ f(s′|y′)f(y′|y)f(y|y)
f(y′, y, s′|y−1, s) ∝ f(s′|y′)f(y′|y)f(y|y−1, s)
So, the only difference is that when calculating the probability of current output, the
government has a degenerate distribution and foreign lenders do not. This imply that
foreign lenders face a positive variance in their estimation while the government does not.
The alternative model has the asymmetry in the information set used to calculate future
output. The government and foreign lenders’ probability functions when they calculate the
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expectation of arriving in different states tomorrow can be written as:
f(y′, s′|y, s) ∝ f(s′|y′)f(y′|y, s)
f(y′, s′|y) ∝ f(s′|y′)f(y′|y)
So, the only difference is that when calculating the probability of future output, the gov-
ernment has the signal in addition to current output while foreign lenders only have current
output. This again implies that foreign lenders face a higher variance in their calculations.
Given the model exogenous processes of the affected variable, the difference in the
variance between the agents is:




















To make the asymmetry comparable under some measure, we can then equalize these
two, which imply a relation between the noise in the alternative model and the one of the
main model:
σ2η =
σ4ε
σ2e
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